Bloc should call out junta’s ‘waiting game’, start engaging with other stakeholders
A major challenge for Malaysia as chair of ASEAN in 2025 is the regional organisation’s response to the civil conflict in Myanmar. Since February 2021, there have been 5,350 confirmed civilian deaths and just under three million internally displaced, while ASEAN is crippled with indecision and division.
How Malaysia manages this will be one of the deciding factors judging our success as chair. Unfair certainly, but likely. The following are three approaches policymakers should keep in mind, as they address this most difficult and wicked challenge in the region.
First, Malaysia must push ASEAN to start engaging other stakeholders in Myanmar. For too long, ASEAN has only engaged the ruling junta, with little to show for it. Meanwhile, other stakeholders have not only gotten more organised but have also made substantial gains in terms of de facto control on the ground.
Threats by the junta to withdraw from ASEAN have contributed to the hesitation by some member states but Malaysia should call this bluff. The State of Southeast Asia 2024 survey conducted by Singapore’s Yusof Ishak Institute, which polls Southeast Asians in the policy sphere, indicates that the highest percentage of respondents (38.6) favoured independent engagements with all key stakeholders followed by more punitive measures to increase the cost of non-compliance to the Five-Point Consensus.
These other stakeholders should not be limited to the National Unity Government, as there are many credible political parties and civil society organisations. A good number are led by a younger generation of Myanmar citizens of all ethnicities and religions, many of whom recognise the failure of prior nation-building, and are seeking a more inclusive, democratic approach.
If ASEAN proves to be lethargic, or even recalcitrant, then Malaysia and like-minded member states should push ahead with this on a mini-lateral basis. Engagement can happen on multiple, separate tracks, with both the junta and these other groups.
Second, Malaysia should stop believing the fallacy that bringing the junta back into the highest levels of ASEAN meetings would somehow lead to an improvement of peace, humanitarian or political realities on the ground. On the contrary, it would only validate the belief among junta hardliners that all they must do is to wait ASEAN out.
ASEAN’s decision to deliberately exclude representatives from the junta at the foreign ministers’ and leaders’ level, limiting it to only a non-political representative, was a rare moment of the bloc sending a signal to a member state that its behaviour was completely unacceptable and not without consequences.
That said, Malaysia and ASEAN must still engage with the junta. While the Tatmadaw have suffered a series of setbacks, they still control large swathes of the country, monopolise heavy weapon systems and are recognised by their immediate neighbours and key ASEAN dialogue partners. Readiness to engage with them, however, should not come at the expense of ASEAN’s reputation and credibility.
Third, Malaysia should take the step next year to strengthen the office and position of the ASEAN special envoy. This can be part of the remit of our appointed special envoy, besides attempting political or humanitarian breakthroughs. A more permanent special envoy set-up was the original intent when it was proposed in 2021, before disagreements among several ASEAN members saw it become a rotational set-up, where in truth, each chair cannot wait to hand over the role to the next member in line.
Having a permanent special envoy, or even a team, with an empowered, institutionalised office, and an expanded mandate, will allow ASEAN to engage all sides of the conflict in a more structured and coherent manner. It would also be a nodal point for ASEAN dialogue partners and other international actors to engage. This effort will certainly be less glamorous and more difficult, but it will be one of the most meaningful things Malaysia can work towards.
All three are by no means easy endeavours nor is there any short-term solution. Such are the realities that Malaysia must contend with. The ineptness and inflexibility of the Tatmadaw leadership ensured that the civil conflict is a long-term problem. But its long-term solutions, however, require foundational steps taken today to prepare for multiple outcomes.
Despite ASEAN’s stickler for consensus-based decisions, there is space for Malaysia to leverage on its position as rotational chair and push on matters deemed as critical. Whether we want to go the distance, and whether we have enough diplomatic and political capital, are questions that only the prime minister and foreign minister can answer.
Pragmatism has always been strength of Malaysia’s foreign policy engagements, but it would be a mistake to confuse pragmatism for concessions that enable a junta that has no interest in meeting ASEAN halfway nor live up to the spirit of the ASEAN Charter.
This article was also published as “Malaysia should call Myanmar’s bluff” in New Straits Times on 26 September 2024.
