



Conversations with Jusuf Wanandi



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ISIS has been at the forefront of some of the most significant nation-building initiatives in Malaysia's history, such as contributing to the Vision 2020 concept and as the consultant to the Knowledge-Based Economy Master Plan initiative. The Institute has also played a role in fostering closer regional integration and international cooperation through forums such as the Asia-Pacific Roundtable, the East Asia Congress and the Network of East Asian Think-Tanks (NEAT).

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- To provide an avenue and a forum for individuals, experts and intellectuals from various fields to exchange views and opinions and to conduct research in a free and conducive atmosphere;
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- To provide library facilities on subjects pertaining to national and international issues;
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Preamble

In this special issue of ISIS Focus, we join the Indonesian magazine, *TEMPO*, in honouring and paying tribute to Jusuf Wanandi. Pak Jusuf, as he is affectionally called, is Senior Fellow at Indonesia's Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and Vice Chair of the Board of Trustees of CSIS Foundation. At the ripe age of seventy-four, he actively leads and participates in regional and international Track 2 dialogues and conferences.

A good and cherished friend of ISIS Malaysia, Pak Jusuf's association with us goes back a long way. Working hand-in-hand with the late Tan Sri Dr. Noordin Sopiee and other stalwarts, Pak Jusuf was instrumental in developing and nurturing the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) into the epistemic community that it is today. A highly respected public intellectual and articulate spokesperson for Asian positions on international affairs, he is undoubtedly one of Asia's leading lights in Track 2 diplomacy.

We have reproduced here the articles from *TEMPO** entitled TEMPO Memoir, which document the illustrious life of Jusuf Wanandi. They shed light on Jusuf Wanandi as a person, as well as present a glimpse of his intellect and astute observations of contemporary Asia.

* *Reproduced with permission from TEMPO (Issue No. 1110/November 3-9, 2010). The articles in the following pages are based on interviews of Jusuf Wanandi by journalists of TEMPO. The style of reporting therefore is informal.*



The Activist from Tanah Abang

The political tumult of 1965 changed the direction of Jusuf Wanandi's life 180 degrees. From a professor of law, he became a political activist, and even had to forego the opportunity of attending Harvard University in the United States. Jusuf was a ringside spectator to the end of President Sukarno's reign, and was personally involved in the political upheavals and student demonstrations that led to Sukarno's fall from power. Together with like-minded individuals, he encouraged General Suharto to become leader of the New Order. He was a close friend of Major-General Ali Moertopo, a Special Operations officer who was greatly trusted by Suharto. The wheels of history never stop turning, and during the Malari incident, or the tragedy of January 15, 1974 it was the turn of Jusuf - and his colleagues at the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), headquartered in Tanah Abang, Central Jakarta - to be the targets of student criticism and protests. Even his relations with Suharto were not always smooth, and from 1987 he began to diverge from the man he had previously supported so firmly. Next month, Jusuf, born in Sawahlunto, West Sumatra, will turn 73. Two weeks ago, he related his life story, so intimately entwined with contemporary Indonesian history, to *TEMPO's* **Nugroho Dewanto, Ign. Yophiandi** and **Ninin Damayanti**.




“Was I really afraid of them?”

“It’s not like that, Sir. I was once in their position, and they’re very strong. We could be overrun.”

THIS conversation occurred as I tried to stop Major-General Ali Moertopo, who was intent on emerging from the offices of the CSIS, brandishing a pistol. Ali wanted to confront Hariman Siregar, Chairman of the University of Indonesia Students Council, who was heading up a demonstration and accusing Ali of being a Japanese stooge.

The 1974 demonstration and the ensuing riot became known as the Malari incident (Indonesian abbreviation for “The January 15 Tragedy”). In his biography, written by Heru Cahyono, the Public Order and Security Operation commander, General Sumitro suggests that the riot may actually have been engineered by Ali Moertopo.

Whatever the case, it was the biggest student demonstration since 1966 and the overthrow of the Old Order and the establishment of the New Order under Suharto. I was part of that process and so I know precisely how formidable student protests could be.



