Bloc confronting challenges like Myanmar, South China Sea and failure of centrality
In recent years, Southeast Asia has grappled with unprecedented challenges that have strained the unity and effectiveness of ASEAN. Heightened geopolitical tensions, persistent divisions over the Myanmar crisis and slow progress on a binding Code of Conduct for the South China Sea have exposed the bloc’s limitations in navigating complex regional dynamics.
Against this backdrop, Malaysia’s turn at the helm of ASEAN arrives at a pivotal moment. Issues of trust, cohesion and relevance are central to ASEAN’s current challenges. As a founding member of the bloc, Malaysia’s turn as chair has been highly anticipated to forge greater unity while steering the bloc against the pressures of great-power rivalry, which is likely further complicated with the second Trump administration.
How Malaysia manages this role will set the momentum for the next two chairs in 2026 and 2027: the Philippines and Singapore, both also founding members of ASEAN. Malaysia’s leadership will be critical in establishing a strong foundation for successive chairs to bolster cohesion and relevance at a time of great upheaval.
In this vein, Malaysia has unveiled the theme of its chairmanship as “Inclusivity and Sustainability, which reflects Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim’s philosophy of nationhood – Madani – calling for a just and inclusive society.
In the domestic context, it envisions the bold intent to elevate Malaysia’s standing as a prosperous nation and provide a voice of moral clarity. Madani places good governance and people-led growth at the heart of its philosophy and is guided by a values-based approach through the six core values of sustainability, prosperity, innovation, respect, trust and compassion.
Amplifying it to the regional context, Anwar envisions Madani as a guiding force for ASEAN, aiming to restore its global standing and enhance effective governance to ensure the bloc’s “sustainability”. The emphasis on “inclusivity” is also crucial, given the current divisions that risk alienating member states and undermining confidence in ASEAN. The principles of respect, trust and compassion are sorely needed to rebuild a cohesive and unified region.
The ASEAN 2025 logo visually reflects this ethos, as the inward-curving petals of the bunga raya symbolise a call for member states (and dialogue partners) to turn inwards towards regionalism, unity and, above all, to uphold ASEAN centrality.
Engaging with Myanmar
At the top of Malaysia’s agenda is confronting the issue of Myanmar, which continues to undermine the bloc’s credibility. Four years since the coup, the Five Point Consensus (5PC) has made limited progress. The bloc has struggled to deescalate the situation while fighting in Myanmar worsens at an alarming rate.
Despite committing to the 5PC in April 2021, the junta has shown no willingness to end the violence. Its leader, Min Aung Hlaing, regards the 5PC as a “constructive suggestion” rather than a binding commitment, further hindering progress. Meanwhile, the junta has restricted the delivery of humanitarian assistance to millions of displaced people, citing concerns over aid reaching rebel groups.
This prompted ASEAN’s decision to allow only a non-political representative from Myanmar at high-level meetings until the 5PC is implemented fully. Myanmar’s absence from ASEAN meetings became a point of contention, highlighting the frustrations with the junta’s non-compliance and prompting some member states to suggest suspending its ASEAN membership.
But Myanmar’s re-entry at the 57th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting and again at last year’s ASEAN Summit – both times represented by Aung Kyaw Moe, the permanent secretary at the Myanmar Foreign Ministry – marked a potential turning point. While not indicative of full compliance, it suggests the junta may be open to dialogue and compromise amid reports that the rebels are gaining ground. For ASEAN, Myanmar’s engagement offers hope for progress driven by ASEAN centrality.
Despite criticism of its failure, Malaysia remains firmly committed to the 5PC as the fundamental framework for peace. As such, Malaysia is unlikely to offer a fresh approach and instead will double down on 5PC, leveraging on Myanmar’s re-engagement to push for tangible outcomes.
Putrajaya might also consider enhancing Myanmar’s participation in the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM). The junta is more likely to be interested in security cooperation and defence-related issues, which align more closely with its interests than diplomatic forums like the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting or East Asia Summit. This approach offers a pragmatic entry point to rebuild trust and encourage Myanmar’s broader participation in ASEAN mechanisms, while keeping pressure on adhering to 5PC.
