

Conference Report

The 24th Asia-Pacific Roundtable

The 24th Asia-Pacific Roundtable was convened in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, from 7 to 9 June 2010. Continuing its tradition as the premier Track Two security conference in the Asia Pacific, this year's Roundtable attracted more than 260 security experts, policy-makers and academics from 25 countries. The Roundtable was organised by the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia, on behalf of the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS). This report was compiled by **Shahriman Lockman**, Analyst, with the assistance of ISIS researchers.

The Hon. Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dato' Sri Mohd. Najib Tun Abdul Razak, officiated at the Roundtable and delivered the Keynote Address. Eight plenary and four concurrent sessions covering a spectrum of security and geopolitical issues were convened.



(From left) Tan Sri Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, HRH Raja Dr. Nazrin Shah Ibni Sultan Azlan Muhibbuddin Shah, The Hon. Dato' Sri Mohd Najib Tun Abdul Razak, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Dato' Dr. Mahani Zainal Abidin

Additionally, the Japanese Ambassador to Malaysia hosted a dinner talk delivered by Prof. Dr. Shinichi Kitaoka of Tokyo University on 'Continuity and Change in Japanese Foreign Policy'. Mr. Kavi Chongkittavorn of *The Nation* spoke in a special tête-à-tête session on recent developments in Thailand. The Hon. Deputy Prime

Minister, Tan Sri Muhyiddin Hj. Mohd. Yassin, delivered the Closing Address. The Roundtable was sponsored by the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) and Konrad-Adenauer-Shiftung (KAS), with the support of the Japan Foundation, the Embassy of Japan in Malaysia and the EastWest Institute.

The discussions were held under the Chatham House Rule to encourage a free and frank exchange of perspectives. This report will highlight and summarise the key points that were raised at the Roundtable.

AN ASIAN CENTURY?

The 21st century has been dubbed the 'Asian Century'. Fuelled largely by China's phenomenal economic growth and expansion, the global economic pendulum is gradually shifting from the West to Asia. The increasingly vibrant economies of India, Indonesia and the Republic of Korea (ROK) are reinforcing this trend. Against this backdrop, there is broad consensus and acceptance that Asia is gaining prominence and that the region could become a leading power in the 21st century. The advent of the Asian Century is concomitantly solidifying the multipolarity of the global economic structure. Asia's confidence and influence is rising in tandem with its economic

success. In years to come, the region is expected to expand its political and strategic influence.

...Asia remains a 'house divided'

The question of how Asia would exercise its power is one that is of great significance, with transformative implications for regional and global affairs. It might, however, as one participant cautioned, be premature to examine the impact of a resurgent Asia as this phenomenon is not pre-ordained. The Asian Century may not materialise. China cannot and would not be allowed to exert hegemony in the region. China would have India and Japan as counterweights, and this would dilute Beijing's leadership and regional aspirations.

Asia's efforts to exert its political clout commensurate with its rising economic power is hampered by the sense of rivalry and suspicion (primarily Sino-Japanese and Sino-Indian) that prevents Asia from harnessing its collective strength. These divisions mean that Asia remains a 'house divided'. The key to Asian leadership and unity is to keep bilateral ties in order. According to a participant, 'if the bilateral relations are taken care of, then the region would take care of itself'. The Asian Century would result from and be founded on the convergence of interests and a condominium of the major stakeholders.

Generally, cooperation and goodwill prevails throughout the region. The myriad forms of economic cooperation in the region is indicative of the strong bonds in the region. Yet, such goodwill has not been fully realised in the geopolitical and strategic realm. Indeed, Asia's geopolitics is out of sync with its geo-economics. Military alliances and

cooperation remain exclusive and are subconsciously directed against states in the region. Unless these suspicions are resolved, they would dilute the cohesiveness of the region.

China is a big factor in the Asian Century but it is by no means the only driver. India with a potential market of more than a billion and Indonesia with some 40 million in its burgeoning middle class are potential engines of growth. The dynamics of the region are more complex and the formation of the Asian Century would be predicated on the convergence of the major and emerging powers in the region.

While China, because of its size and strength, would be *primus inter pares*, it is unlikely to exert a hegemonic hold on the region, not least because the United States retains military superiority over all potential challengers in the region. It is for this reason that in order to realise the full potential of the Asian Century, all the major and emerging powers – China, India, Indonesia and Japan – will have to work together.

The Asian Century – if it materialises – would not

... 'if the bilateral relations are taken care of, then the region would take care of itself'

only see an Asia that is more confident and globally engaged, but would bring about a reformulation of prevailing ideas and values. Western ideas may be adapted or replaced with forms that are more amenable to Asian culture. A dynamic Asia would be more vocal and participatory in shaping and formulating regional and global norms, practices and agenda.

THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE

The future of the region is shaped by its constituents as much as by its structures. The animated debate on regional architecture following Australia's Asia-Pacific community (APC) proposal is a clear signal of the need to re-think the mechanisms that underpin regional affairs. These discussions have heretofore been focused on designing an overarching design for the Asia Pacific, with not much attention being given to the substance and functionality of the architecture itself. The region is replete with bilateral and multilateral processes such as the ASEAN Plus Three, the ASEAN Regional Forum and Apec. Existing structures tend to be issue-specific and have limited memberships. No doubt, the support for the APC proposal has waned. But it has nevertheless sparked off a round of intensive discussions on regional architecture.

Although bilateralism continues to be the preferred modality, especially in the security domain, there is a growing tendency to seriously re-examine existing structures and processes. While there is no talk of dismantling or streamlining existing structures, there is growing acceptance that the East Asia Summit (EAS) is the

most preferred modality to engage all stakeholders at present. Similarly, support for the United States and Russia to join the EAS is gaining momentum.

