

SPECIAL EDITION

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## The 26<sup>th</sup> Asia-Pacific Roundtable

*28-30 May 2012, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia*

*Asian Security Governance and Order*



## CONFERENCE REPORT



INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (ISIS) MALAYSIA

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## ABOUT ISIS MALAYSIA

The Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia was established on 8 April 1983, in realization of a decision made by the Malaysian Government to set up an autonomous, not-for-profit research organization that would act as the nation's think-tank. ISIS Malaysia was envisioned to contribute towards sound public policy formulation and discourse.

The research mandate of ISIS therefore spans a wide area. It includes economics, foreign policy and security studies, social policy, and technology, innovation, environment and sustainability.

ISIS Malaysia today fosters dialogue and promotes the exchange of views and opinions at both national and international levels. It undertakes research in collaboration with national and international organizations, in important areas such as national development and international affairs.

ISIS Malaysia also engages actively in Track Two diplomacy, fostering high-level dialogues at national, bilateral and regional levels, through discussions with influential policymakers and thought leaders.

## RESEARCH

### Economics

Research in this area is generally aimed at promoting rapid and sustained economic growth and equitable development in the nation. We study specific (rather than generic) issues that concern the nation's competitiveness, productivity, growth and income. Areas of research include macroeconomic policy, trade and investment, banking and finance, industrial and infrastructure development and human capital and labour market development. The objective of all our research is to develop actionable policies and to spur institutional change.

### Foreign Policy and Security Studies

The primary aim of this programme is to provide relevant policy analyses on matters pertaining to Malaysia's strategic interests as well as regional and international issues, with a focus on the Asia-Pacific Region. These include security studies, foreign policy, Southeast Asian politics and military affairs.

## Social policy

Demographic and socio-cultural trends are changing Malaysian society and the social policy programme was established to respond to these developments. Research in this area is concerned with effective nation building, and fostering greater national unity. In particular, we look at issues involving the youth, women and underprivileged communities. In conducting its research, ISIS Malaysia networks with non-governmental organizations and civil society groups.

## Technology, Innovation, Environment & Sustainability (TIES)

The TIES programme provides strategic foresight, collaborative research and policy advice to the public sector, businesses and policy audiences, on technology, innovation, environment and sustainable development. Its focus includes green growth as well as energy, water and food security. Towards this end, TIES has been active in organizing dialogues, forums, policy briefs and consultancies.

## HIGHLIGHTS

ISIS Malaysia has, among others, researched and provided concrete policy recommendations for:

- Greater empowerment and revitalization of a national investment promotion agency;
- A strategic plan of action to capitalize on the rapid growth and development of a vibrant Southeast Asian emerging economy;
- A Master Plan to move the Malaysian economy towards knowledge-based sources of output growth;
- The conceptualization of a national vision statement;
- Effective management and right-sizing of the public sector; and
- Strengthening of ASEAN institutions and co-operation processes.

ISIS Malaysia has organized the highly regarded Asia-Pacific Roundtable, an annual conference of high-level security policymakers, implementers and thinkers, since 1986.

## INTERNATIONAL NETWORKING

As a member of the Track Two community, ISIS Malaysia participates in the following networks:

- ASEAN-ISIS network of policy research institutes;
- Council for Security and Cooperation in Asia and the Pacific (CSCAP);
- Network of East Asian Think Tanks (NEAT); and
- Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC).

It is also a partner institute of the World Economic Forum (WEF).

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## Conference Report

### The 26<sup>th</sup> Asia-Pacific Roundtable

**T**he 26<sup>th</sup> Asia-Pacific Roundtable was convened in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, from 28 to 30 May 2012. Continuing its tradition of being the premier Track Two security conference in the Asia Pacific, this year's Roundtable attracted more than 370 security experts, policy-makers and academics from the Asia-Pacific region. It was organised by the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia, on behalf of the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS). This report was compiled by **Mr Woo Hon Weng**, with the assistance of **Mr Alizan Mahadi**, **Ms Natalie Shobana Ambrose**, **Dr Jorah Ramlan**, **Ms Mazlena Mazlan**, **Ms Nor Izzatina Abdul Aziz**, **Mr Shahnaz Sharifuddin**, **Mr Shahrman Lockman**, **Mr Billy Tea** and **Ms Zarina Zainuddin**.



(From left) Muthiah Alagappa and Brian Job

The Hon. Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dato' Sri Mohd. Najib Tun Abdul Razak officiated at the Roundtable and delivered the Keynote Address. The following report covers the ten plenary sessions and two concurrent sessions convened at the Roundtable this year.

#### Asian Security: Order or Disorder

The Asian Security Order has undergone significant change over time. The Cold War order (1945-1990) based on realist and instrumental dynamics, is being overtaken by efforts towards the construction of a contractual order. The eventual goal of the post-Cold War order is the formation of a communitarian order. The degree

and type of order at a particular point in time showed variations across both issues and sub-regions. In the post-Cold War era, the Asian Security Order has been driven by three key dynamics:

1. **Nation- and state-making:** Most of the conflicts in Asia, whether between North and South Korea, or between China and Taiwan, or between India and Pakistan, all relate to nation- and state-making. Conflicts over political systems such as in Thailand are also related to state-making;
2. **Rise of Asian powers:** This relates particularly to the rise of China and the impact this has for the security of Asia;

3. **Economic growth, competition, and cooperation:** Economic growth has become the primary focus of Asian governments. Asia has become one of the three core world regions with the prospect of becoming the hub of the world.

