Looking at the strengthened Malaysia-India ties solely through the ‘China lens’ does not give enough credit to the conscious maturing of bilateral relations
Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s maiden state visit to India earlier this week was nothing less than historic. This was the first time in six years that a Malaysian Prime Minister has made a trip to India and PM Anwar’s trip can be seen as the culmination of the reset in ties with India since the brief diplomatic row in 2019. In the last few years, relations have been on an upward trajectory with a flurry of diplomatic visits from high-level ministers from India and vice-versa. Malaysia’s former Foreign Minister travelled to India for the Joint Commission Meeting at the end of last year while most recently, Indian External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar visited Malaysia right before the 18th Lok Sabha elections.
The key objectives and provisions of the CSP are yet to be laid out and finalised, but the very fact that there now exists such a high-level partnership between Malaysia and India is crucial optics on the significance of the relationship to the region.
The Anwar-Modi summit witnessed the elevation of ties from Enhanced Strategic Partnership (ESP) to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP), marking a new era. This comes just before the ESP turns 10 years old next year. The upgrading of ties to CSP addresses concerns that the foundations of bilateral cooperation do not reflect or acknowledge current geopolitical realities. Granted, the key objectives and provisions of the CSP are yet to be laid out and finalised, but the very fact that there now exists such a high-level partnership between Malaysia and India is crucial optics on the significance of the relationship to the region. India is now one of the four countries to have a CSP with Malaysia after China, Australia, and Japan.
Because of the complex state of geopolitics today, these positive developments in Malaysia-India ties are no longer just seen within the confines of the bilateral relationship. With China’s assertiveness and influence in the region at a time of entrenched US-China rivalry, Malaysia’s enhanced ties with India—Beijing’s strategic competitor and Washington’s close partner in the last few years—is observed solely through the ‘China lens’. This is, unfortunately, a predicament Southeast Asian countries have faced in recent years. All strategic relationships are seen either as a product of, by, or for China and this is severely reductionist and undermines the agency that these countries hope to exercise.
To be sure, stronger Malaysia-India ties are not about China. To think that they are is naïve and ignorant of the trajectory of Putrajaya-New Delhi relations and how Putrajaya manages its relations with Beijing. For starters, Malaysia has always had a positive relationship with China, most recently exhibited during Chinese Premier Li Qiang’s visit to Malaysia on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations. In fact, relations have always been amicable and most importantly, functional, despite the South China Sea dispute. Putrajaya’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ when dealing with Beijing on these issues has steadily worked, pointing to Malaysia’s inherent ability to compartmentalise different aspects of its relations with China.
Malaysia has always had a positive relationship with China, most recently exhibited during Chinese Premier Li Qiang’s visit to Malaysia on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations.
Malaysia’s approach is, of course, vastly different from those of Vietnam and The Philippines—in which India has featured rather prominently in recent times. India has enhanced its military and diplomatic engagement with both countries, and it is likely that India will further expand its presence in the South China Sea, continuing to invite ire from China. While it remains to be seen how India envisions its long-term role in the South China Sea, considering its own strategic context, Malaysia will not look to garner support from third parties for its claims—even if the third party, here, is a ‘comprehensive strategic partner’. Thus, Malaysia-India relations in that sense, will be independent and divorced from any developments in the South China Sea, despite being on the same page on China’s sweeping territorial claims.
Looking at the strengthened Malaysia-India ties solely through the ‘China lens’ does not give enough credit or currency to the conscious maturing of bilateral relations after the impasse five years ago. Since then, both countries have worked to incrementally enhance cooperation and build interdependence, staying away from irritants in the relationship—with the scope to revisit them later. Launching a CSP now is therefore an immense win for ties, a potent success for Malaysia’s foreign policy and a significant milestone for India’s Act East Policy in its 10th anniversary this year.
During his special lecture at Sapru House in the Indian Council of World Affairs, PM Anwar while speaking about Malaysia’s intentions to join the BRICS+ grouping, stressed that “India’s distinct and influential role within BRICS is of particular importance, as we recognise that our strong bilateral ties will add significant value to the dynamics of the grouping”. This in itself is a compelling indicator of the value Malaysia holds to its relationship with India, more so within cooperative frameworks and one which is increasingly viewed as a ‘Chinese-led regional bloc’. To Malaysia, India’s presence in BRICS+ brings balance to the grouping, helping shed the perception that it is ‘anti-West’ or solely China- and Russia-driven. With PM Modi endorsing Malaysia’s bid to join the group, it is clear that the strength of bilateral ties will also feature in regional dynamics, going beyond the simplistic US-China or even, India-China ‘binary trap’.
To Malaysia, India’s presence in BRICS+ brings balance to the grouping, helping shed the perception that it is ‘anti-West’ or solely China- and Russia-driven.
And this is perhaps the most important point. While often troubled by US-China rivalry, Southeast Asian countries do not, for the most part, allow themselves to be mired by the complex India-China equation. A luxury, of course, that South Asian countries cannot afford. For observers and analysts to force the ‘China factor’ in all things related to Southeast Asian countries’ relationship with India is, to say the least, reckless and oblivious to the unique and intricate nature of these ties. In fact, these analyses also undermine India’s agency to nurture its bilateral and multilateral relations independent of its dynamics with China.
For Malaysia, stronger bilateral ties with India are just that—no subtext. It serves the long-standing, multifaceted, and unique relationship in the best way possible. Making significant developments in bilateral relations all about China or about the US-China competition rejects the reality that Malaysia and India are acting based on the value attached to ties, and this is severely problematic. Moving forward, policymakers in both countries must ensure that the CSP is a truly holistic and enduring document that shapes and prepares relations for geopolitical uncertainties already in motion. Any lack of momentum hereafter will only be counter-productive and perpetuate reductionist narratives.
This article was first published in ORF online, 4 September 2024
