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“Enhancing Maritime Security”

***Thunder Out of Asia: Reflections on an
Increasingly Problematic Maritime Environment***

by

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[The views presented in this paper are those of the author only and do not represent the official policy of Canada's Department of National Defence.]

These are worrisome times in Asian waters. The maritime environment has become increasingly brittle and dangerous: an historic assemblage of warships has failed to bring piratic depredations to an end off the Horn of Africa; Tokyo has grown alarmed by the activities of the largest task force that the Chinese Navy - the PLAN – has sent to sea; Seoul is contemplating a course of action after it has become clear that a North Korean submarine sank a Republic of Korea Navy corvette; and an expert consensus has begun to emerge that a naval arms race is underway in the Indo Pacific region.

Ironically, it was less than a year ago that the Chinese retailed the concept of “Harmonious Seas” at the 60th anniversary of the PLAN in Qingdao. Now, with the Chinese Navy making the transition from Green Water to Blue Water operations, there is a growing level of regional wariness and scepticism about Chinese sincerity and intentions. This fact is borne out by the evolution of a collective posture on the part of the member states of ASEAN over and against China in the South China Sea. China’s recent hard-edged foreign policy in maritime Southeast Asia, not to mention the steady allocation of naval assets to China’s Southern fleet, centered on Hainan, have cast China’s peaceful rise in an entirely new light. This paper reviews these developments in the Indo Pacific maritime realm and analyzes the nature of regional security concerns.

The piracy drama continues to play out in the Northwest Indian Ocean. Traditionally, Southeast Asian waters were ground zero for piracy, but early in this century that region was supplanted by piratic activity off the Horn of Africa. The seas off the northeastern corner of the continent witnessed the convergence of two powerful phenomena:

maritime traffic, as a hallmark of globalization, and illegal fishing as a hallmark of the new age of global scarcity. Despite the recent problems affecting the shipping industry, the Red Sea – Gulf of Aden Sea route, which connects the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, remains one of the world's great shipping lanes. Roughly 30,000 vessels per year ply that route next to the desperately poor, strife-ridden, largely ungoverned African political entities of Somalia, Puntland, and Somaliland. The fisher folk who live here, on Africa's longest coastline, have witnessed the steady erosion of their livelihood as foreign fishing craft vacuum up the sea. Thus, what appears to have started as an indigenous effort to discourage illegal fishing has been transformed into a highly lucrative piratic industry.

There is a certain *frisson* about piracy; a curiosity – and in some cases a grudging admiration – for the young Somalis, charged with the narcotic khat, and armed with AK-47s, who take down huge container ships hundreds of miles at sea. Romantic delusions, aside, this is a grim business and the pirates are not naifs. They mine the internet for shipping schedules, and, equipped with cell phones and GPS devices, they position themselves strategically astride major shipping routes.

Their activities raise a host of questions. How should navies and coast guards respond to Somali piracy when only a tiny fraction of the vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden, bound for the emporia of Europe or the oil fields of the Middle East, are attacked let alone captured?¹ Should commercial shippers re-route their vessels at great expense in time and money in an effort to avoid seizure? Alternatively, should they look at ransoms

for vessels and their crews as simply the price of doing business? Should they arm their crews in an effort to repel Somali boarding parties? And what of navies and governments? Is it the responsibility of the shippers or national navies to ensure the safe delivery of cargoes - the very life blood of the global economic system? Should navies attempt to retake vessels by force, as the Russians did recently, thereby imperilling the lives of hundreds of seamen held hostage ashore? Or should they try to prosecute pirates who fall into their hands? Certainly, recourse to the law has proven to be the glass jaw of the entire anti-piratic endeavour. Few, if any governments are prepared to bring pirates to book in national courts and when they do the evidence is seldom robust enough to withstand the rigours of the judicial process.²

Whatever the case, we are witnessing a truly historic assemblage of naval vessels off the Horn of Africa: warships from the European Union, from NATO nations, and from the American-led naval coalition, CTF 151. In addition, there are vessels from Russia, China, Singapore, Iran, Japan, South Korea, India, and Malaysia. Their presence telegraphs a vitally important message: this is a century of sea power. This eclectic armada highlights the critical necessity for interoperability, for standard operating procedures, and for information sharing as warships from around the world attempt to secure the ocean commons.³ The Somali experience underscores a truism: no one navy can sustain the constabulary burden at sea. Maritime cooperation is not an option, it is a necessity.

