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Title: The Future Shape of the Alliance between Japan and the United States for the Next 25-45 years

Summary: In order to speculate the future shape of the bilateral alliance, I turn my eye to two hundred years ago. In 1820 the power configuration in the Asia Pacific was roughly as follows according to Angus Maddison. China was under Qing and its economic weight was very heavy, pumping out some 30 percent of world GNP. India was under Mughal and its economic weight was very heavy, pumping out some 25 percent of world GNP. At that time Europe was only beginning to industrialize, pumping out some 10 percent of world GNP. In other words, Asia was economically dominant in the world. According to the Qing historical document named Jiaqing huidian, the chronicle of Emperor Jiaqing, published in 1816, carried an interesting perception of the world in the Qing eye. According to Jiaqing huidian, there are two kinds of states surrounding China. One is a tributary state while the other is a trading state. The former includes Vietnam, Korea and England. The latter includes France, the Netherlands and Japan. Why was England categorized as a tributary state in the Qing eye? Presumably because King George III sent an emissary headed by Lord Macartney to Emperor Qianlung in 1793 with a huge number of gifts, requesting Qianlung to open the ports and the country. Why was Japan categorized as a trading state? Because Japan did not send its tributary mission to China for some centuries. As a matter of fact, Japan was not really a trading state either. Because Japan forbade foreign trade except at a tiny port called Deshima, Nagasaki with Chinese and Dutch merchants for some two centuries. Japan in early 19th century was pumping out some 10 percent of world GNP. Some 25-45 years thereafter, what happened to Asia? The rise of the West headed by England. Key variables are demography and military technology and of course political systems.

Turning to the early 21st century, the power configuration in Asia is roughly as follows. Asia pumps out the largest GNP and foreign trade in the world with some 30 percent of

world population. In other words, the rise of Asia is real and somewhat similar to Asia's power configuration in the early 19th century. How will demography, military technology and political systems evolve in Asia for the next 25-45 years? Demographically, China will be stalled and its economic developmental momentum will be slowed down, registering some 3-7 percent annual economic growth rate. The only two countries out of the current military powers of the world, India and the United States, will be vibrant demographically circa 2050. In terms of military technology, Asia will acquire and develop weapons steadily. Whereas research and development investment in weapons is currently dominated by the United States, the drastic cuts in defense expenditure for the next 5-10 years in the US federal budget will mean that research and development expenditure in weapons will be curtailed and that its current dominance will be moderated somewhat. In terms of political systems, the picture for the next 25-45 years is unclear. Two big trends may emerge. One is the increase in the presidential system and the other is the increasing contrast between democratic maritime Asia and authoritarian continental Asia. How China will evolve for the next 25-45 years in terms of political systems remains to be speculated.

I now turn to the alliance between Japan and the United States. The alliance will be sticky like japonica rice. And this characteristic will be immensely appreciated during the potentially stormy next 25-45 years.