However, questions have been raised on whether the United States would be able to participate fully in the EAS given the travel constraints on the part of the US president. Would the inclusion of the United States and Russia dilute or add value to the EAS? The impact of enlarging the EAS remains uncertain. It is, however, clear that there is strong support for continuing and enhancing US engagement with the region.

ASEAN needs to put its house in order before it can effectively steward the EAS process

As the momentum toward enlarging the EAS intensifies, there is some degree of concern about ASEAN's influence and role in this process. While the major stakeholders acknowledge ASEAN's stewardship, the regional organisation continues to labour under the burden of exercising effective leadership. It has yet to satisfactorily demonstrate that it has the capability to lead. ASEAN needs to put its house in order before it can effectively steward the EAS process. A cohesive and united ASEAN is paramount. ASEAN must earn the spurs of leadership. Bilateralism and existing multilateral structures and processes will continue to guide and manage regional relations given that there is as yet no consensus on what the 'new' regional architecture would be.

CHINA'S REGIONAL RELATIONS

The interaction among the major powers of the Asia Pacific was a recurrent theme in the



(From left) Assoc. Prof. Simon Tay, The Hon. Mr. Hitoshi Tanaka, Amb. Rodolfo C. Severino, Amb. Kishan Rana, Mr. Arthur Spyrou, Dr. Amy Searight

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discussions at the Roundtable. A major aspect was the relationship between China and the United States, which has undergone a transformation in recent years. This has mainly been the result of a divergence in the economic fortunes of the two countries. While China continues to record significant economic growth, the same cannot be said of the United States. In addition, the United States is saddled with its costly military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

...it was still uncertain whether Beijing would continue to acknowledge US primacy in the region

A participant asserted that while China was keenly aware that the strategic presence of the United States had sustained peace and stability in the Asia Pacific, it was still uncertain whether Beijing would continue to acknowledge US primacy in the region. As a result, there remains wide scope for an intensification of the competitive relationship between the two countries.

How the rest of the region would react to the potential erosion of US primacy will have few historical precedents. It has often been asserted that strategies that focus on establishing a balance of power would risk a new Cold War in Asia. Admittedly, many of China's neighbours have been hedging against a more assertive stance by Beijing through closer collaboration with the United States. However, owing to the growing economic interdependence in the region, none of China's neighbours would favour a zero-sum competition between Beijing and Washington. Such interdependence, said a participant, would

discount the possibility that the United States would adopt a containment strategy with regard to China.

China's engagement with its neighbours has undoubtedly generated a lot of goodwill, particularly in Southeast Asia. A participant asserted that, as part of its peaceful development, China would not seek to dominate the rest of Asia. Indeed, given Asia's growing importance, China believes that a stable Asia was a necessary antecedent for the achievement of a harmonious world.

It was however observed that Beijing had become more assertive in its foreign policy in recent months. This was attributed to the growing pressure on the Chinese leadership from certain elements of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as well as the country's increasingly vocal 'netizens'. A participant argued that there was a growing urgency for ASEAN and China to formulate a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea in order to mitigate the tensions arising from the overlapping claims in the areas surrounding the Spratly and Paracel islands.



(From left) Dr. Rizal Sukma, Datuk Ernest Z. Bower, Emeritus Prof. Dr. Carol Hernandez

THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA

The tone adopted by the United States in its engagement with East Asia has noticeably changed since the inception of the present White House administration. Even so, there is a strong degree of continuity in US policy towards Asia from the previous Republican administration. This has been chiefly attributed to Washington's continued preoccupation with its domestic economy and with developments in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Another reason suggested was the bipartisan consensus in Washington on many of the elements of US engagement with the region.

The relationship between the United States and ASEAN was assessed to be on an upward trajectory

A participant observed that there have been several notable missteps in Washington's policy towards Asia in the previous year. For instance, the United States did not sufficiently anticipate the implications of the election of the Hatoyama administration in Japan. Furthermore, the visit by US President Barack Obama to China in November 2009 was criticised for its lack of results. It was also suggested that the White House had not done enough to convince the American public about the need to engage East Asia and in particular China.

The relationship between the United States and ASEAN was assessed to be on an upward trajectory. The United States has shown renewed interest in becoming involved in the Asia-Pacific regional architecture. Washington's indications of

interest were reciprocated by ASEAN during its Summit in Hanoi, Vietnam, in April 2010. At the time of the Roundtable, there remained uncertainties about how the United States would become involved in the regional architecture. The two options under consideration were an expanded East Asia Summit (EAS) – the present members plus Russia and the United States – or an ASEAN Plus Eight, a separate process that would meet whenever the Apec Summit is held in East Asia. A participant argued that as the United States was interested in being close to the core of Asia-Pacific regionalism, it would settle for nothing less than joining the EAS.

INDIA'S ENGAGEMENT WITH EAST ASIA

Regionalism remains at its infancy in South Asia due to the strained relationships between some countries of the region. However, since the promulgation of India's Look East policy, the country has sought to deepen its involvement in ASEAN-led regional processes. The country was a founding member of the EAS and has become an active participant in the ASEAN Regional Forum.



(From left) Mr. Manu Bhaskaran, Mr. Nguyen Nam Duong

Even so, it was suggested that India's diplomatic presence in East Asia remained marginal. A participant argued that India should be invited to

participate in Apec, as the country's exclusion from the process represented a major gap in efforts to promote economic integration in the Asia Pacific. Another participant asserted that Sino-Indian competition was one of the key factors influencing India's engagement with East Asia. It was claimed that some Chinese scholars were convinced that India's Look East policy was designed to compete with China for influence in the region. A participant argued that the competitive dimension of Sino-Indian relations could complicate efforts to promote regional cooperation and integration.