Interactions between these three dynamics have created a very complex security environment. Therefore, multiple arrangements and strategies are required for constructing and sustaining security order in Asia. The largely zero-sum machinations of the Cold War has been replaced by much more complicated relations which makes for cooperation and cross-cutting interdependence, as well as conflict. In this situation, there are multiple pathways to order. Bilateralism, regionalism, and the balance of power have assumed greater significance in sustaining order in Asia while hegemony has declined after a very brief spurt.

The roles of these different pathways varied in three different issue areas related to the security order:

1. **Rules:** Asia relies extensively on global regimes. Regional rules mostly emphasize principles and norms, and rarely go into regulatory and enforcement rules;
2. **Goals:** National goals still dominate, with very few collective goals;
3. **Instruments of Order:** Force is still relevant in a wide range of hardcore issues, whether it be in the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Straits or the India-Pakistan border. However, force is more relevant in the defence and deterrence role than offensive imperatives.

In conclusion, security governance in Asia is still very much in the realist mode; security governance in Northeast Asia and South Asia is overwhelmingly in the realist mode, while in Southeast Asia, there is some movement in the

contractual direction; dispute settlement is important, with significant scope for progress at the Track Two level; and fostering the development of nations and states in Asia is important, as the fundamental building blocks of regional community-building are nation states.

The impact of the burgeoning 'angry citizens' in Asia, coupled with the impact of the information revolution, is viewed as increasingly undermining the ability of governments to maintain control, thus contributing to a potential future source of disorder in Asia. According to a participant, political systems that appear legitimate at some point, in due course no longer look legitimate, and it is important to realize that one-party systems which have been the dominant mode of governance in many countries in Asia, cannot survive forever, as sovereignty now resides with the people, not with governments *per se*.

### China's Strategic Vision and Regional Security

The 'New Security Concept' developed by China in the post-Cold War era proposed that traditional security, based on military alliance, coercion and power politics be replaced by a new security structure based on mutual trust and benefit, equality and coordination. For over a decade, this has been China's fundamental guiding philosophy to address international security issues.



Tong Xiaoling



Simon Tay

The new security concept is founded on four major policy pillars :

1. Building friendship and partnership with neighbouring countries;
2. Pursuing a strategy of opening-up for mutual benefit;
3. Building an open, transparent, inclusive and representative Asia-Pacific security structure;
4. Having a defensive national defence policy.

In maintaining regional security, China has emphasized equally both the bilateral and multilateral approaches. Bilaterally, it has established security dialogues and defence consultations with the majority of Asia Pacific countries, at various levels. This is to enhance mutual understanding and trust and help to prevent miscalculations and misunderstanding.

Multilaterally, it has promoted the development of security cooperation, and actively participated in regional and international security mechanisms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), ARF, ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM+), the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), and the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum. China has also proposed the creation of the ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC) at the vice-defence ministerial level.

Regarding territorial disputes over land and maritime boundaries with its neighbours, China looks for fair and responsible solutions jointly with its neighbours. It has successfully resolved land demarcations with all of its neighbours except India and Bhutan. As regards the South China Sea dispute, China proposes to shelve the differences for the moment and consider joint development to engender trust and foster co-operation.

To maintain peace and stability and create favourable conditions for claimant states to finally

solve the maritime disputes, China has encouraged adherence to international laws such as the 1982 *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea* (UNCLOS), and the 2002 *Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea* (DOC) signed by China and ASEAN countries. China is also willing to formulate a code of conduct (COC) with ASEAN countries.

A participant asserted that China does not perceive the US pivot strategy as a threat, as is commonly believed, because during the bilateral talks between Chinese President Hu Jintao and US President Barack Obama, the Asia Pacific was described as large enough to accommodate the interests of both countries. However, existing security cooperation at the diplomatic and defence levels between the US and China should be used to ensure that one country's security will not be to the detriment of another country's security.

It is also suggested that China's domestic politics, such as the forthcoming leadership transition, will affect foreign policy. A participant asserted that although every country's domestic politics will affect its foreign policy, in China's case this is mitigated to a large extent by the leadership consensus that principles on foreign policy are above domestic politics.

### India and the Security of Asia

India's rise is a work in progress. High economic growth has enabled India to become the tenth largest economy in the world. It has a sizeable military because it has the world's eighth largest defence spending. Nevertheless, India is still a developing country. It is the largest of the middle powers while being the weakest of the major powers.

One of its strategic drawbacks is the 'continental' security posture forced on it by the fact it is located in a difficult part of the world in which to develop as a power – the 'wrong side of the track.' India also suffers from acute problems






*C Raja Mohan*



*Carolina Hernandez*



*Sandy Gordon*



*S D Muni*

with governance and an incomplete economic reform process.

Other factors to take into account are India's hostile South Asian geostrategic environment (conflict with Pakistan and border disputes with China), reliance on the Persian Gulf for energy, and the importance of the Indian Ocean in India's overall strategy. The Indian Ocean is seen as a protective ring fence and strategic backyard for the Indian Navy, while its Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) are regarded vital in terms of energy and trade links.

Despite having a Look East Policy, India does not actively pursue the policy as can be discerned from the disposition of its resources on the ground. Therefore, India is not yet a full-fledged strategic player in East and Southeast Asia.

Recognizing its current limitations and to avoid overestimating its own strength, India follows a middle path in regional security by focusing on its internal development in collaboration with other partners in Asia to create a peaceful periphery around itself.