Armed soldier on guard during the Malari incident



People at the Ciliwung River during the Malari Incident in Jakarta, January 15, 1974

The background to the Malari incident was public anger resulting from soaring rice and other basic commodity prices, the cause of which was the global recession that had set in 1973 due to the Arab oil embargo and the ensuing surge in world oil prices. The anger came to a head through the student movement as the students had been asked by Sumitro six months before to criticize the government so as to serve as feedback for government policy.

A flood of Japanese products, accompanied by a superior attitude arising from their investments in Indonesia, particularly in the automotive industry, further enraged the students. So, it was no surprise that one of their targets was Astra, an Indonesia-Japan joint venture—the students pushed a number of Japanese-made cars and motorcycles into the Ciliwung River.

The situation put a lot of pressure on President Suharto, especially given that Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka was in the country at the time. Due to the riots, he wasn't brave enough to emerge from Hotel Indonesia, where he was staying.



People at the Ciliwung River during the Malari Incident in Jakarta, January 15, 1974

In 1973, Sumitro was appointed the Public Order and Security Operation commander. Previously, President Suharto was overly trustful of him, since he was the nephew of Doel Arnowo, a figure from East Java known to be a Sukarno loyalist. However, Sumitro had performed well when he was Deputy of Operations at Armed Forces HQ.

He had succeeded in sorting out the “rebellion” by a number of generals in the regions who were unhappy with Suharto, including Kemal Idris in Sulawesi, H.R. Dharsono in West Java, Sarwo Edhie—Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s father-in-law—in North Sumatra, and Amir Machmud. Sumitro managed to pull this off by transferring the generals away from their power bases.

As Public Order and Security commander, Sumitro acted like a prime minister. He could summon ministers, the Attorney General and

technocrats to meetings in his office. He used to make visits to various universities and meet with student leaders, including Hariman. He encouraged them to express criticism so as to provide feedback on government policy. I thought this was very strange. Students don’t normally need to be told to be critical. But this was exactly what he was doing.

At the same time, Ali Moertopo, Soedjono Hoemardani, myself and some others had just visited Australia and a number of Pacific nations, including Papua New Guinea, Fiji and New Zealand. We didn’t know that Sumitro was working to get permission from Suharto to put Ali in his place because Ali was felt to be too pro-Malaysia in its dispute with the Philippines over Sabah.

So, Ali’s telephone was tapped by Strategic Intelligence. His bodyguard and adjutant were withdrawn by Skogar at Sumitro’s instigation. Upon arriving back in Indonesia in December, Ali and Soedjono were surprised to find themselves being treated as *persona non grata*. “What does he want?” Ali asked me angrily. “If it was just him, it would be nothing to worry about.” Ali was convinced that Sumitro was using the students to get at him.

Our movement was an underground one devoted to resisting the communists, who were so strong back then

Suharto sensed the outbreak of a Cold War in the ranks. Acting quickly, he summoned nine generals to the Palace on December 31, 1973. Besides Sumitro and Ali, also present were Soedjono, Kharis Suhud, the head of Strategic Intelligence, later the Strategic Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Coordinating Agency head Seotopo Joewono, Public Order and Security

Deputy Commander Sudomo, State Secretary Sudharmono, Presidential Ministry Secretary Tjokropranolo, and Army Chief of Staff Surono.

Suharto admonished the generals: “If there are those of you who want to take over as president, go ahead. You don’t have to be competing with each other to launch coups like in Latin America,” both Ali and Soedjono quoted him as saying. The meeting left Sumitro very nervous, and he swore that he had no ambitions to replace Suharto. After the meeting, Kharis, Ali and Sumitro were asked to hold a joint press conference and say they were the best of friends, while at the same time attempting to douse down the student protests. It was too late. Two weeks later the Malari incident occurred. The pressure that had been building up for six months couldn’t be dissipated just like that.

The CSIS was originally a documentation bureau on Jalan Gunung Sahari, Central Jakarta. Established in 1962, its job was to collect clippings on social events and analyze them for the Catholic Party and the Church Council.

In 1963, we came to the conclusion that the Indonesian Communist Party was going to take power. We believed they were set to win the general election in five years’ time as Sukarno appeared entranced by the party’s mass movement. And we, the Catholics, would be the first up against the wall as we were the most opposed to the Communists, alongside Masyumi and the United Indonesian Islamic Party (Partai Sarikat Islam Indonesia).