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India's emergence as a major power has been driven by its rapid economy growth. The country's GDP is expected to expand by about eight per cent in 2010. The Indian economy has largely been insulated from the global economic turbulence of the previous two years, mainly because of its huge domestic market. By the same token, India's economic integration with East Asia remains at its early stages, even though the growth in Sino-Indian bilateral trade has been the world's fastest.

Many multinational corporations have established production networks throughout East Asia, but have largely excluded India from their overall plans. This was attributed to two major factors. First, India continues to be perceived as a difficult place to do business, mainly as a result of persistent bureaucratic delays. Second, India's infrastructure, especially in terms of

transportation linkages, remains underdeveloped. A participant, however, contended that India's infrastructure would see a lot of improvement in the near future. A prominent showcase in this regard is the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor Project.

THE KOREAN PENINSULA

The situation in the Korean Peninsula was the subject of a contentious debate at the Roundtable. From the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) perspective, the United States is seen to have adopted policies that one participant described as 'provocative'. These include the stationing of a large number of US troops in the ROK, its military exercises with the ROK, and the explicit exclusion of the DPRK from the countries covered by US negative security assurances on the use of nuclear weapons, as articulated in the 2010 *Nuclear Posture Review*. A participant argued that without a peace treaty between the DPRK and the United States, the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula would not be possible.



(From left) Dr. Cheon Seongwhun, Mr. Ralph Cossa, Amb. Ma Zhengang, Mr. So Ki Sok, Amb. Koji Watanabe, Prof. Dr. Georgy D. Toloraya

... China had a significant stake in the stability of the DPRK, making it unlikely that Beijing would threaten to withdraw its aid to Pyongyang

In response, it was observed that US President Barack Obama's peaceful overtures towards the DPRK was rebuffed by Pyongyang through its ballistic missile test in April 2009. Apart from adding to tensions in the Korean Peninsula, the missile test contravened at least two UN Security Council Resolutions, 1695 and 1718. A participant said that the negative security assurances by the United States would be extended to the DPRK if the latter played by the rules, namely by signing and conforming to the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Obama administration's current stance towards the DPRK has also been shaped by allegations of DPRK's arms sales to Hamas, the assassination of DPRK defectors and the sinking of an ROK naval vessel, the *Cheonan*.



(From left) Tan Sri Razali Ismail, Mr. Xavier Nuttin, Prof. Dr. Anthony Milner, Ms. Clara Joewono, Amb. Kyaw Tint Swe, Dr. Christopher Roberts

Significant emphasis was placed on the need to reconvene the Six Party Talks to address the security situation in the Korean Peninsula. DPRK's demands for the removal of economic sanctions before the resumption of the Six Party Talks are unlikely to be met by the UN Security Council unless Pyongyang demonstrated its commitment towards denuclearisation.

...given its geographical location, Myanmar has to carefully manage its complex relationships with neighbouring countries...

It was suggested that China had a role to play in encouraging Pyongyang to return to the negotiating table, given its substantial economic aid to the country. A participant, however, argued that China had a significant stake in the stability of the DPRK, making it unlikely that Beijing would threaten to withdraw its aid to Pyongyang. Uncertainties about the health of the DPRK leader Kim Jong-il has also cast doubts about the stability of the government in Pyongyang. It was speculated that the growing importance of the military in DPRK's decision-making had shaped the country's policies in recent months.

HAS MYANMAR CHANGED?

Political developments in Myanmar also remain difficult to assess. While the military government, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), appears to be as strong as ever, it has yet to announce a date for the country's general elections. A participant argued that developments in Myanmar should be understood within the context of its numerous challenges. The country has over a hundred different ethnic groups, some

of which have had a long history of animosities between them.

Moreover, given its geographical location, Myanmar has to carefully manage its complex relationships with neighbouring countries, with all the implications arising from the latter's distinct political, historical and cultural backgrounds. It was also contended that Myanmar had taken meaningful steps to eradicate the cultivation and production of narcotic drugs. The SPDC has declared that it aims to rid the country of narcotics by 2014, a year ahead of the date set by ASEAN.



(From left) Prof. Dr. Robert Ayson, Amb. Guenter Overfeld, Mr. Dang Dinh Quy, Prof. William Maley, Amb. Ken Lewis

Calibrating the international community's response to Myanmar involves making difficult choices. Serious doubts remain over whether the country's new constitution and the planned general elections would lead to genuine political reforms. Some participants argued that despite its numerous faults, the constitution could provide a framework for reforms on an incremental and long-term basis.

Moreover, the prospective retirement of current SPDC chairman, Senior General Than Shwe, may

present opportunities for the international community to engage the country's new leaders. It was argued that economic sanctions against the SPDC should remain, although these should be carefully targeted, with unambiguous benchmarks established for their removal. Economic sanctions should be designed to minimise the harm done towards the general population of the country. And while some countries may have serious reservations about channelling economic aid through the SPDC, the fact remains that the people of Myanmar are in dire need of help.

COUNTERINSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN

The situation in Afghanistan generates implications not only for those with a direct stake in present counterinsurgency efforts, but also for many other countries of the Asia Pacific. That the Taliban may survive and continue to wage the insurgency despite the recent surge of coalition troops could potentially serve to galvanise radical groups in other parts of the world. It has become clear that the Taliban has benefitted significantly from access to sanctuaries in Pakistan, specifically the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). These sanctuaries allow the Taliban to conduct tactical retreats when pursued by American and other International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops.

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Even so, it was argued that in order to neutralise the Afghan Taliban, there would be no need for Pakistan to effect a full-fledged takeover of FATA. Instead, what is required is a decisive and targeted move against the Afghan Taliban leadership in

Quetta, as the Pakistani security services are 'undoubtedly aware' of their locations according to a participant.