Therefore, India will not take a leadership role in Asia despite its participation in regional cooperation and integration schemes such as the ARF and the East Asia Summit (EAS), which it believes should be led by ASEAN. However, India is willing to make some contributions by promoting engagement and building partnerships with all.

To harness its full potential so as to play an effective security role in Asia, India may have to fast-track the following: military modernization and outreach capabilities; economic reforms and wealth creation; bureaucratic strength and resilience; and decision-making and delivery of promises.

### **US Strategic Interests and Roles in Asia**

The Obama administration's concept of 'pivoting' and 'rebalancing' denote the new US policy in Asia. While some countries welcome the move others receive it with caution. The policy is acknowledged as the natural progression of US foreign policy following the focus on the Middle East in recent years. The gridlock in domestic politics which constrain Obama's domestic plans has further contributed to the focus on Asia.

The US does not consider this concept as a 'return' of US interest to the region since it believes that it never left the region in the first place. Military analysts may agree with this notion based on existing US military bases in the Asia Pacific region. Sceptics however, believe that the US 'return' to the region is due to the economic and military expansion of China.

The six key lines of action introduced by the Obama administration in order to achieve the



*Jusuf Wanandi*



*Norodom Sirivudh*



*Duane D Thiessen*



*Hideki Asari*

new US policy in Asia were : strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening US working relationships with emerging powers including China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions such as ASEAN, APEC, EAS, and ARF; expanding trade and investment by means of such tools as APEC and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights.

The US is determined to continue to play a central role in maintaining peace and stability in the region and to be an integral part of regional economic integration. It is willing to work with partners in the region bilaterally and multilaterally bases, and to be a co-partner in supporting the liberal order.

US interests and roles in Asia are viewed with caution by many countries with respect to the impact of these on domestic and regional security and on economic development. While the US denies its objective is to maintain primacy in Asia and to contain China's economic and military development, its current economic and military policies are perceived to be contradictory to its declarations.

Some participants highlighted examples such as the TPP initiative and the exclusion of China in TPP, the geographical dispersal and re-deployment of the US military to Darwin,

Australia, and to Guam, and the proposal for a separate secretariat for the East Asia Summit as signs of the US enlarging its political, strategic and economic footprint in the region.

#### **Southeast Asian Perspectives on Regional Security Order**

Regional order needs to serve at least five main strategic objectives, according to ASEAN member states: preserve ASEAN's centrality (Southeast Asia's autonomy); accommodate major powers; prevent strategic rivalry among major powers as well as concerts of power among them; ensure ASEAN's unimpeded access to material benefits (defence, trade, investment, financial cooperation, market access, and so on); and facilitate regional integration (ASEAN community-building).

The current regional security order from Southeast Asian perspectives is driven by three strategic developments: the rise of China; the US attempt to retain its primacy; the implications of both for Sino-US relations.

This in turn brings about three strategic implications for ASEAN: polarization of ASEAN should the Sino-US rivalry intensify; marginalization of ASEAN's role as a 'manager of regional order;' unsustainable centrality of ASEAN while regional unity would have to be abandoned by member states that are forced to take sides in



*Rizal Sukma*



*Hitoshi Tanaka*



*Tan See Seng*



*Nguyen Hung Son*

the emerging Sino-US rivalry, for the pursuit of national security.

Southeast Asia can be likened to an airport and ASEAN to a control tower. ASEAN has the capability to become this control tower that would manage all powers and accommodate them in order to provide a secure environment for everyone. The hedging strategy is aimed at: 1) moderating the potential negative implications of the rise of China for regional order, and 2) reducing US dominance as a hegemonic power in the region, by emphasizing the centrality of ASEAN in regional security.

However, ASEAN still needs to overcome three main constraints: the perception of ASEAN as a crisis-driven institution; the lack of commitment towards community-building, exemplified by the relatively low level of

investments in ASEAN by its own members; and the imitating form rather than substance of the security community concept.

Unless these constraints are solved, ASEAN will continue to have difficulty in convincing its detractors, and crucially, its dialogue partners who have invested in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), and ASEAN's wider complex of regional institutions, that 'ASEAN Centrality' is worth supporting.

### **Middle Powers and Regional Governance and Order**

Middle major powers are countries that sit just below the powers at the top of the international hierarchy. They possess capabilities beyond those of the next tier of countries and have surplus capability that allows them to more than simply meet the basic necessities of statehood and statecraft. They can act autonomously when their interests are threatened, and they possess the resources and capabilities to defend their homeland. They are principal players on the international stage rather than the supporting cast. These characteristics aptly describe Canada and South Korea.

Despite the view that it is declining in global importance, Canada still exhibits the characteristics of a middle power. The nation retains its networks of expertise, and its continued



*(From left) Koji Watanabe and David Dewitt*





*Lee Chung Min*

presence on the world stage through membership in a host of key multilateral organizations.

Canada's technical competencies in the financial regulatory sector have become a major and highly regarded diplomatic asset, and most recently it contributed considerably to the international response to the global financial crisis. Canada can leverage on its credentials, especially in institutions such as the G20, to support East Asian diplomatic, economic, and development goals.

Canadian bilateralism with Asian G20 members will not necessarily overlook important states like Singapore, Malaysia, and New Zealand. Relations with non-G20 Asian states can also be developed through Canadian membership in newly-emerging multilateral arrangements, possibly including the TPP.

The prominence of the South Korean development model, given the nation's successful economic transition and political transformation from authoritarian politics to one of Asia's most vibrant democracies, has enabled South Korea to brand itself as a middle power.