We, members of the Republic of Indonesia Catholic Students Association (PMKRI)

For Suharto back then, questions of strategy meant military strategy without any need for civilian input



With General Sumitro

and Catholic intellectuals, ran the bureau. Social analysis was needed to provide material for argumentation and making decisions by the Catholic Party and the Church.

At the time, I was the deputy chairman of the PMKRI, while Harry Tjan was secretary-general of the Catholic Party. We were two of the prominent thinkers in the movement. We also had people with military training. Our movement was an underground one devoted to resisting the communists, who were so strong back then.

At the time of the 1965 events, the bureau helped us in the Pancasila Front, which was a kind of anti-communist think tank. After Suharto became president, we were asked to keep helping as a think tank within the presidential structure. At the time I remember thinking that this guy was naturally clever. If we weren’t careful, we would end up under his thumb.

While we believed that there was a need for a research institute to help the government create a more developed Indonesia in the political, economic and defense realms, we took the view that it would be better if it was not part of the presidential structure but independent and self-financing.

For Suharto back then, questions of strategy meant military strategy without any need for civilian input. We thought differently. But we also understood that the military needed to be

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With family and relatives

involved. So we opted for military men who were able to think, like Ali Moertopo and Soedjono Hoemardani. It was they who became the protectors of the CSIS.

Ali and Soedjono were Special Operations officers who subsequently became personal assistants to Suharto. The special operation in question was ordered by Army Minister and Commander General Ahmad Yani to bring a resolution to the confrontation with Malaysia. In reality, their duties were primarily political in nature.

Through the CSIS, we provided political, economic and defense input to Suharto, all in the form of academic and strategic studies. We also invited various experts from Western Europe to assist us. Daud Jusuf and Hadi Soesastro joined us later after they had completed their studies.

Through the CSIS, we provided political, economic and defense input to Suharto, all in the form of academic and strategic studies

It was Ali who presented us with our first offices on Jalan Kesehatan, Central Jakarta. It was also Ali who provided the funding to set up the institute. In order to allow us to become self-financing, we set up the Proclamation Foundation—subsequently the CSIS Foundation—and Sofjan Wanandi was appointed treasurer to take charge of fundraising.

We did not only present our studies to our own government, but also to other countries. For example, we presented a report at the Japan-Indonesia Conference at the start of December 1973, six weeks prior to Malari, in which we criticized Japan's policy of shoving its way into Indonesia, including in the investment arena.

I was of the opinion that Japan, after the end of World War II, saw Indonesia and Southeast Asia as nothing more than a market for their products. They were still not very shrewd politically so that they focused all their attention on governments and local business people.

We are used to studying Indonesia's bilateral relations with other nations, including the normalization of relations with China in 1992. At the time, China was looking up in both economic and defense terms.

Other studies were about multilateral organizations of which Indonesia is a member. At the start of the New Order, we studied the development of ASEAN. As it happened, eight months before the signing of the ASEAN declaration on August 8, 1967, I was assigned by Ali Moertopo to study organizational collaboration among the Southeast Asian nations.

At the present time, the CSIS is very much involved in providing reports on China to the government and the private sector, particularly since the enactment of the ASEAN-China freetrade agreement at the start of this year.

I am the fourth generation offspring of immigrants from Fujian, China, who came here back in 1850. There are seven of us children, and I am the oldest. I was born in Sawahlunto, West Sumatra, a place known for its coal mines.

While I may be of Chinese descent, I never went to a Chinese school. When I was small, I went to a Dutch school in Padang, even though the city also had a good Chinese school. My grandfather and father, Lim Gim To, still communicated with each other in the Fujian dialect.

Our father was a strict disciplinarian and the rattan rod was a regular feature in our lives. By contrast, my mother, Katrina Tjoa Gim Jong Nio, was full of love and affection. She never spoke harshly to us, was always cheerful and had a positive influence on other people. It was she who taught us always to empathize with others.

In 1966, I was known as Liem Bian Kie. My younger brother, Sofjan Wanandi, then a student activist at the University of Indonesia, was known as Liem Bian Koen. After Suharto came to power, I changed my family name to Wanandi, and my younger siblings followed suit.