There is, of course, another question that needs to be asked. How long can, or should, anti-piracy patrols be sustained?⁴ There is a provocative answer to that question, namely that piracy is in almost everyone's best interest. Leaving aside the fact that combating piracy is the "right thing to do," piracy benefits nearly all of the players, save those who are taken hostage or those who suffer delays receiving their cargoes. How is this so? Well, the young pirates earn a living; their bosses ashore grow rich; their more distant backers (if we are to believe intelligence reports about the Russian mafia bankrolling and profiting from piratic activities) grow richer; insurance companies increase their premiums; shippers increase their freight rates; private security firms garner contracts; and navies, particularly those in the West, advance an impeccable *raison d'être* in the face of budget cuts and manpower shortages.

In another ocean - far from the Gulf of Aden - the Japanese are becoming (like the Indians) increasingly alarmed by the steady growth of the Chinese navy and its increasingly ambitious scope of operations.⁵ Beijing has argued that it is merely protecting its Sea Lanes of Communication, SLOCs that have become vital to the wellbeing of China's export driven economy. Of course, that economy is not dedicated solely to the outbound movement of goods by sea. An analysis of the Chinese economy suggests that the value added component of exports from China is probably not more than 35 percent; that is to say, China is critically dependent on components flowing into China to be assembled for export. Similarly, the safe and untrammelled flow of energy into China is absolutely critical. While Beijing has moved resolutely over the past decade to diversify China's energy sources and to ensure that a greater proportion of

the nation's energy imports come by land from Russia and Central Asia, the majority of China's energy still comes by sea. Maritime imports of this sort are seen to be highly vulnerable in the event of hostilities at sea. Thus, the Chinese argue quite rightly that it is only natural for them to employ their burgeoning navy to ensure the integrity of their maritime commerce.

There is, of course, another side to the story. Defence budgets in China have been rising significantly faster than the nation's GDP and more than one third of those budgets is being directed towards the navy.⁶ This is an ahistorical trend. Traditionally, Chinese security concerns related to the Asian interior and the embryonic navy of the 1950s and 1960s was predicated on Soviet models whereby the navy was seen as a coastal and riverine force dedicated to providing flanking protection for army operations ashore. In the 1970s and 1980s China began to abandon this legacy and to look toward the sea to the extent that the navy could protect China from seaborne assaults and, more especially, enable China to exert its authority over Taiwan.

During this era China became increasingly Mahanian in outlook. Mahan, the late nineteenth century American theorist of sea power, argued seductively that great nations had great navies and the relentless growth of Chinese naval power over the past two decades attests to Beijing's commitment to his precepts. Mahanian ambitions are very much in keeping with China's sense of new found national pride and identity not to mention Beijing's receptivity to victimization arguments. In a word, a major, ocean-going navy will demonstrate to the world, as America's Great White Fleet did a century

ago, that China has arrived and will no longer permit herself to be humiliated as she was throughout the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century.

The PLAN has cleaved to a three-stage plan, one which is predicted on the slow and steady expansion of the areas in which the navy operates. Initially, the navy sought to operate close to the Asian shore while divesting itself of old-fashioned and obsolete craft. Its area of operations extended as far as the “First Island Chain”, that array of arcuate island systems linking Japan with the Philippines and beyond. With growing sophistication and more self assurance, the PLAN has moved toward the “Second Island Chain” which runs from Guam southward to Australia. Thus, equipped with a new and impressive array of frigates, destroyers, and submarines (including Jin-class ballistic missile boats and the Shang-class, nuclear, hunter-killer submarines), the PLAN has entered the transitional phase from Green to Blue Water operations.⁷

The Japanese have protested repeatedly to Beijing that Chinese naval vessels, hydrographic ships, and submarines have penetrated Japanese water space. While in some instances, the maritime boundaries involved may be subject to dispute or the precise activities of scientific vessels may be open to interpretation under the United Nations Convention Law of the Sea, there are an increasing number of clear cut Chinese infractions. Paradoxically, these infractions have occurred at the very time that the Chinese have been protesting the conduct of US hydrographic vessels, like the USNS *Impeccable*, operating within China’s exclusive economic zone as distinct from her territorial waters. Some Chinese pronouncements seem to suggest that the Chinese

feel that their territorial water rights apply equally to their EEZ and that if this mantra is repeated often enough international law will come to embrace this extension. Whatever the case, the harassment of the USNS *Impeccable*, regardless of the merits of the Chinese position, involved egregious errors in seamanship and could easily have endangered the Chinese naval and fisheries vessels involved.⁸