Doubts were expressed with regard to the will of the international community to compel Pakistan to act decisively against the Taliban. Following the July 2005 terrorist bombings in London, for example, the United Kingdom became deeply reluctant to apply more pressure on Islamabad, fearing that cooperation between UK and Pakistani security services might be compromised. And despite the paucity of results, the United States has similarly opted to continue its 'constructive engagement' with Pakistan's security forces.

Progress, if any, will only materialise over the long run. This would undoubtedly be costly for the political leaders of countries that have committed troops to Afghanistan. A participant, however, argued that the United States would likely prove to be resilient in maintaining its military presence in Afghanistan. The credibility and reputation of the United States is at stake. And despite the UK government's assurances to the British public that Afghanistan represents a finite commitment, it is unlikely that UK forces would be withdrawn precipitously.

MARITIME SECURITY

Maritime security remains one of the key issues in the security agenda of the Asia Pacific. The threat of piracy and armed robbery at sea has admittedly subsided. Even so, the global trading system continues to be highly dependent on maritime links. Furthermore, some countries remain wary about the presence of extra-regional navies, because from their historical experiences, colonialists often came by sea. These factors have led to a dramatic expansion of naval capabilities in the Asia Pacific.



(From left) First Admiral Maritime Zulkifli Abu Bakar, Dr. Andrew Butcher, Dr. Vijay Sakhuja, Dr. Mark J. Valencia, Dr. James Boutillier

Regional countries have clearly placed greater emphasis on building their navies rather than their armies or air forces. For instance, China, India, Japan and the ROK are expected to invest nearly US\$60 billion on enhancing their respective maritime forces. That figure may reach US\$173 billion over the period to 2030. A major source of concern arises from the fact that many of the new or planned acquisitions involve capabilities that are regarded as inherently offensive. The growth of submarine forces in the region is a prime example in this regard.

...regional countries should develop voluntary guidelines regarding military and intelligence-gathering activities in foreign EEZs

Given the qualitative and quantitative expansion of naval forces in the Asia Pacific, it is important for countries to have a common understanding

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with regard to the rules and norms of military operations at sea. However, fundamental disagreements and confusion persist with regard to the regime governing military activities in exclusive economic zones (EEZs).

For example, there appears to be no clear answers as to whether the law of the sea permits military exercises in foreign EEZs. This has been the source of contention between some Asia-Pacific countries, most notably the United States and China. A participant argued that there is an urgent need for regional countries to increase dialogue in order to arrive at a common interpretation of the relevant laws. A participant proposed that regional countries should develop voluntary guidelines regarding military and intelligence-gathering activities in foreign EEZs.

ASEAN CONNECTIVITY

'Connectivity' is a major thrust in ASEAN's community-building efforts, and is divided into three domains: physical, institutional and people-to-people. Improving the physical connectivity among ASEAN member states through a network of land transport would provide an integrated transport link to facilitate economic ties and



(From left) Amb. Pushpanathan Sundaram, Mr. Nguyen Hung Son, Dr. Satu Limaye, Amb. K. Kesavapany, Prof. Dr. Fukunari Kimura



(From left) Prof. Toshiya Hoshino, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mely Caballero-Anthony, Mrs. Malayvieng Sakonhninhom, The Hon. Prof. Gareth Evans, Asst. Prof. Herman Kraft

people-to-people interactions. In these trying times of economic downturn, investment in infrastructure has the added benefit of acting as a stimulus to hasten the recovery process.

It is, however, imperative to guard against the externalities of improved connectivity. Easier access may provide more avenues for human trafficking and other transnational criminal activities. These risks could be reduced or mitigated through closer coordination among law enforcement agencies in the region. There are still nagging issues that hamper closer community-building. Problems over rules-of-origin (ROO) and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) continue to hamper the realisation of a 'connected' ASEAN. Success requires that the three pillars of connectivity – physical, institutional and people-to-people – work in tandem.

THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

Responsibility to protect (RtoP) is a contentious concept in Asia even though it was unanimously endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005. In essence, RtoP means that states have a responsibility to protect their populations; but when a state fails to fulfil that responsibility, the international community has the obligation to

step in. RtoP is not a blanket call for action. Nor is it a catch-all justification for intervention. Its scope is limited to war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.

Considering that the principle of sovereignty remains a significant barrier to the successful application of RtoP, a possible 'entry point' for the application of the doctrine is the protection of civilians in instances of armed conflict. Support from civil society, in particular, is important to mobilise political will and action for RtoP. In this regard, the role of 'norm entrepreneurs' in informing and localising RtoP across the region is critical. The enhancement of civilian capabilities such as strengthening diplomatic mediation mechanisms, fact-finding missions and monitoring resources are some of the practical ways to operationalise RtoP.

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CLIMATE CHANGE:

The Struggle for Consensus

The lack of trust among key stakeholders is a grave impediment to meaningful progress on climate change. Negotiations during the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen (COP15) were hampered by 'finger pointing' and the refusal of parties to offer tangible concessions to each other.

The 2010 UN Climate Change Conference in Cancun (COP16) would be a repeat of the disappointing Copenhagen talks unless there is a change in mindset and outlook. States need to

States need to move from a 'game of fear' to a 'game of hope'

move from a 'game of fear' to a 'game of hope.' A shift of focus towards the highlighting of economic incentives through Green Growth strategies may spur more environmental-friendly policies. The pessimistic outlook going into COP16 should not be used as a justification or excuse for inaction. The European initiative of enhancing its good practices and encouraging sub-global alliances of climate pioneers is laudable, and provides a promising alternative for positive change while waiting for the global consensus to emerge.