While the political deadlock will continue to challenge ASEAN’s cohesion, as chair Malaysia will prioritise the humanitarian crisis, putting a people-centred focus to tackle the Myanmar question. Human rights is an issue close to Anwar’s heart and with regard to Myanmar, he has expressed that “non-interference is not a licence for indifference”.
As such, Malaysia will aim to push beyond rhetoric and focus on ways to deliver on concrete actions. There will be greater emphasis on Point 4 of 5PC on ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid to displaced, vulnerable and at-risk populations. This may entail engaging with all relevant stakeholders, including ethnic armed groups, to foster an inclusive approach.
Sudden breakthroughs for the Myanmar crisis are unlikely. However, Laos’ chairmanship in 2024 marked a significant step forward by drawing in Myanmar’s re-engagement with the bloc after a four-year hiatus. This progress offers Malaysia a critical opportunity to continue the momentum, encourage engagement and build trust among all stakeholders. By prioritising concrete action on humanitarian assistance, Malaysia could fostering meaningful progress on addressing the Myanmar crisis.
Maintaining stability in disputed waters
Another key priority for the 2025 ASEAN chair is the South China Sea. As a claimant state in the territorial dispute, Malaysia is expected to make progress in securing stability in the contested waters. This points towards the much anticipated conclusion of a Code of Conduct (COC), which the ASEAN Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn says is expected in 2025.
This is not likely.
The COC negotiations have been progressing at a snail’s pace since 2002 and missed the its target of completion by 2021 due to the pandemic. The growing urgency for a diplomatic resolution has prompted all parties to agree that a conclusion should be finalised in the next few years but the increasingly delicate situation makes this improbable.
Clashes between the Philippines and China in the disputed waters, especially since 2023, are troubling. Beijing is doubling down on grey zone tactics. The China Coast Guard’s use of water cannon and military grade lasers against Philippine vessels indicate aggressive behaviour that undermine the stability and security of the South China Sea. This has not only raised tensions between the two countries but also contributed to an atmosphere of distrust within ASEAN as its leaders have been slow in providing a united response.
The challenges to achieving a COC are multifaceted. ASEAN’s consensus-driven approach has constrained the bloc from attaining an effective and impactful resolution, while non-claimant states with close ties to China are reluctant to publicly criticise Beijing’s actions. China also presents a significant challenge. China may continue to posture itself as cooperative and call for political will in finding a quick conclusion to COC but it will not endorse a code that rules the nine-dash line as illegitimate, which Beijing views as conceding sovereignty.
However, for any Code of Conduct to be meaningful and impactful, the nine-dash line must be addressed. If the code tiptoes around the issue of territory and sovereignty, it would essentially be useless. Hence, while a conclusion of the COC will demonstrate unity and consensus, it may be a weak one consensus, and it still is not likely be achieved in 2025.
Despite the bleak outlook, the longstanding trust between Malaysia and China, highlighted by the commemoration of its 50th anniversary of bilateral relations last year, underscores the unique role Malaysia can play. Malaysia was the first ASEAN country to normalise relations with China during a time of geopolitical strife and ideological divide, and it also facilitated China’s integration into ASEAN processes, specifically when it invited China to be an observer at the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 1991. This subsequently paved the way for China to be accorded dialogue partner status in 1996. This partnership has evolved into one of mutual respect and trust and enables space for constructive engagement.
As the ASEAN-China dialogue coordinator for 2024-2027, Malaysia is uniquely positioned to leverage on this relationship to foster stability in the South China Sea. The Malaysian government’s approach to sensitive issues, especially pertaining to the South China Sea, is to be discussed with discretion behind closed doors to prevent the issue from being overly politicised and inadvertently heightening tensions. This approach is appreciated by Beijing, which is more inclined to cooperate under such conditions. Hence, Malaysia in its time as ASEAN chair will likely encourage this discreet approach to foster constructive dialogue and maintain stability in the disputed waters. The goal of the 2025 chairmanship will be to manage existing hostilities and prevent the situation from escalating further.
Steering leadership transition
While Myanmar and the South China Sea will surely feature prominently in Malaysia’s agenda, its role is not to solve these disputes. Regardless of Malaysia’s effort, it is ASEAN’s collective ability to move beyond a shallow consensus that is critical. The prospects are not promising, especially given the recent changes in leadership across Southeast Asia.