For South Korea's longer term stability, the major focus has to be on fostering institutionalized trilateral cooperation and enhanced transparency between China, Japan and South Korea, as exemplified by the launching of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) in September 2011. Such cooperation is essential to ensure that the transition to a unified Korea is achieved with minimal fallout, and with maximum security, economic and political dividends for all of the principal players, including the core members of the Six Party Talks.

### **Asia in the Eyes of China**

China generally sees Asia-Pacific countries in terms of geopolitical distance - the closer, the more important - and as divided into mainland Asia and Oceanic Asia. Patron-client relations are regarded by China as central in the international relations of Asia-Pacific countries. Asian countries meanwhile are seen as having mixed feelings about China.

China therefore needs a new foreign policy that will see it becoming a 'responsible stakeholder' but the region also needs a new China policy. In the future, China may have to reform its domestic economy and foreign policy in order to become a pillar of the global order and not just become a conditional and occasional participant in the 'Western liberal order.' China is likely to become both the largest market for the rest of the region and also 'a provider of security insurance' for Asia, by allowing others to rely on it for their security.

Asia remains 'divided and vulnerable,' despite the emergence of regional security cooperation. Progress is constrained by the competition between the old, US-dominated military alliances and the new ARF, EAS, SCO and Six-Party Talks (SPT) frameworks. The combination of old (border, historical grievances) and emerging (maritime, strategic) disputes contributes to the complexity of the situation.



*Ong Keng Yong*



*Huang Xiaoming*



*Zhang Yunling*



*Pang Zhong-ying*

China sees the TPP as a new US initiative to maintain its primacy by casting China as an outsider. It also views the US 'back to Asia strategy' as a direct and strategic threat targeting it. If the TPP were to supplant current efforts within APEC, the spirit of Asia-Pacific cooperation may be weakened.

The US and China will however remain cautious and pragmatic in managing bilateral tensions due to the shared interests of both countries. Other countries in Asia will increasingly hedge their policies due to China's increasing importance and influence.

### **Governance in Asia: What's Best and What Works by the Hon. Tun Dr. Mahathir**

Governance in Asia, according to Tun Dr. Mahathir, the former Prime Minister of Malaysia,

faces a dilemma, as there is no perfect system of governance. Imperfection is inevitable and therefore has to be tolerated.

In a democratic system, the government is formed by representatives chosen by the people, but achieving unanimity and consensus is problematic. So people settled on a majority, and even that is not problem-free. The benefit of democracy lies in the ability of a nation to change its government if it does not deliver. However, by manipulating elections, such as through bribery, even an unpopular government can come to power.

Administering and implementing policies in a democratic system is not easy either. Some rights can be disruptive when they are abused, such as the right to freedom of expression. In some developing countries, the right to freedom of expression is being misused, to the detriment of the economies of these countries; investments are deterred and employment creation disrupted. The tendency of certain groups towards disruptive and destabilizing activities creates a challenge to governments. Governments now need the right skills to manage such groups, especially in this age of information technology that undermines governments' ability to control the media.



*Mahathir Mohamed*

The proper practice of democracy means the ability to change a government through the ballot box. There is now a new notion of liberal democracy. However, Malaysia is not liberal in several ways, such as in issues of gay rights. Even in countries that practice a liberal democratic system, undemocratic practices will be undertaken when the need arises, and people will give liberalism a second thought. A clear example would be the detention of people without trial as the terrorism risk proliferates.

While reforms have to be undertaken to achieve better governance, they should be carried out gradually, without risking instability. Russia and China are different in one important respect: the extent to which the reform of their economic and political systems has emulated the West.

Russia tries to reform both systems at the same time, and faces great difficulty in doing so. China on the other hand maintains its political system, changing its economic system only partly, and finds itself more successful. In its present form of governance, China has also exemplified its success in managing a huge and diverse population. India is comparatively more difficult to manage due to 'excessive' democracy.

### Role of Non-State Actors in Promoting Conflict Resolution

Non-state actors such as NGOs and civil society work on ways to mitigate the fallout from conflicts and also to prevent future conflicts. They are most effective in providing confidence-building measures that enable the transformation of the conflict narrative and offer a new vision for society. However, support from the government, both at the central and local levels, is essential for their efforts to be successful, as seen in case studies of Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

In the case of Thailand, throughout the history of the nation's dealings with the Patani Malay separatist movement, the idea of including civil society in a formal peace negotiation process never materialized in a meaningful way. Thai military and civilian officials see the conflict as an internal matter and genuinely believe it would be a waste of political capital to bring in outsiders who could very well put the discussion of the legitimacy of the Thai state in the Malay homeland on the table.

With the exception of the National Security Council (NSC) initiative, in which the process tried to bring on board members of civil society and other stakeholders to form a



(From left) Rizal Panggabean, Charlito Manlupig, John Brandon and Don Pathan

## Conference Report

'partnership for peace,' other initiatives were mainly looking to secure a one-time peace agreement to end the conflict once and for all.

In Indonesia, the issue of whether civil society was able to mitigate and prevent communal violence was determined by the type of civic engagement. From 1999-2002, during a time of regime crisis and the ensuing political and economic turmoil, violence erupted in Ambon between Christians and Muslims while peace prevailed in Manado. Inter-religious, day-to-day civic life was found to be higher in Manado compared to Ambon, contributing to peace and preventing violence in local communities.