CONCLUSION

The primary aim of the Asia-Pacific Roundtable is to bring together a multiplicity of perspectives on the most pressing security issues that affect the region. This was evidently achieved during many of the sessions convened at this year's Roundtable.



(From left) Amb. Shyam Saran and Amb. Mutsuyoshi Nishimura

Among the whole host of security challenges that were discussed at the Roundtable, three issues, in particular, merit greater attention. First, there remains significant scope for the harmonisation of perspectives on the evolving regional order. The relationship between the major players – China, India, Japan and the United States – will be the key determinant of whether the Asia Pacific will continue to benefit from the stability that has persisted in the region for the past 40 years.

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Second, the regime governing the use of the maritime domain needs to be clarified. This is particularly urgent in light of the growing sophistication and strength of naval forces in the region. And third, there is a critical need to find a sustainable solution to the impasse in the Korean Peninsula. The risk of miscalculation remains high, and all the main parties have a stake in ensuring that tensions do not escalate. Consideration of these issues will require tapping into the expertise of policymakers and scholars alike.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

‘THE FUTURE OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE’

by
MOHD NAJIB BIN TUN ABDUL RAZAK
Prime Minister of Malaysia

I would like to begin by thanking the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) for inviting me to address the 24th Asia-Pacific Roundtable. And I would like to congratulate ASEAN-ISIS and ISIS Malaysia for hosting the Roundtable, which has become one of the highlights of the Track Two calendar. I am proud that the Roundtable has grown from strength to strength and has gained the recognition as one of the premier security conferences of this region.

I am and always have been in the past and present a strong supporter of the Track Two processes. I believe that it is important for us to have a platform where policymakers, scholars, business people and journalists amongst others are brought together to examine the security challenges of this region. It is within a Track Two setting such as the Asia-Pacific Roundtable that we can establish a bridge between theory and practice, between idealism and pragmatism, in order to formulate ideas that will take security cooperation to the next level. It is in such events, which provide an informal and non-official channel for the exchange of opinions and perspectives, that we can refine our understanding of each other's security and foreign policy priorities.

And this is why I am here today. I believe, that as we emerge steadily from the global economic crisis onto a path or trajectory of growth and stability, we must not simply take the comfortable path that would return us to the status quo position. In a new and fast-changing international environment, we must be prepared to look ahead to prepare for the challenges that will define the coming decade and even beyond - on foreign policy, international stability, security and economic growth.

And I want to suggest today that even as we see evidence of a new power configuration in the Asia Pacific, the region must begin to adapt to and accommodate the concurrent rise of several major regional powers; that we must recognise and embrace the collaborative multilateral imperative that will drive policy and allow us to meet new challenges in the years ahead; and that in doing so, we must define and implement an Asia-Pacific Regional Architecture that puts people, global progress and the prosperity of this region first. I believe this is the road we must follow. The changing political and economic landscapes demand it.

In recent times, China, India and Japan have left a significant imprint on the Asia-Pacific strategic landscape. China's economic output has increased

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ten-fold since the economic reforms of 1978. In Purchasing Power Parity terms, it is now the second-largest economy after the United States. India's growth is just as impressive, averaging seven per cent annually since 1997. Japan remains a formidable economic power, and its regional role and stature will be sustained for the foreseeable future.

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The evolving strategic landscape presents a set of challenges as well as opportunities for all of us. Together, we are able to mould and guide this transformation in a way that ensures the continuing stability and prosperity of the Asia Pacific region.

In addition to adapting to the new strategic landscape, there is also a growing need and expectation for international cooperation to deliver more progress on the issues that cut across borders. No single nation – irrespective of size, wealth, or military might – can confront challenges such as climate change, international terrorism, human trafficking and transnational crime on its own. Individually, states are ill-equipped to address this myriad of challenges, but collectively, the synergy and pooling of resources provides us with the best chance of safeguarding and enhancing our security.

The twin challenges of changes in the regional

power structure and the increasing pressure to address transnational issues require us to re-examine the efficacy of existing regional arrangements. It is therefore unsurprising that there has been an increasingly active discourse on the Asia-Pacific regional architecture. In fact, the way we shape our regional institutions today will have a major impact on the future of our region.

Over the course of the following days, I trust that fruitful and constructive discussions on the Asia-Pacific regional architecture will transpire among the participants but allow me to contribute to the discussions by sharing with you some of my thoughts on the subject.

To begin with what do I mean by the Asia-Pacific regional architecture? The term is frequently used, but rarely with precision. For some, it collectively refers to all the institutions of the region, from security alliances to large assemblies of regional leaders. According to this view, ASEAN, APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum, among others, represent the different parts of a regional architecture. And there are those who say that an architecture for the region does not yet exist.

For me, however, the Asia-Pacific regional architecture refers to, and I would like to define it in this context as, a series of concentric circles one after another, but at the core is ASEAN, followed by the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the other regional architecture which can complement what we have in this region. These concentric circles represent the evolution and growing maturity of cooperation in the Asia Pacific. As we all know, ASEAN itself began with five members – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand – before expanding to almost the entire geographical region of Southeast Asia. Recognising the need to

engage its Asian partners, and prompted by the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the ASEAN Plus Three was established with the inclusion of China, Japan and South Korea.

The East Asia Summit is a natural progression from the ASEAN Plus Three in extending the geographical footprint of regional cooperation through the inclusion of Australia, India and New Zealand. If anything, these series of cooperative initiatives reflect a pragmatic and adaptive approach on the part of ASEAN. For Southeast Asia, the regional architecture is and will continue to be a work in progress. We will seek to consolidate the significant gains that have been achieved within ASEAN and the ASEAN Plus Three. At the same time, we will develop the East Asia Summit as an avenue for cooperation with an extended circle of countries from the wider region.