Sofjan and I have not had a political argument since the election of 2004. Sofjan, because he is close to Jusuf Kalla, supported the Yudhoyono-Kalla ticket, while I supported Megawati, not because she was better but rather because she was courageous enough to defend the policies of her subordinates. I did not see this same courage in Yudhoyono.

Because of our different political choices, Sofjan and I did not talk for three months. Whenever we met in our mother's house, we



In his CSIS office, Jakarta

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would always keep our distance. I would be in one corner and Sofjan would be in another. Seeing what was going on, Mother decided it was time to act. A great traveler, she invited us all to go on a 10-day family trip to China.

During the trip, naturally we did everything together: travel, eat, shop, and so bit by bit we began to forget about our differences. How could it be any different?

Upon our return from China, Sofjan was offered the Trade Ministry portfolio by Kalla. I wouldn't allow it. As a businessman and trader, he would be laboring under a conflict of interest if he accepted the offer. With the bureaucracy the way

it was, it would also have been impossible to make trade policy work. So Mari Pangestu, also a CSIS economist, was proposed instead. It took a year after Yudhoyono came to power for Sofjan to realize he had made the wrong choice.

I invited Jusuf Kalla to the launch of a short biography of our mother at the Jakarta Theater lounge some time after the 2009 election. Sofjan and I were united again, and were fully behind Jusuf Kalla. Speaking from the podium, I told Mother not to worry as Sofjan and I were both on the same wavelength this time around, and while Kalla's presidential bid had failed, he was still the best candidate. Kalla smiled when he heard this.



Jusuf Wanandi meeting former Malaysian Prime Minister, Abdullah Badawi. ISIS CE Mahani Zainal Abidin is on the extreme left

'Eyes and Ears'

On the advice of colleagues in the Catholic party, Jusuf Wanandi decided to get close to Sukarno, to help Suharto become president!

In 1964 I was an assistant professor and the executive secretary of the University of Indonesia's Law Faculty. The dean at that time was Professor Soejono Hadinmoto. When Soejono was appointed minister and deputy chair of the Supreme Advisory Council (DPA), he asked me to be his secretary.

Before deciding whether or not to take up the offer, I sought advice from my colleague, Harry Tjan, who was then the secretary-general of the Catholic Party. I said to him, "What do you think? I had hoped to become a professor." At the time I had intended seeking a scholarship to do my PhD at Harvard University in 1965, but in the end I cancelled the plan.

On the advice of Harry and other colleagues in the Catholic Party, I accepted Professor Soejono's offer. My colleagues said that I could serve as "eyes and ears" so as to identify those who were closest to Sukarno, bearing in mind that the political situation was heating up at the time. I was then the chairman of the Republic of Indonesia Catholic Students Association (PMKRI).

My office was in the palace. Sukarno also served as chair of the DPA so that I ended up being actively involved in his work. Almost every morning, I had breakfast with Sukarno and his guests in the Palace. Every Saturday night I would take part in *lenso* dance events at the Bogor Palace, something I fully enjoyed.

Upon my return from a visit to Europe at the start of August 1965, Sukarno fell ill. When I asked to visit him, I was prevented by one of his aides. "The President is not feeling well," he said. A few days later, the leader of the Indonesian



Sukarno and Suharto

Communist Party (PKI), D.N. Aidit, arrived with six or seven doctors from China. Since 1960, the PKI had been closer to the Chinese Communist Party than the Soviet Communist Party.

Sukarno's skin was covered with bluish spots—a telltale sign of kidney failure. The Chinese doctors told Aidit, "Whatever you have to do, do it now." That was in the middle of August, and at the end of the month the PKI began to prepare its next moves.

I myself did not hear the first broadcasts by the Generals' Council and Revolutionary Council on October 1, the broadcasts by Lieutenant-Colonel Untung. Rather, who I heard was Harry Tjan. I was on my way from the office to the Palace in a Toyota jeep belonging to the State Secretariat. I had decided to stop off at the Catholic Party's Documentation Bureau on Jalan Gunung Sahari. It was there that I bumped into Harry Tjan. "They're saying there's been shooting at Nasution's and Yani's homes."

Back then, the PMKRI worked closely with the Muslim Students Association (HMI) ...

Harry asked me to check whether Sukarno was at the Palace. I entered the State Secretariat and met Djamin, the President's secretary. I asked him where Sukarno was. Djamin replied that he did not know. However, he was only pretending. In reality, Sukarno had been at Halim since 10am. No one knew precisely what was happening at the time.