The Mindanao case demonstrates the key role of civil society: organized and concerted efforts by stakeholders, both local and international, to manage conflict and prevent violence. In August 2011, the peace process between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Philippines government was failing, with the strong possibility of renewed war, and both sides swapping accusations and counter-accusations in public statements as well as interviews with the media. Local, regional and national coalitions of civil society peace advocates held dialogues and issued calls for sobriety as they urged both sides to continue talking.

The Consortium of Bangsa Moro Civil Society (CBCS) asked the opposing camps to 'talk to each other instead of talking about each other in the media.' International civil society organizations represented by the International Contact Group (The Asia Foundation, Conciliation Resources and Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue) also did an excellent job in bridging and facilitating backchannel negotiations.

### **New Dawn in Myanmar: Possibilities and Prospects**

The previous military government in Myanmar, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) fulfilled the 7-step roadmap to democracy and



*Tin Maung Maung Than*



*Richard Grant*



*Yin Yin Myint*



*Patrick Cronin*

transferred power in accordance with the state constitution, adopted via the 2008 referendum. The new elected civilian government which assumed power in March 2011 implemented ongoing political reforms which saw the establishment of democratic institutions such as national and regional parliaments, and respective administrative, legislative, and judicial bodies, to exercise state power.

Efforts were also made towards political reconciliation. An opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD) was permitted to participate and win most seats in a historic by-election which saw the election to parliament of NLD leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. Engagement with the various rebel ethnic groups (Shan, Kachin, and Kayin) continues apace. Strong commitment has been given to carrying out economic reforms to



attract foreign investments and establish a market economy for rural development and poverty alleviation. In recognition of the positive developments made by the Myanmar government, the US, EU, Canada, and Australia suspended economic sanctions.

However, it remains to be seen whether political stability can keep pace with the momentum of the reform process. The reactions amongst the rank and file of the military to current political developments will determine the future trajectory. The core interests of the current crop of military officers are not affected by reforms thus far but the government must contend with the issue of diluted privileges and frustrated aspirations among its younger officers. The institution of electoral democracy still needs to mature and to meet the high expectations and increasing demands of a population in the face of limited available resources.

None of the domestic and external stakeholders want the reforms to be reversed but the reforms can yet stall. This is likely because

high expectations and small setbacks can have magnified effects. Therefore, other countries will need to temper their irrational exuberance or 'Myanmar mania' though they must embrace the reform movement.

Some participants pointed out that the NLD needs to transform from being merely an opposition party by first establishing its position and then formulating policy prescriptions to demonstrate its readiness to govern. Otherwise, disillusionment amongst the people may induce them to vote for the ruling party. This is among the possible developments that could affect the outcome of the next Myanmar general elections to be held in 2015.

#### **Securing the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC): Threats and Responses**

The gap in state capacity, stability and economic development between the western and eastern portions of the Indian Ocean Rim resulted in diverging security dynamics along their respective Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC). Piracy and



*(From left) Euan Graham, Vijay Sakhuja, Noor Aziz Yunan and Diego Ruiz-Palmer*









sea robbery are gradually being relegated to the lower-order realm of maritime crime, and in future might no longer be considered a maritime security issue in Southeast Asia. Specific responses from within the Southeast Asian region, improved shipping industry 'self-help' measures, and external pressure and capacity provision have also played a role.

This contrasts with the situation in the Gulf of Aden, and off Somalia, where strategic progress in counter-piracy remains elusive. Nevertheless, international efforts in the Gulf of Aden are laudable and effective. Maritime forces have managed to cooperate despite the differences in political-military command structures. This is paying off in terms of shared experience, as the western Indian Ocean littoral states gradually acquire their own maritime law enforcement capabilities and cooperation forums such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) established in 2008.

NATO also played an important role as exemplified by Operation Ocean Shield for the purpose of counter-piracy in the Indian Ocean. This is in accordance with the Alliance Maritime Strategy and Maritime Security Operations Concept which authorized its naval forces to support law-enforcement efforts at sea within the legal framework of international law.

However, piracy is a law enforcement problem that should be addressed by constabulary forces such as coast guards instead of the navy. Despite the successes thus far, counter-piracy addresses symptoms rather than the root of the problem; piracy originates in the failure of governance which results in fragile and failed states. Therefore, the focus should be directed at re-building countries and helping their recovery from conflicts.



Alain Aeschlimann



Wendy Southern

### Managing Illicit Transnational Migration in Asia

The crimes of trafficking in persons and people smuggling are serious concerns to many countries due to the trend of the increasing number of victims. As these crimes take place across borders, concerted efforts by states are required to prevent and prosecute the perpetrators, as well as to protect the victims. This requires not only efforts by governments, but stakeholders at all levels, including NGOs and civil society.

Relevant laws and procedures should be in place to enable impartial humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to allow all migrants effective and safe access, without discrimination, and irrespective of their legal status. Screening and identification of the different migrant categories, including victims of trafficking, asylum seekers and refugees, is necessary.

Due to the transnational nature of human trafficking and people smuggling, these problems cannot be addressed by any nation acting alone. The best chance of a lasting solution must involve




cooperative arrangements under regional and international frameworks. The 2002 Bali Process Regional Cooperation Framework was borne out of sustained regional and bilateral discussions over a significant period of time. Arrangements under the framework, such as the Transfer and Resettlement Arrangement between the Governments of Australia and Malaysia, have the potential to make a real impact on illicit transnational migration.