How do we harness the full potential of the ASEAN Plus Three and the East Asia Summit? If these two processes are to be effective, I believe that we must start at the core. We must start with ASEAN.

When ASEAN was established in 1967, the leaders of Southeast Asia had few reasons to be optimistic about the future of cooperation in the region. To begin with, their nations or our nation had practically no history of collaboration. In fact, it would only have been prudent for them to remain rather wary of each other's intentions. Confidence had to be built; suspicions had to be overcome.

Not surprisingly, the Bangkok Declaration, the founding document of ASEAN, is brief by today's standards. At just over 700 words, it articulates a vision of regional cooperation that is at once hopeful, and firmly grounded in the realities of that period.

Since then, the breadth and depth of cooperation under ASEAN's auspices have grown tremendously. But this has taken place over decades, not years. In ASEAN we speak of 'step by step, at a pace comfortable to all', and that is a favourite phrase within ASEAN. And so it took almost a decade after its establishment before ASEAN convened its first Summit. A Charter for the organisation would not come before ASEAN had turned 40.

Admittedly, there were legitimate grounds for this approach. In ASEAN's initial decades, its members were understandably preoccupied with domestic priorities – with building roads, schools and health facilities. Alleviating poverty topped the agenda. Insurgencies had to be defeated. National identities had to be cultivated. To different extents, these issues remain very live ones for several ASEAN member states. Securing the commitment of each and every member towards regional initiatives was always going to be a monumental task. For certain issues, it still is. And so, getting to where we are today has been an exercise in patient diplomacy.

...we will develop the East Asia Summit as an avenue for cooperation with an extended circle of countries from the wider region

Many rely on the history of ASEAN to argue that we can only hope to advance regional cooperation in marginal increments. The same narrative is used by those who say that some issues are best kept in the back burner, until such time as when everybody is ready to move forward. No doubt,

building confidence among nations is often a time-consuming endeavour. Nevertheless, we need to re-examine the manner in which we conduct our diplomacy if we are serious about propelling regional cooperation to the next level.

...we need to re-examine the manner in which we conduct our diplomacy if we are serious about propelling regional cooperation to the next level

We need to show that regional diplomacy brings tangible benefits to the peoples of this region. Being involved in multilateral processes imposes great demands on the national purse. The citizens of this region deserve more from the resources that go into the hundreds of meetings that take place every year.

It is for these reasons that I believe the way ASEAN conducts its affairs needs to be constantly fine-tuned. We need the organisation to be more effective and more efficient. We need to constantly explore ways to make and execute decisions more expeditiously.

And we need to start addressing a wider range of issues, including those that have long been held in abeyance. Free Trade Agreements need to be harnessed to their full potential so that the benefits are spread to each corner of the region. In short, ASEAN needs to engage in some serious and honest self-reflection and from this process move towards making meaningful and substantive progress. A vibrant and coherent ASEAN is essential if it is to continue to effectively exercise

its traditional role of fostering friendships and regional cooperation.

I am a firm believer that openness and inclusivity should be the guiding principles in our efforts to consolidate the architecture of our region. Geographical distance, in my opinion, should not stand in the way of applying these principles. Of course, the proximity between the members of ASEAN has meant that we naturally have stronger ties with each other. But beyond this, the wider ties that ASEAN has forged with our regional partners have certainly transcended the physical distance that separates us. Indeed, we need to acknowledge that the Asia Pacific is a region where there is an intersection of interests of nations near and afar.

Malaysia and her ASEAN neighbours have always adopted a broad vision when assessing our strategic interests. This is why we place such importance on our relations with all the major stakeholders of the Asia Pacific region. We appreciate the significance of our relationship with our Asian neighbours – China, India, Japan and South Korea. We also value our ties with Australia and New Zealand, which have played constructive roles in promoting regional economic integration. There is also scope for enhancing our relations with Europe, and we welcome opportunities to engage the countries of the European Union, whether collectively or singularly.

The nations of Southeast Asia also see potential in our relationship with Russia and the United States. This is why the recent ASEAN Summit in Hanoi which I participated in, was the clearest-ever expression of Southeast Asia's encouragement of Russia and the United States to deepen their engagement in the evolving regional architecture.

There is a compelling logic to enhancing the participation of these two countries in the Asia-Pacific regional architecture. The United States represents an integral part of the Asia-Pacific regional order. Washington will continue to exercise substantial economic, political and cultural influence for the foreseeable future. Russia's geography gives it a major stake in the affairs of the region. Moscow is earnestly intensifying its bilateral engagements, a development that has been warmly embraced by regional countries.

New ideas, big ideas, and visionary ideas are always important to the building of regional institutions,...

Certainly, both Russia and the United States meet the formal requirements, the most basic requirements, for participation in the EAS. They have signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, are dialogue partners of ASEAN, and have substantive cooperative relations with the organisation and with individual states. There are however multiple ways in which the eventual involvement of Russia and the United States can be realised. I would therefore encourage the participants of the Asia-Pacific Roundtable to deliberate on how the two countries can participate in the regional architecture, as this is still an on-going process and not formalised by the leaders of ASEAN.

As I have noted at the outset of my speech, I view Track Two events as providing avenues for the cultivation, and even the testing, of ideas. It is here where we should be bold and imaginative, even we should think aloud. And it is here where

we should plant ideas and see whether they can germinate and flourish. New ideas, big ideas, and visionary ideas are always important to the building of regional institutions, more so now than ever before. I earnestly look forward to the results of your deliberations. Towards that end, I hope that your discussions will be frank and robust, and that you will have a fruitful conference in the days ahead.

Thank you.