More recently the PLAN despatched ten warships, through the First Island Chain, into the western Pacific south of Japan. This was a naval deployment on an unprecedented scale and built on a similar “long range training exercise” of the sort conducted by the PLAN in March.⁹ These, of course, are absolutely natural and legitimate undertakings for a navy with global ambitions. However, the psychological impact of the deployment, with all of the signals that it embodied, was something else altogether. Curiously, at a time when Washington-Tokyo relations are strained over US military facilities on Okinawa, the Chinese did the Japanese a favour. Similarly, the Chinese declaration that China intended to move beyond the revitalization of the ex-Soviet carrier *Varyag* to build a number of indigenous aircraft carriers over the next decade crossed a psychological red line in the Indo Pacific and strengthened the hand of congressional hawks in Washington. They have been arguing, for quite some time, that China would be seduced into using its navy for the long-range projection of hard power.

Hard power is at the heart of the dilemma facing the Lee Myung-Bak government in Seoul. In late March a ROK Navy corvette, the *Cheonan*, was torn apart by a violent explosion. Forty-six crewmen died.¹⁰ At first, it was speculated that the vessel, operating

near the Northern Limit Line, the de facto maritime boundary between North and South Korea in the sea to the west of the peninsula, may have struck a mine left over from the Korean War or might have suffered some internal machinery failure that detonated ammunition stores on board. Shortly thereafter, the ROK Navy, aided by American experts, undertook a detailed forensic examination of the site, trawling the seabed for incriminating evidence. This was soon forthcoming and included the after section of a North Korean torpedo, complete with its twin propellers. Detailed metallurgical analyses as well as an analysis of trace explosive elements revealed beyond doubt that the *Cheonan's* keel had been broken by a torpedo whose 250 kilogram explosive head detonated about six meters below the surface and just off the center line of the corvette. Indeed, structural recreations show how the warships hull was bent asymmetrically in cross section by the off-centred blast.¹¹

These increasingly incontrovertible finds constitute a grave challenge for Seoul. It should be said, in the first instance, that the South Korean government has played its hand adeptly, being slow to point fingers until the forensic study was not only completed but upheld by an international investigative team including British, Australian, Canadian and Swedish experts. But now the fact remains, that forty-six South Korean servicemen have died as a result of an outright act of war. What then is Lee Myung-Bak to do? Fortunately, the egregious nature of the attack deflected initial criticism that somehow the government was responsible for allowing the attack to occur in the first place. Clearly, the attack cannot be allowed to go unanswered, particularly as this is the latest in a long catalogue of incidents at sea to the west of the peninsula. North and South

Korean naval vessels have exchanged fire repeatedly over the past decade, not frequently with lethal results. However, there are remarkably few options open to the South Korean government unless it wants to court the prospect of a wholesale escalation of hostilities. Knowing this, Pyongyang has become increasingly emboldened.¹² There are always sanctions, but North Korea's primitive and reptilian economy is nearly impervious to sanctions, particularly when Kim Jong-il can count upon his Chinese patrons to keep the DPRK on life support. Ralph Cossa, extraordinarily seasoned observer of the Asia Pacific security scene, has argued that the United Nations Security Council should mandate that all North Korean submarines and torpedo boats be restricted to port henceforth (subject to periodic reviews) and that any such vessels found venturing to sea would be deemed legitimate targets for attack. It very much remains to be seen whether the UN, not the most responsive of international organizations, will act, and act in a timely fashion to restrain DPRK naval operations. And even if it does, the outright sinking of a warship constitutes an extremely serious threat to an already problematic maritime environment.¹³