Whether because of elections or other reasons, the leadership of nearly all ASEAN states have been reshuffled in the past four years. Singapore’s Lawrence Wong, Thailand’s Paetongtarn Shinawatra, Indonesia’s Prabowo Subianto and Vietnam’s To Lam took office last year, while Malaysia’s Anwar, the Philippines’ Ferdinand Marcos Jr, and Laos’ Sonexay Siphandone assumed their roles since 2022. Cambodia saw a historic leadership change in 2023 when Hun Manet took over from his father, who reigned for 38 years. In 2021, Vietnam also welcomed a new prime minister, Pham Minh Chinh, while Myanmar saw a military council, led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, seize power in a coup.
This makes Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah the most senior statesman in ASEAN, but Brunei’s limited capacity constrains it from demonstrating the leadership necessary to overhaul ASEAN. Following second would be Myanmar’s coup leader Min Aung Hlaing and Vietnam’s Pham Minh Chinh, neither of whom are particularly popular within the bloc. Hence, high hopes are placed on Anwar and Malaysia.
But these hopes may be misplaced.
ASEAN is not in need of one singular leader. Instead, it needs collective leadership that can work together and forge a strong consensus. Yet, the dynamics of ASEAN today makes that unlikely. Gone are the days when Suharto would make a phone call to other ASEAN leaders like Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad or Lee Kuan Yew, with whom he had close working relationships, during moments of crisis to seek a swift resolution. Today, we are dealing with an ASEAN that has a new, though not necessarily refreshed, dynamic.
This new array of regional leaders has not had sufficient time to familiarise themselves and develop the same working relationship enjoyed by their predecessors. In their early terms, domestic concerns will take precedent over regional issues to ensure political stability at home, while maintaining a hardline stance on sensitive issues like the South China Sea.
ASEAN’s past has shown that personal diplomacy can play a key role in multilateral processes. Since taking office, Anwar has gone to great lengths to cultivate relationships with all regional leaders with the aim of reinvigorating the ASEAN spirit and improve its cohesion. This effort needs to be reciprocated across the region and will take time. Hence, despite Malaysia’s best efforts, expectations of a strengthened consensus are premature – let alone hope of any breakthrough. For ASEAN to succeed, it must address its internal divisions and demonstrate a genuine commitment to unity.
Reviewing legacies
Flashpoints aside, historically, the Malaysian chairmanships of ASEAN have marked significant milestones, such as the setting up of ASEAN Plus Three in 1997, establishment of the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005 and unveiling of the 2025 ASEAN Community Vision in 2015. Given this legacy, policymakers and observers naturally expect Malaysia’s upcoming turn as chair to introduce a forward-looking, landmark initiative that reflects the evolving challenges and aspirations of the region.
Equally important is the need to revitalise existing mechanisms to sustain ASEAN’s vitality. In his speech at the 36th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Anwar noted that geopolitical developments have “overshadowed some regional mechanisms and multilateral frameworks, calling into question their resilience, readiness, even relevance, to upholding peace, prosperity and security in the Asia-Pacific.”
The decline of platforms like EAS, for example, underscores this concern. Its failure to produce a Leaders’ Statement last year (after Russia and China allegedly blocked a subclause on the South China Sea) reflects the erosion of EAS as a key forum for dialogue and cooperation as well as demonstrating how major-power rivalry is effectively undermining ASEAN centrality.
Further, the platform’s diminishing convening power contradicts its claim to be the premier leaders-led forum, as leaders, such as Presidents Joe Biden, Xi Jinping or Valdimir Putin frequently skip gatherings while prioritising other forums like Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) or G20 summits.
Similarly, the ASEAN Plus Three, once a cornerstone of regional cooperation that drew China, Japan and Korea to set aside their historical tensions in favour of building an East Asian community, no longer represents a major mechanism in ASEAN. Geopolitical tensions between the Plus Three members have complicated cooperation, while divergent priorities and agendas have prompted them to strengthen bilateral connection with ASEAN, sidelining the Plus Three mechanism.
This was particularly evident during the pandemic, when China, Japan and South Korea provided assistance to and supported ASEAN member states bilaterally or through ASEAN Plus One mechanisms instead of utilising the ASEAN Plus Three as a platform. At best, the Plus Three reallocated US$1 million from the ASEAN Plus One Cooperation Fund to the Covid-19 ASEAN Response Fund. The diminishing visibility and relevance of APT reveals a drift from its aspirations of a cohesive East Asian community, which will only become more fragmented if not revitalised.