At around 2pm, I arrived back at Margasiswa, the headquarters of the PMKRI, on Jalan Sam Ratulangi, Central Jakarta. Just then, the second announcement by the Revolutionary Council came on the radio. So, there was a Revolutionary Council made up of 45 members, but no members from the Catholic Party? We immediately concluded, "It has to be the PKI." We were sure of this since there were also Catholics in

favor of Sukarno. So why were they not included on the council?

After realizing that the PKI was behind the maneuvers, the first thing we did was to ensure the safety of Kasimo, the chair of the Catholic Party—which was one of the few parties brave enough to stand up to the communists. He took refuge in the home of a friend in Kwitang, Central Jakarta. I was 27 years old at the time, was married and had been blessed with two children: Yudi and Ari. Concerned for their safety, I brought the children to my parents-in-law's house.

Back then, the PMKRI worked closely with the Muslim Students Association (HMI), whose members included Firdaus Wajdi, Sulastomo, Mar'ie Muhammad, Akbar Tandjung and Fahmi Idris. We organized our first demonstrations against what was happening on October 6, in front of Papernas. After that, we held demonstrations every day. We tried to use the Indonesian Students Union (PPMI) as a vehicle, but were unable to do so as many of its members were leftists. In the end, we set up the Indonesian Students Action Association (KAMI).



Des Alwi, Adnan Buyung Nasution, and Sofjan Wanandi

“Tell Sukarno that if he surrenders his powers to me, I will guarantee his safety ...”

We then held a mass meeting on November 9, which drew a crowd of 1.5 million to Banteng Square in Jakarta. The square was filled to capacity, with the crowd overflowing into the side streets. We demanded that the PKI be banned. We used the same tactic in the 1971 election, when we sent civil defense personnel around people’s houses, advising them that they would be regarded as PKI if they did not attend our meetings.

However, Sukarno refused to ban the PKI, and eventually the Indonesian National Students Movement (GMNI) and the Marhaen Youth (Pemuda Marhaen) launched a counteroffensive, and drew up a plan to attack the Salemba campus of the University of Indonesia, where KAMI was headquartered. The leaders of KAMI were armed with pistols, but amazingly none of them would work. I myself was carrying a Sten gun.

KAMI was dissolved on February 25, 1966. Tjakrabirawa (the Presidential security) troops tried to round us up and we were forced to move from house to house. Sofjan moved to Ali Moertopo’s house in Kebon Sirih, which is now his office. KAMI also moved its headquarters there. I was now actively involved in the Pancasila Front, which was attempting to get parties to support Suharto. It was also busy producing statements for students conducting protests.

As March 11 approached, the political temperature was becoming hotter than ever. On that day, Sukarno convened a cabinet meeting. Suharto was ill and unable to attend. The meeting started, and then at around 10am, Jakarta Garrison commander, Major-General Amir

Mahmud entered the room to report to Sukarno that unidentified troops were approaching the Palace.

Sukarno immediately fled to the Bogor Palace by helicopter, accompanied by Subandrio and Chairul Saleh. Three individuals present at the cabinet meeting, General M. Jusuf, Basuki Rachmat and Amir Mahmud, then went to confront Suharto at Jalan Agus Salim. Suharto asked them to go to Sukarno in Bogor. “Tell Sukarno that if he surrenders his powers to me, I will guarantee his safety and so forth.”

At the outset, Sukarno was unwilling to relinquish power, but in the end gave up because the three “emissaries” were quite close to him. As evening approached, the three returned to Suharto, bringing with them the letter that has since been known as the March 11 Order (abbreviated in Indonesian as “Supersemar”). I never read the letter. Its contents directed the restoration of public order and security, and secondly, that the Great Leader of the Revolution (Sukarno), his family and his doctrines be defended. However, this second point was soon erased.

We activists of the Pancasila Front and KAMI were asleep when Kemal Idris arrived to tell us that Suharto wanted to meet us. At around 9pm, we were shown the Supersemar to elicit our support for the banning and dissolution of the PKI and the restoration of public order. The following day, the RPKAD (Army Special Forces) staged a show of force in the form of a parade of tanks.