Farther to the South, the South China Sea is the scene of growing maritime tensions. Marx would no doubt have smiled knowingly when the Chinese Communist Party, building on precedent advanced by their opponents, the Kuomintang, in 1935, enumerated China's claim to the vast majority of the South China Sea in February 1992. This was a superb piece of effrontery; a land and sea grab in the grand imperialistic tradition favoured by the Europeans in late nineteenth century Africa. Since 1992, the states in Southeast Asia, with competing maritime claims, have lived with this exercise

in *force majeure*, none of them having the temerity or the military wherewithal to challenge Beijing directly. For their part, the Chinese, at least in their own eyes, have been remarkably accommodating, allowing a wide range of discussions provided that no-one questions the basic premise – the South China Sea and all therein belongs to China. The Vietnamese, even before 1992, tried to uphold their claims and came away with a bloody nose. That was enough to *encourage les autres*, and a vast array of technical talks unfolded which were of value, in and of themselves, but did nothing to address the problem of the imposed status quo.¹⁴

More recently China's posture in the South China Sea has become more assertive and considerably less ambiguous. Whereas previously, the member states of ASEAN, with an interest in the South China Sea, had allowed themselves be picked off one by one in a series of bilateral negotiations with China, they have begun to take a united stand against China. In a four day meeting in Hanoi, ASEAN defence ministers agreed that all ten member states would patrol the South China Sea jointly in order to ensure the integrity of critical sea routes.¹⁵ This declaration was no doubt influenced by events in the South China Sea in March and early April. In the previous month China dispatched the 4600 tonne *Yuzheng 311*, the nation's largest fishery patrol vessel, to the Spratly Islands in response to allegations that Chinese fishermen had been harassed by the Vietnamese coastguard service. On 1 April the Vietnamese President, Nguyen Minh Triet, accompanied by two destroyers, visited Bach Long Vi, a disputed island located between Haiphong and Hainan Island, and declared that the island belonged to Vietnam.¹⁶

The Vietnamese had already begun to recalibrate their maritime defence posture to address new Chinese realities by ordering six Kilo-class attack submarines from Russia in 2009. The Chinese had the *chutzpah* to suggest that this acquisition was destabilizing, all the while ignoring the regional impact of their own fleet of sixty submarines. Indeed, the growth of submarine fleets has become an established feature of the Indo Pacific region with more and more navies, including the Malaysian, Singaporean, Indian, Iranian, Australian, and South Korean navies, adding or looking to add submarines to their fleets.¹⁷

These acquisitions have further reinforced arguments that a naval arms race is underway in the region. Reference has already been made to the Chinese aircraft carrier programme and the Indian Navy, having been bilked endlessly by the Russians, is about to take delivery of the refurbished carrier *Gorshkov*, and is embarking on its own carrier programme.¹⁸ Similarly, through on a lesser scale, the Japanese and the South Koreans have taken a page from the “through-deck-cruiser” playbook and built, in the Japanese case, a monster “destroyer” complete with a flight deck and an “island” for helicopter operations. It is still a very long way from a 13,700 ton LPH to a full blown Chinese or Indian-style carrier, but as the maritime environment deteriorates, arguments may very well be advanced in support of bigger vessels.

The same is true with mid-sized surface combatants. Some while ago it could have been argued that regional fleets were merely modernizing, but now there appears to be

a demonstrable emulative or action-reaction factor at work. The Republic of Singapore Navy is a case in point where missile-equipped gunboats have given to corvettes which gave way to Lafayette-class frigates, backed by submarines. The Australians, clearly anxious about the correlation of forces in East Asia, have embarked on their own highly ambitious naval acquisition programme, which, among other things, sees the Royal Australian Navy's submarine force doubling over the next two decades to twelve boats. Similarly, alarmed by the relentless growth and increasing sophistication of the PLAN, the Indian Navy has over forty warships on its order books.¹⁹

Perversely, the United States Navy is one of the few major navies in the region that is not growing, or, if it is, is growing very slowly.²⁰ What it has done, however, is to begin positioning more and more of its assets into the Pacific over and against the possibility of naval conflict in the region. For their part, the Chinese have sought to address the asymmetry between the PLAN and USN by embarking on an anti-access, sea denial strategy intended to keep the USN at or beyond the Second Island Chain. A critical element in this anti-access strategy is the much discussed ballistic anti-ship missile, a Dong Feng 21 variant which, where if to work, would track and destroy incoming American aircraft carriers. This missile is part of a revolution in missilery that enables ships to attack targets hundreds of miles inland while enabling littoral states to reach well out to sea to attack enemy warships.²¹