In upholding this year’s theme of “sustainability”, Malaysia should look into revitalising these mechanisms to ensure their continued relevance in addressing regional challenges. This would not only reinforce the legacy of past Malaysian chairmanships but also reaffirm ASEAN centrality in navigating geopolitical complexities.
Diversifying diplomatic relations
Looking ahead, Malaysia will likely launch signature initiatives in 2025. The government is expected to unveil the ASEAN Community Vision 2045, which conceives a resilient, innovative, dynamic and people-centred region.
Additionally, under Malaysia’s stewardship, ASEAN may expand its cooperation with other global mechanisms. Since Anwar took office, a key component of Malaysia’s foreign policy has focused on expanding cooperation with the Global South. Beyond Southeast Asia, the prime minister has been strengthening ties with countries in the Middle East and Central Asia. This may lead Anwar to prompt ASEAN to “look west” and enhance its engagement with these regions.
This wouldn’t be new to ASEAN, as the bloc has been in contact with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) since the 1990s and held several ministerial meetings. This culminated in the first ASEAN-GCC summit in October 2023, marking both regions’ intentions to develop their partnership and intensify cooperation, particularly on the economic front. The development of ASEAN-GCC relations in recent years echoes the emerging trends of Global South cooperation, which aims to diversify diplomatic relations while focusing on enhanced economic development.
Malaysia is set to host the second ASEAN-GCC summit this year and has extended an invitation to President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang but whether the Chinese leaders will attend remains to be seen. Anwar noted in a speech at the 7th China International Import Export (CIIE) in Shanghai that the prospective ASEAN-GCC-China summit “will be a great consequence to the trajectory of regional growth and will make a significant contribution to moving the needle on greater global parity in economic advancement”.
The details and rationale behind this trilateral have been scant and there is no obvious link between China and the ASEAN-GCC relationship. One can only speculate this as an effort to geostrategically link the boundaries of China, Southeast Asia and the Gulf –akin to the geopolitical reimagining of the Indo-Pacific – while placing economic cooperation at the centre.
In time, perhaps this could also incorporate Central Asia and possibly South Asia into the fold. Anwar and other ASEAN leaders are motivated by economic cooperation that could deliver greater prosperity for their countries, and this trilateral could be the novel idea needed to achieve that objective. Irrespective of Anwar’s intentions, Malaysia has a historical habit of bridging China into mechanisms supporting South-South cooperation, such as with ASEAN back in the late 1990s.
Other efforts in relation to the Global South might also extend to BRICS, a grouping of emerging economies formed in 2009 to enhance economic cooperation and advocate for reform in global financial institutions. Malaysia, alongside Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam and nine other nations, were recently named BRICS “partner countries”, highlighting the growing influence of the grouping as a major platform for Global South cooperation.
The aim of these four ASEAN countries partnering with BRICS is to deepen economic cooperation and participate more actively in multilateralism, while having alternatives to the US-China rivalry that ensure their ability to maintain non-alignment. While BRICS is primarily an economic platform, some ASEAN leaders believe that membership or cooperation with the bloc could lead to strategic partnerships and diversify their international relations.
Of course, this is not an exhaustive of all the initiatives that will take place under Malaysia’s time at the helm of ASEAN. Timor-Leste’s accession to full membership, for instance, will mark a historic milestone for ASEAN. Malaysia’s chairmanship will aim to prepare Timor-Leste for integration through focusing on strengthening institutional frameworks and enhancing economic preparedness. The anticipated signing of the Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) may be another milestone for ASEAN, as it will promote intra-regional digital trade, enhance interoperability and create a safe online environment.
The expectations for the Malaysian chairmanship are high but the burden shouldn’t be left to Malaysia alone. It is important to temper expectations with an understanding of what can realistically be achieved in a single year, given the complex regional environment. Indonesia’s 2023 chairmanship, for example, carried similar lofty expectations but despite significant strides made, its efforts did not deliver fully. Malaysia’s approach, therefore, should focus on fostering regional integration, improving cohesion and promoting inclusivity. This will lay the groundwork for successive chairs to push for progress and reinforce ASEAN centrality.
This article first appeared in The Diplomat on 1 January 2025