Although international cooperation has many advantages, the disparities in legal frameworks between countries have led to discrepancies in cooperation on law enforcement. These discrepancies sometimes become the main obstacle in the implementation of assistance provided by the Bali Process, making it difficult for

country participants to cooperate in tackling the issue in the region. Thus, harmonization of legal cooperation procedures within the region is crucial in managing illicit transnational migration activities in the Asia Pacific.



*Mely Caballero-Anthony*



*Mulya Wirana*

## KEYNOTE ADDRESS

### 26<sup>th</sup> Asia-Pacific Roundtable

**The Hon Dato' Sri Mohd Najib Tun Abdul Razak**  
Prime Minister of Malaysia

Good evening. I am delighted to be back at the Asia-Pacific Roundtable and I thank ISIS Malaysia and ASEAN-ISIS for inviting me to deliver the Keynote Address.

We live in challenging times. There is a dark cloud descending over us as Europe struggles to find its feet in tackling the debt crisis. Greece's possible withdrawal from the Euro-zone may be the precipice looming over greater economic stress. At the same time, the Chinese economic juggernaut is losing steam and the US economy shows little signs of sustained recovery. Closer to home, the once calm and tranquil waters of the South China Sea have become increasingly stormy.

As we utilize our collective minds and resources to address these challenges, we must not lose sight of the bigger picture. The most important and critical issue of the 21st century is not the rise of China or the shifting of the economic pendulum to Asia. Don't get me wrong. I am not belittling the positive transformational effects China's ascendancy has and will continue to have on Asia and beyond. Far from it. Malaysia is a beneficiary of China's economic growth, and China is our largest trade partner. I was informed that the Chinese Embassy in Kuala Lumpur is the second highest issuer of Chinese visas in the world. These are but two indicators of the vibrant relations we have with China. Managing competing interests and visions is the most important and critical issue of the 21st century. The future of Asia rests on our ability to do so.

Asia has come a long way in the last few decades. At the turn of the century, Asia accounted for 10.7 per cent of the world's GDP. Today, that figure is 19.2 per cent and growing.



*Mohd Najib Tun Abdul Razak*

Success, however, can be fleeting. It would be a mistake to focus myopically on the economic success story alone. Prosperity cannot take root unless accompanied by stability and peace. Herein lies the most important strategic challenge for Asia: the management of intra-mural relations.

How do we moderate our differences and ensure that conflicts, when and if they do occur, are managed in a manner that is fair, just and most of important of all, without the threat or the use of force? The theme of this year's conference, Asian Security Order and Governance, is highly relevant and speaks to these questions. I am confident that your deliberations will help to unpack this strategic puzzle and provide the impetus for a peaceful and secure Asia.

This pivotal question is urgently in need of an answer to ensure that the fruits of our toil and sweat are not wasted away by our destructive quest for power and influence. To begin with, we in Asia must take greater responsibility for our own security. While we value the assistance from our friends who have contributed immensely to regional stability, Asia must transform itself from being a consumer to a producer of security. More specifically, we must assume greater responsibility for our own security and establish frameworks to ensure our safety and to uphold our interests.

It also follows that we need to change our mindsets that have heretofore been programmed to focus on economic development at the expense of security issues. If Asia is to be a force in global politics, we cannot shy away from speaking out and taking positions on seemingly sensitive issues such as nuclear disarmament, arms build-up and military alliances. Asia must stand up and be counted.

In charting our future, we should be mindful of two important considerations. Firstly, relationships must be founded on a broad spectrum of areas, and not be defined by single issues. Just as we should not be fixated on economic benefits alone, it would be harmful for regional stability if we were to allow ourselves to be conditioned by military concerns. Take ASEAN as an example. The three pillars – political-security, economics and socio-cultural – need to be equally strong; otherwise, the stability of the 10-member organization will be in jeopardy. Asia cannot stand on one leg; it needs to strengthen its foundation, and that will include among other things, deepening its people-to-people relations.

Secondly, there is no place for rivalry in Asia. We have lived through the second half of the 20th century divided by ideology. We should not allow conflict and the jostling for power to divide us again. What we need is cooperation, and thankfully there is an abundance of that in Asia. Since 1967, ASEAN has recognized the value of stability and has founded its relations based on

the principles of mutual respect and ‘prosper thy neighbour.’ This spirit of cooperation pioneered by ASEAN has since been extended beyond Southeast Asia.

When the five visionary statesmen signed the Treaty of Bangkok to establish ASEAN, they were guided by the idealism of a peaceful and prosperous Southeast Asia. Never in their wildest imaginations would they have envisioned that ASEAN would become the focal point for region-wide cooperation. Without a doubt, the ‘investment’ in 1967 has paid off handsomely, and it is time for us to make a similar investment in our future. I am confident that as long as we continue to make ‘cooperation’ the centrepiece of our relations, Asia is poised for a golden age.

*... we must assume greater responsibility for our own security and establish frameworks to ensure our safety and to uphold our interests*

You will recall that last September when I addressed the United Nations General Assembly, I called upon all peace loving peoples to join us in embracing, and striving toward, a way of life based on tolerance, mutual respect and moderation. The Global Movement of Moderates (GMM) builds on the inspirational work and ideals of our forefathers. Manifestations of GMM are found everywhere. Take ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), for example. TAC, which is the bedrock of intra-ASEAN relations, and engagement with friends far and near, is the epitome of moderation. Eschewing confrontational politics and recognizing that might is not necessarily right, TAC institutionalizes the norm of peaceful resolution of conflicts.