Where does this leave us? As we have seen, the growth, enhanced capability, and global ambitions of the Chinese navy have begun to alter the naval order in the Indo

Pacific region profoundly, much to the concern, not to say alarm, of the Indians, Japanese, Americans, and number of smaller navies. From Beijing's perspective, there is nothing unusual about the PLAN's activities. The Chinese can make reference to a long list of powers that have developed naval forces commensurate with their burgeoning political and economic power. However, in this instance, there is a good deal of uncertainty about China's end game. There is an old saying that crocodiles smile before they eat you and the region's growing scepticism about the sincerity of "peaceful rise" rhetoric is, if would seem, contributing to the build-up of regional navies and the appearance of loose groupings at sea that could have anti-Chinese intentions in the future.²²

Elsewhere, we have two profoundly different maritime threats in play: piracy off the Horn of Africa and a grave stand-off on the Korean peninsula. The former raises more questions than it answers. Nonetheless, it gives rise to some hope in the sense that it has encouraged an assortment of curious naval bedfellows to work together. One only wishes that that collective activity could be prolonged into a post piratic period. The latter, is in some ways the exact opposite of the former. Whereas, piracy is a terrestrial problem translated to sea, the *Cheonan* incident is a maritime problem translated ashore. If the international maritime community cannot allow piracy to go unaddressed, can it, then, allow a bald-faced act of war at sea off the Korean peninsula to go unaddressed. The stakes are, of course, dramatically different, but they demonstrate, yet again, that Asian seas may be the point of detonation for conflict in the Indo-Pacific region.

Notes

¹ Anon., “Former CTF-151 Commander Says Media Attention Dramatizes Somali Piracy,”

<http://www.defpro.com/news/details/11787/> (accessed December 8, 2009)

According to Rear-Admiral Terence McKnight, USN, Ret’d., the past commander of The Combined Task Force 151 for counter piracy operations, only 27 attacks were successful in 2009.

² McKnight, December 8, 2009.

The admiral noted that “Since there is no competent government in the area of operation the pirates have to be transferred to courts that will accept jurisdiction. This requires transportation, jailing for the pirates, the gathering and securing of evidence, security escorts for the pirates and witnesses to testify in the trials, and so on.”

Kenya has incarcerated and tried a number of pirates over the past eighteen months, but it was not until May 2010 that the first piracy trial commenced in Europe in Rotterdam. Office of the Asia Pacific Advisor, “World Naval Brief, May 26, 2010,” Maritime Forces Pacific, http://esquimalt.mil.ca/marpac/n00-5/Briefing_Products/Daily_Briefs/World_Naval_Brief/apnb100526.htm

³ Sourabh Gupta, “Japan-India Maritime Security Cooperation: Floating on Inflated Expectations,”

<http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/05/11/Japan-india-maritime-security-cooperation-floating-on-inflated-expectations/>

In a recent visit to New Delhi, the Japanese Defence Minister, Kitazawa, discussed anti-piracy cooperation with his counterpart.

⁴ James K. Sanborn, May 15, 2010, http://www.navytimes.com/news/2010/05/marine_pirate051510W/

In April 2010 Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, the Commander of the U.S. Naval Forces Europe, informed reporters at the Pentagon that “It is too expensive for U.S. warships to continue indefinitely patrolling for pirates in waters off the Horn of Africa.”

⁵ Kathrin Hille, “Fear Over China Moves in Pacific,” *Financial Times* (Asia Edition), May 26, 2010, p.6

Hille observed that there had been “complaints by Japan’s government in recent weeks over aggressive behaviour from a Chinese coastguard vessel in contested waters and a Chinese military helicopter in international waters.”

See also, Ishaan Thasoor, “India’s China Panic: Seeing a ‘Red Peril’ on Land and Sea,” *Time Magazine*, September 20, 2010

⁶ Mark Helprin, “Farewell to America’s China Station,” *Opinion*, May 17, 2010.

Helprin points out that between 1988 and 2007, there was a tenfold increase in per-capita GDP in China, but a 21-fold purchasing power parity increase in military expenditures.

See also Andrew Erickson detailed analysis of Chinese defence spending. “Chinese Defence Expenditures: Implications for Naval Modernization,” *China Brief*, vol. 10, Issue 8.