THE 24TH ASIA-PASIFIC ROUNDTABLE

7-9 JUNE 2010
THE SHERATON IMPERIAL,
KUALA LUMPUR,
MALAYSIA

PROGRAMME

Monday, 7 June 2010

1830 Welcoming Dinner
Nusantara Ballroom 1 & 2

Tuesday, 8 June 2010

0730-0900 Registration
Foyer, Nusantara Ballroom, Level 2

0900-0905 **WELCOMING REMARKS**
Nusantara Ballroom, Level 2

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Thitinan

Pongsudhirak

Chair, ASEAN Institutes of Strategic
and International Studies (ASEAN-
ISIS) & Director, Institute of Security
and International Studies,
Chulalongkorn University, Thailand

0905-0930 **KEYNOTE ADDRESS**
The Hon. Dato' Sri Mohd Najib
Tun Abdul Razak
Prime Minister of Malaysia
0930-1000 Refreshments
Foyer, Nusantara Ballroom, Level 2

1000-1130 Plenary Session 1
CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH
ASIA: PAST, PRESENT AND
FUTURE

Co-Chairs:

Tan Sri Hasmy Agam

Distinguished Fellow, Institute of
Strategic and International Studies
(ISIS), Malaysia & Executive
Chairman, Institute of
Diplomacy and Foreign Relations
(IDFR), Malaysia

Prof. Emeritus Dr. Kim Dalchong

President, The Seoul Forum for
International Affairs & Professor
Emeritus, Yonsei University,
Republic of Korea

Speakers:

Prof. Dr. Ma Ying

Director, Center for Asia-Pacific
Studies, Shanghai Institutes for
International Studies (SIIS), China

Mr. Jusuf Wanandi

Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS) &
Vice-Chair, Board of Trustees,
CSIS Foundation,
Indonesia

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Michael J. Green

Edmund A. Walsh School of
Foreign Service, Georgetown
University & Senior
Adviser and Japan Chair, Center
for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), USA

1130-1300

Plenary Session 2

THE ASIA PACIFIC'S REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE

Co-Chairs:

Amb. Kishan Rana

Chairman, CSCAP India

Amb. Rodolfo C. Severino

Head, ASEAN Studies Centre,
Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies (ISEAS), Singapore

Speakers:

The Hon. Mr. Hitoshi Tanaka

Senior Fellow, Japan Centre for
International Exchange (JCIE) &
Former Deputy Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Japan

Mr. Miles Kupa
Australian High Commissioner to
Malaysia-designate

Assoc. Prof. Simon Tay
Chairman, Singapore Institute of
International Affairs (SIIA) &
Associate Professor, Faculty of
Law, National University of
Singapore, Singapore

Dr. Amy Searight
Adjunct Fellow, Center for
Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) & Adjunct
Professor, Elliott School of
International Affairs, George
Washington University, USA

1300-1400 Lunch
Essence Restaurant, Level 1

1400-1530 Plenary Session 3
**THE DAWN OF THE ASIAN
CENTURY: SOUTHEAST ASIAN
PERSPECTIVES**

Chair:
Dr. Rizal Sukma
Executive Director, Centre for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS),
Indonesia

Speakers:
Prof. Dr. Anthony Milner
Basham Professor of Asian History, The
Australian National University,
Australia

Tan Sri Mohamed Jawhar Hassan
Chairman, Institute of Strategic
and International Studies (ISIS),
Malaysia

Amb. Kishan Rana
Chairman, CSCAP India

1530-1700 Plenary Session 4
**ASEAN CONNECTIVITY: AD
VANCING ECONOMIC DEVEL
OPMENT AND COMMUNITY
BUILDING**

Co-Chairs:
Dr. Satu Limaye
Director, East-West Center, USA

Amb. K. Kesavapany
Director, Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore

Speakers:
Mr. Pushpanathan Sundaram
Deputy Secretary-General
(ASEAN Economic Community),
ASEAN Secretariat

Prof. Dr. Fukunari Kimura
Chief Economist, Economic Re
search Institute for ASEAN and
East Asia (ERIA), Indonesia

Mr. Nguyen Hung Son
Director, Center for Regional and
Foreign Policy Studies, Diplomatic
Academy of Vietnam

Dr. Dionisius Narjoko
Researcher, Economic Research
Institute for ASEAN and East Asia
(ERIA), Indonesia

1700-1715 Refreshments
Foyer, Nusantara Ballroom, Level 2

1715-1845 Concurrent Session 1
**ENHANCING MARITIME
SECURITY**
Imperial 3, Level M

Chair:
Dr. Andrew Butcher
Director, Policy and Research,
Asia New Zealand Foundation,
New Zealand

Speakers:
Dr. Vijay Sakhuja
Director of Research, Indian
Council of World Affairs (ICWA),
India

**First Admiral Maritime Zulkifli
Abu Bakar**
Northern Region Commander,
Malaysian Maritime Enforcement
Agency (MMEA), Malaysia

Dr. Mark J. Valencia

Research Associate, National Asia Research Program (NARP), The National Bureau of Asian Research, USA

Dr. James Boutilier

Special Adviser (Policy), Maritime Forces Pacific (MARPAF), Canada

Concurrent Session 2

MAKING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (RtoP) WORK IN THE ASIA PACIFIC

Penang Room, Level 3

Chair:

Mrs. Malayvieng Sakonhninhom

Director-General, Institute of Foreign Affairs, Lao PDR

Speakers:

The Hon. Prof. Gareth Evans

Co-Chair, International Advisory Board, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect; Chancellor, The Australian National University & Former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Australia

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mely Caballero Anthony

Head, Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Asst. Prof. Herman Kraft

Executive Director, Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS) & University of the Philippines, Diliman, The Philippines

Prof. Toshiya Hoshino

Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, Japan

1930

Dinner Talk hosted by

Amb. Masahiko Horie

Ambassador of Japan to Malaysia
Nusantara Ballroom 1 & 2, Level 2

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY

Distinguished Speaker:

Prof. Dr. Shinichi Kitaoka

Professor, Graduate School for Law and Politics, University of Tokyo & Senior Fellow, Tokyo Foundation, Japan

2130

Tête-à-Tête

THAILAND UPDATE

Moderator:

Mr. Bunn Nagara

Associate Editor, Star Publications, Malaysia

Speaker:

Mr. Kavi Chongkittavorn

Assistant Group Editor, The Nation Multimedia Group, Thailand

Wednesday, 9 June 2010

0900-1045

Plenary Session 5

ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE: MOVING TOWARDS COP16

Nusantara Ballroom, Level 2

Co-Chairs:

Mr. John Brandon

Director, International Relations Program, The Asia Foundation, USA

Prof. Dr. Brian Job

Director, Center of International Relations, University of British Columbia, Canada

Speakers:

Amb. Mutsuyoshi Nishimura

Special Adviser to the Cabinet on Climate Change & Ambassador for Global Environment, Japan

Amb. Chung Rae Kwon
Director, Environment and Sustainable Development Division, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) & Former Ambassador for Climate Change, Republic of Korea

Amb. Shyam Saran
Former Special Envoy on Climate Change & Foreign Secretary, India

Dr. Hartmut Grewe
Coordinator for Environment and Energy Policies, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Germany

Prof. Dr. Stephen Howes
Director, International and Development Economics, Crawford School of Economics and Government, The Australian National University, Australia
1045-1115 Refreshments
Foyer, Nusantara Ballroom, Level 2

1115-1245

Concurrent Session 3
PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA
Imperial 3, Level M

Chair:
Amb. Ma Zhengang
Chairman, China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA) & Chairman, CSCAP China, China

Speakers:
Mr. So Ki Sok
Senior Researcher, The Institute for Disarmament and Peace, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Mr. Ralph Cossa
President, Pacific Forum CSIS, USA

Amb. Koji Watanabe
Senior Fellow, Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE) & Former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Japan

Dr. Cheon Seongwhun
Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification, Republic of Korea

Prof. Dr. Georgy D. Toloraya
Regional Director for Asia and Africa, Russkiy Mir Foundation, Russia

Concurrent Session 4
COUNTERINSURGENCY AND NATION BUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS
Penang Room, Level 3

Chair:
Mr. Dang Dinh Quy
Vice-President, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam & Director-General, Institute of Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies, Vietnam

Speakers:
Prof. William Maley
Director, Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, The Australian National University, Australia

Amb. Guenter Overfeld
Vice-President and Director of Regional Security and Preventive Diplomacy, East West Institute (EWI), Belgium & Ambassador-at-Large, Germany

Amb. Ken Lewis
Canadian Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates & Former Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK)

Prof. Dr. Robert Ayson
Director, The Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand

1245-1345

Lunch
Essence Restaurant, Level 1

1345-1515	<p>Plenary Session 6 US ASIA POLICY: A NEW PARADIGM?</p> <p>Chair: Emeritus Prof. Dr. Carol Hernandez Founding President and Chair, Board of Directors, Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS), The Philippines</p> <p>Speakers: Datuk Ernest Z. Bower Senior Adviser and Director, Southeast Asia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), USA</p> <p>Amb. Ma Zhengang Chairman, China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA) & Chairman, CSCAP China, China</p> <p>Dr. Rizal Sukma Executive Director, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia</p> <p>Prof. Dato' Dr. Zakaria Hj. Ahmad Senior Vice-President (Research), HELP University College & President, Malaysian International Affairs Forum (MIAF), Malaysia</p>	<p>Tan Sri Razali Ismail Member, Board of Directors, Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia & Former UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy to Myanmar, Malaysia</p> <p>Dr. Christopher Roberts Faculty of Business and Government, University of Canberra, Australia</p> <p>Mr. Xavier Nuttin Senior Asia Analyst, Directorate General External Policies, The European Parliament, European Union</p>
1645-1700	Refreshments Foyer, Nusantara Ballroom, Level 2	
1700-1830	<p>Plenary Session 8 INDIA'S ENGAGEMENT WITH EAST ASIA</p> <p>Co-Chairs: HRH Prince Samdech Norodom Sirivudh Chairman, Board of Directors, The Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP), Cambodia</p> <p>Mr. Brad Glosserman Executive Director, Pacific Forum CSIS, USA</p>	
1515-1645	<p>Plenary Session 7 IS MYANMAR CHANGING OR HAS MYANMAR CHANGED US?</p> <p>Co-Chairs: Ms. Clara Joewono Deputy Chair, Executive Board, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia</p> <p>Prof. Dr. Anthony Milner Basham Professor of Asian History, The Australian National University, Australia</p> <p>Speakers: Amb. Kyaw Tint Swe Former Myanmar Ambassador to the United Nations, Myanmar</p>	<p>Speakers: Amb. Sudhir T. Devare Director-General, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), India</p> <p>Mr. Nguyen Nam Duong Senior Researcher, Center for Political Security Studies, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, Vietnam</p> <p>Dr. Li Li Senior Research Fellow, Institute of South and South-East Asian Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), China</p>

Mr. Manu Bhaskaran
Council Member, Singapore Institute
of International Affairs (SIIA) &
Director and CEO, Centennial Asia
Advisors, Singapore

1830-1850 CLOSING ADDRESS

**The Hon. Tan Sri Muhyiddin Hj.
Mohd Yassin**
Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia

1850-1900 CLOSING REMARKS
Dato' Dr. Mahani Zainal Abidin
Chief Executive, Institute of Strategic
and International Studies (ISIS),
Malaysia



24th Asia-Pacific Roundtable





ASEAN INSTITUTES
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


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