It is easy to advocate peace, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. But, as members of the diplomatic corps will no doubt agree, putting these ideals into practice is anything but easy. Be that as it may, I would like to venture some thoughts for consideration. I offer that the world will be a better and certainly more peaceful place, if we take heed of the Golden Rule, 'do unto others, as you want others to do unto you.' Mutual respect is the foundation of all relationships.

*Marginalizing opposing opinions is counterproductive and will only serve to harden old grievances and fuel new ones*

We reject extremism in all forms, but recognize that when differences and diverging interests manifest themselves, the outlier voices must be heard. Marginalizing opposing opinions is counterproductive and will only serve to harden old grievances and fuel new ones. The great British statesman, Winston Churchill, wisely noted, 'jaw jaw is better than war war.' Only through communication and dialogue can we work out our differences.

On a positive note, I am heartened that GMM has found traction, and has received encouraging support from the international community. I am particularly grateful that my ASEAN colleagues have endorsed GMM at the 18th ASEAN Summit in May 2011 and that a concept paper to implement GMM was adopted at the recently concluded ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh. As gratifying as these developments are, we need your support to mainstream GMM around the world.

As proof of our commitment to advocate and sustain the GMM concept and core principles regionally and globally, Malaysia has initiated the Global Movement of Moderates Foundation, which is based in Kuala Lumpur, in January of this year. I am happy to announce that currently the GMMF is fully operational.

Asia's economic prosperity has been accompanied by alarming concomitant effects. Throughout history, states have been taking measures to bolster their defences and military power as they became richer. History is repeating itself in Asia. The top five country recipients of arms transfer, from 2007-2011, are Asian: they are India, South Korea, Pakistan, China and Singapore, and they account for 30 per cent of the volume of international arms imports.

Granted that the right to self-defence is permitted under the UN Charter. However, it bears reminding that history is replete with instances of wars fought under the guise of self-defence. While, it is difficult to ascertain the underlying reasons for the arms build-up, it is critical that mechanisms and structures are in place to ensure that this region will never display the proclivity to the extreme action of taking up arms.

Because the stakes are high, we cannot leave the protection of the region's peace and security to chance. We have to take proactive steps towards the construction of a pluralistic security community in which the use of force is not an option. We cannot rely merely on pronouncements of friendship and peaceful

*it is critical that mechanisms and structures are in place to ensure that this region will never display the proclivity to the extreme action of taking up arms*



intent. We need to work through our problems, and to accommodate diverging interests, if these emerge.

A good starting point would be to forge a common vision for the region. What is the preferred regional order? How do we institutionalize our strong bilateral and multilateral bonds of partnership and friendship into workable arrangements that are nimble enough to accommodate diverging interests without sacrificing organizational efficacy? In this regard, I look forward to the East Asia Vision

Group (EAVG) II's final report which will be submitted to the 15th ASEAN Plus Three Summit in November 2012.

I congratulate and commend ISIS Malaysia and ASEAN-ISIS for proposing the timely and relevant theme of *Asian Order and Security Governance* for the Roundtable. I am keen to hear your thoughts and suggestions, generated over the course of this conference. I wish you a productive round of deliberations and I am honoured to declare open the 26th Asia-Pacific Roundtable.



# 26<sup>TH</sup> ASIA-PACIFIC ROUNDTABLE

28 - 30 May 2012  
INTER CONTINENTAL HOTEL,  
KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA

## PROGRAMME

### DAY 1 28 MAY 2012

20:15 - 22:00

#### WELCOMING DINNER AND KEYNOTE ADDRESS

*Venue: Grand Ballroom, Level 2  
InterContinental Kuala Lumpur*

Welcoming Remarks  
Keynote Address and Official Opening

**Dato' Paduka Awang Haji MOHD  
ROSELAN bin Haji Mohd Daud**  
Chairperson, ASEAN-Institutes of Strategic and  
International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS),  
Permanent Secretary at the Prime Minister's  
Office & Chairman of Centre of Strategic and  
Policy Studies (CSPS), Brunei Darussalam

**The Hon Dato' Sri MOHD NAJIB Tun  
Abdul Razak**  
Prime Minister of Malaysia

### Day 2 29 MAY 2012

08:00 - 09:00

#### REGISTRATION

*Venue: Foyer, Ballroom 1 & 2, Level 2*

09:00-10:15

#### PLENARY SESSION 1 ASIAN SECURITY: ORDER OR DISORDER?

*Venue: Ballroom 1 & 2, Level 2*

*Moderator:*  
**Prof Dr Brian JOB**  
Director, Institute of Asian Research  
The University of British Columbia, Canada

*Speaker:*  
**Dato' Dr Muthiah ALAGAPPA**  
The Tun Hussein Onn Chair in International  
Studies, Institute of Strategic and International  
Studies (ISIS) Malaysia

10:15-10:45

#### REFRESHMENTS

*Venue: Foyer, Ballroom 1 & 2, Level 2*

10:45 - 12:00

#### PLENARY SESSION 2 CHINA'S STRATEGIC VISION AND REGIONAL SECURITY

*Moderator:*  
**Assoc Prof Simon TAY**  
Chairman, Singapore Institute of  
International Affairs (SIIA) & Associate  
Professor, Faculty of Law, National  
University of Singapore

*Speaker:*  
**Amb TONG Xiaoling**  
China's Ambassador to ASEAN

12:00 - 13:30

#### LUNCH

*Venue: Ballroom 3, Level 2*

13:30 - 14:45

#### PLENARY SESSION 3 INDIA AND THE SECURITY OF ASIA

*Chair:*  
**Emeritus Professor Dr Carolina  
HERNANDEZ**  
Founding President and Chief Executive  
Officer, Institute for Strategic and  
Development Studies (ISDS), The Philippines