When Sukarno found out about the tank parade and the planned dissolution of the PKI, he was livid. On March 14, he summoned all the commanders to the Palace and chewed them out. Suharto, however, pretended not to know about it.

Based on the Supersemar, a three-man presidium was appointed to take care of day-to-day governance. Suharto became its chairman and

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had responsibility for security, Adam Malik was given responsibility for politics and foreign relations, while Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX was assigned the task of managing the economy.

Sukarno became even angrier when he heard that relations with Malaysia had been normalized on August 15. Two days later, Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak was invited as a guest of honor to the Palace. Sukarno now realized it was an act of *fait accompli*, and the tension continued to rise between him and Suharto.

In order to resolve this dualism, Mashuri's Law Graduates Association urged the MPRS (Ad Hoc People's Consultative Assembly) to hold a special session to demand accountability from Sukarno over the September 30, 1965 incident.

This session was convened in February 1967. We all wanted Suharto to become president.

The problem was, however, that Suharto was unwilling to use the term *Pedjabat Presiden* (acting president), preferring instead, *Pemangku Pedjabat Presiden* (caretaker of the presidency—*Ed.*). According to Suharto, "I only want to be the one to guard the presidency. If I use the term 'acting president', people would curse me." The debate went on all night in the lobby outside the hall where the plenary session was taking place.

In the end, the solution was that Suharto would be styled as *PD Presiden* in Indonesian, in which the 'PD' could be read as *Pedjabat* (acting) for short, or the abbreviation of *Pemangku Pedjabat* as in the old spelling, thus satisfying all concerned.



Jusuf Wanandi at the 21st Asia Pacific Roundtable, 2007



A Parting of Ways

After 20 years, the CSIS began to part company with Suharto. One regret has been the inability to be close to Muslim groups



Meeting President Suharto

When Suharto and I were establishing the New Order, what age were you all? Still in elementary school? Don't you know that it was I who made Suharto president?"

This was the "lecture" I gave to a number of Military Police officers while I was questioned inside the Guntur Detention Center in Jakarta. It was May 1998 and the political situation was very tense. There had been a series of disturbances and bombings all over the country. I and my younger brother, Sofjan, had been rounded up in connection with the bombing in Tanah Tinggi, Jakarta's Senen area, in January that year. The spotlight of suspicion had fallen upon us as a result of an email purportedly sent by an activist from the People's Democratic Party.

Prior to the questioning, I had been summoned by the Strategic Intelligence Agency, which had barred us from traveling abroad for

about two months. The end of the process was the preparation of the final case files by officers of the Jakarta Metropolitan Police. From the outset, the police had been very sympathetic. "Sorry, Sir, this is really nothing to do with us. We don't believe it, but what can we do?" they told us.

I have no idea who implicated my brother and I in that bombing. But our relations with Suharto had grown strained for some time. In fact, ever since I wrote him a memo back in 1987. Ten years later, Sofjan rejected in no uncertain terms the nomination of Habibie for vice president when he spoke to General Prabowo. At the time, Prabowo had thought we were inviting him to stage a coup against Suharto.

After the questioning, a number of media organizations reported that I regretted what had happened. It is true that I had expressed a certain regret over what had happened. However, I did

... society was becoming more complex with the rise of the middle class that Suharto himself had fostered during his 20 years in power

not mean that I regretted the political accusation, but rather, I meant that our relations with Muslim groups were not as good as they once were.

Throughout the Old Order, the Catholic Party and Masyumi had been great friends. When Masyumi was banned by Sukarno, we defended them. However, after 1966, an old problem returned to divide us, namely, the polemics over the Jakarta Charter. At the start of his presidency Suharto was not close to the Muslim groups, however, in time, he closed the gap.

The memo that I wrote landed on Suharto's desk one day in September 1987. Golkar had just won its fourth election, and Suharto was once again set to be reelected. The memo contained only two points, with detailed explanations being given for each point. The first one pointed out that society was becoming more complex with the rise of the middle class that Suharto himself had fostered during his 20 years in power. As a consequence, society was becoming increasingly difficult to govern, unlike during previous times of chaos when Suharto had emerged as a hero. Accordingly, I said, Suharto needed to appoint new team members that were better able to govern such a complex society.