⁷ James Kraska, “China Set for Naval Hegemony,” *The Diplomat*, May 6, 2010.

Kraska speaks of “a well-coordinated campaign of legal, political and military pressure – and sometimes aggression – to gradually bring the littoral seas under Chinese domination.”

⁸ Michael Richardson, “Rise of Chinese Navy Changes the Balance.” *Straits Times*, May 10, 2010.

See also Kraska, May 6, 2010. Kraska writes that on “March 7 of 2009, Chinese maritime forces stalked the USNS *Impeccable* ocean surveillance ship. Working in tandem with an intelligence ship, an oceanographic ship and a fisheries enforcement vessel, two commercial cargo ships crossed the bow of *Impeccable*, stopping directly in front of the ship.”

⁹ Michael Auslin, “Asia’s Troublesome Waters: The U.S. Navy Will Have to Face New Challenges from China and North Korea with Fewer Resources,” *Wall Street Journal*, May 20, 2010.

The deployment included submarines, guided missile destroyers and corvettes. They passed “into waters off of Okinawa, then continued down to Japan’s southern-most islands, the Okinotori atoll...”

¹⁰ Jung Sung-Ki, “Speculation Rages Over Sinking of South Korean Warship,” *Defence News*, April 5, 2010, p. 4

¹¹ Anon., “South Korea Confirms RDX Found in Ship Wreckage,” *Bloomberg Businessweek*, May 10, 2010.

¹² Anon., “Anger at North Korea over ‘Sinking.’: <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2010/05/2010520142257571428.html>

Rather predictably, Pyongyang declared that the forensic investigation was a “sheer fabrication.”

¹³ Ralph Cossa, “Cheonan Incident: Choosing an Appropriate Response,” *PacNet #21*, April 30, 2010

¹⁴ Kraska, May 6, 2010.

Kraska, who has a legal background, refers to China “... pressing specious ‘territorial’ claims to virtually the entire South China Sea.” The Chinese now describe their claim as a “core” national interest akin to Tibet.

See also: Vivian L. Forbes and Mohd Nizam Basiron, "Unresolved Maritime Boundaries and Implications for Maritime Security in Southeast Asia," *MIMA Bulletin*, vol. 17, (I) 2010.

¹⁵ Greg Torode, "More Than a Game 'Chinese Build-up No Threat to ASEAN Countries: Experts'," *South China Morning Post*, April 20, 2010.

¹⁶ Anon., VNA news agency website, Hanoi (English), May 6, 2010.

The Vietnamese have traded barbs with the Chinese for decades over the status of islands in the South China Sea. Spokeswoman Nguyen Phuong Nga noted that Vietnam "has indisputable sovereignty over the Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Troung Sa (Spratly) archipelagos," the very island clusters that China claims indisputably.

¹⁷ Daniel Blumethal, "China's Grand Strategy," on ForeignPolicy.com: April 29, 2010.

¹⁸ Anon., "Russia's MIG Company Confirms Delivery of Naval Fighters to India," RIA Novosti, December 8, 2009. The carrier that was to have a cost about 850 million USD is now likely to cost \$2.5 billion and be delivered four years late.

¹⁹ Sudha Ramachandran, "India Steals a March on the High Seas," *Asia Times*, May 12, 2010.

India will induct 37 major warships over the next five to seven years.

²⁰ The professional literature is full of articles describing the irresistible decline of the USN and the equally irresistible rise of the PLAN. These are, in many ways, simplistic accounts, but indicative, nonetheless, of a prevalent mood in the international naval community.

See Ronald O'Rourke, "Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, Report 7-5700, May 3, 2010.

The total number of "battle force ships" in the USN reached 568 at the end of FY 1987. That number stood at 285 on September 30, 2009.

See also, Seth Cropsey, "The US Navy in Distress," *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 34, No.1, January 2010, pp.35-45.

²¹ See Kraska, May 6, 2010, and James A. Lyons, "Countering Beijing's New Weapon: Stealthy Zumwalt Destroyer is the Answer," *Washington Times*, December 6, 2009.

²² Ian Storey, "China's 'Charm Offensive' Loses Momentum in Southeast Asia [Part 1]," *China Brief*, vol. 10, Issue 9, April 29, 2010.