Secondly, I told Suharto that he needed to come up with a new vision for Indonesia over the coming 20 years. It was no longer enough to tinker with short-term solutions, I said, while advising him to delegate more powers to his coordinating ministers. "You cannot do everything by yourself." But I knew that this was precisely what he wanted

to do so as to be able to obtain businesses for all of his children.

I was aware that after 20 years I was no longer in a position to advise Suharto what was in the country's best interests. As I had expected, he got upset. He ordered his ministers to have nothing more to do with us. A number of generals who were close to us now had to keep their distances, such as Wiyogo Atmodarminto, who was then the Jakarta Governor. They were also prohibited from giving Sofjan any business project.

Despite the difficulties, the CSIS was able to keep on operating. The credibility this institute had built up on the international stage meant that there was no shortage of patrons and support for our research work.

The business interests of the Suharto children were not only a cause of concern to me. Two weeks before he passed away in 1984, Ali Moertopo dropped by my home. "The situation is getting worse. The Suhartos are everywhere," he said, adding, "If the situation continues like this, it's not only he who will be destroyed. This Republic will be destroyed!"

He had come to ask me to speak to Benny Moerdani. "Ask him to speak to Suharto, to rein in his children." Among old hands like us, only Benny was still in Suharto's inner circle. Ali was now serving as the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council (DPA), a post that was outside the Suharto circle.

In fact, Benny had already taken the steps to look after the Suharto children. He first

But I knew that this was precisely what he wanted to do so as to be able to obtain businesses for all of his children

withheld the passport of Sigit Harjojudanto, Suharto's first son, to stop him from gambling overseas. In one night, Sigit could blow US\$2 million on the casino tables. This sort of money, Benny pointed out, could go a long way towards alleviating poverty in Indonesia. Benny had also warned Siti Hardijanti Rukmana, Tutut, Suharto's eldest daughter, to watch her step.

The situation became more complex when the children complained to Suharto about Benny's style of supervision. Then Prabowo, Suharto's son-in-law, also became upset when he was pulled out of the Middle East. Then a mid-ranking officer in the Special Forces, Prabowo was known for his short temper and for roughing up his men. As a result, he had a lot of enemies, and who knows what might could happen to him on the ground. Benny obviously did not want any "accident" to befall the son-in-law of the President and chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces.

After 20 years, there was no doubt that Suharto had become arrogant. Back when he was still the caretaker president, I and my friends often gave him advice. Essentially, he was a naturally intelligent person but had not received much

formal education. When he became used to being president and understood what he was doing, he no longer sought advice from others.

After Ali Moertopo died, Suharto reminded everyone that people had previously said he would be unable to perform without Ali. "But here we are," Suharto said, "Ali's gone and I'm still President."

This was also the case with Soedjono Hoemardani. Romo Diyat in Semarang, spiritual advisor to both of them, had once told Soedjono to take care of Suharto as it had been predicted that one day he would be a great man. That was the reason why Soedjono withheld Suharto's letter of resignation from the military.

At the time, Suharto felt he had no future in the military, as he had only been appointed deputy commander of the Mandala Siaga command. In reality, he enjoyed seniority over Omar Dani, who was his superior. In the Army, Suharto was the second most senior officer after General Ahmad Yani. However, Suharto was excluded from Yani's inner circle because he was unable to speak either Dutch or English.



With Ali Moertopo

Conversations with Jusuf Wanandi

Suharto consistently rejected suggestions that Soedjono was his spiritual teacher. “Djono can kiss my hand,” he often said. In fact, it was Soedjono who acted as the go-between in the spiritual relations between Suharto and Romo Diyat.

Suharto was also not averse to insulting people. He would often suggest that Sofjan Wanandi’s success as a businessman was due solely to the fact that he had been on the winning side back in 1966.

After Suharto’s fall from power, Benny told me that he had been visited by Suharto’s daughter Tutut, who accused him of being arrogant for not coming to see her father. Benny immediately responded that if Suharto wanted to see him, he would never refuse. So Tutut arranged a meeting at Sigit’s house, where Suharto asked Benny what he had done wrong to be ousted from power. Benny steadfastly replied, “You left the Armed Forces, even though it was the Armed Forces which gave you your power base all that time.”



Jusuf Wanandi at ISIS Events



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