*Speakers:*  
**Prof S D MUNI**  
Visiting Research Professor, Institute of  
South Asian Studies, The National University  
of Singapore

**Dr C Raja MOHAN**  
Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research  
Foundation, India

**Dr Sandy GORDON**  
Visiting Fellow, Regulatory Institutions  
Network (RegNet), The Australian National  
University

14:45 - 15:00

#### BREAK

15:00-16:15

#### PLENARY SESSION 4 US STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND ROLES IN ASIA

*Chair:*  
**HRH Prince Norodom SIRIVUDH**  
Chairman, Board of Directors, The  
Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and  
Peace (CICP), Cambodia

*Speakers:*  
**Lt Gen Duane D THIESSEN**  
Commander, US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific,  
USA

**Mr Hideki ASARI**  
Deputy Director-General, Japan Institute of  
International Affairs (JIIA)

	<p><b>Mr JUSUF Wanandi</b> Vice-Chair, Board of Trustees, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia</p>	<b>DAY 3</b>	
		<b>30 MAY 2012</b>	
16:15 - 16:45	<p><b>REFRESHMENTS</b> <i>Venue: Foyer, Ballroom 1 &amp; 2, Level 2</i></p>	08:30 - 09:45	<p><b>PLENARY SESSION 6</b> <b>MIDDLE POWERS AND REGIONAL GOVERNANCE AND ORDER</b></p> <p><i>Chair:</i> <b>Amb Koji WATANABE</b> Senior Fellow, Japan Center for International Exchange (CIE) &amp; Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Japan</p> <p><i>Speakers:</i> <b>Mr Allan GYNGELL</b> Director-General, Office of National Assessments, Australia</p> <p><b>Prof Dr David DEWITT</b> Vice-President of Programs, The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Canada</p> <p><b>Prof Dr LEE Chung Min</b> Dean, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University, Republic of Korea</p>
16:45 - 18:00	<p><b>PLENARY SESSION 5</b> <b>SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE REGIONAL SECURITY ORDER</b></p> <p><i>Chair:</i> <b>Mr Hitoshi TANAKA</b> Chairman, The JRI Institute for International Strategy &amp; Former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Japan</p> <p><i>Speakers:</i> <b>Dr RIZAL Sukma</b> Executive Director, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia</p> <p><b>Assoc Prof Dr TAN See Seng</b> Deputy Director, S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore</p>		
	<p><b>Mr NGUYEN Hung Son</b> Deputy Director-General, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam</p>	09:45 - 10:00	<p><b>REFRESHMENTS</b> <i>Venue: Foyer, Ballroom 1 &amp; 2, Level 2</i></p>
19:30 - 21:00	<p><b>DINNER TALK</b> <b>RETHINKING ASIAN SECURITY: JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE</b> <i>Venue: Ballroom 2 &amp; 3, Level 2</i></p> <p><i>Moderator:</i> <b>Prof Dr Anthony MILNER</b> Basham Professor of Asian History, The Australian National University &amp; Professorial Fellow, The University of Melbourne, Australia</p> <p><i>Speaker:</i> <b>Prof Dr Takashi INOBUCHI</b> President, University of Niigata Prefecture, Japan</p>	10:00 - 11:15	<p><b>PLENARY SESSION 7</b> <b>ASIA IN THE EYES OF CHINA</b></p> <p><i>Chair:</i> <b>HE ONG Keng Yong</b> High Commissioner of Singapore to Malaysia &amp; Former ASEAN Secretary-General</p> <p><i>Speakers:</i> <b>Prof ZHANG Yunling</b> Director, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, Renmin University, China</p> <p><b>Prof Dr PANG ZhongYing</b> School of International Studies, Renmin University, China</p> <p><b>Prof Dr HUANG Xiaoming</b> Director, New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand</p>
21:00	<p><b>TETE-A-TETE</b> <b>NORTH KOREA AFTER KIM JONG IL: REFORM OR PLUS CA CHANGE?</b> <i>Venue: Junior Ballroom, Level 2</i></p> <p><i>Moderator:</i> <b>Mr BUNN Nagara</b> Associate Editor, <b>The Star</b>, Malaysia</p> <p><i>Speaker:</i> <b>Prof Dr Andrei LANKOV</b> Social Science Department, Kookmin University, Republic of Korea</p>	11:15-11:30	<b>BREAK</b>
		11:30 - 12:45	<p><b>CONCURRENT SESSION 1</b> <b>SECURING THE SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION (SLOC): THREATS AND RESPONSES</b> <i>Venue: Ballroom 1 &amp; 2, Level 2</i></p> <p><i>Chair:</i> <b>Vice Admiral Maritime Dato' NOOR AZIZ</b> Yunan (R) Director-General, Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA)</p>

*Speakers:*

**Dr Vijay SAKHUJA**

Director of Research, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), India

**Mr Diego RUIZ-PALMER**

Head, Strategic Analysis Capabilities Section, The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

**Dr Euan GRAHAM**

Senior Fellow, S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

**CONCURRENT SESSION 2  
MANAGING ILLICIT TRANSNATIONAL  
MIGRATION IN ASIA**

*Venue: Junior Ballroom, Level 2*

*Chair:*

**Assoc Prof Dr Mely CABALLERO-ANTHONY**

S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore & Former Director of External Relations, ASEAN Secretariat

*Speakers:*

**Dr Wendy SOUTHERN**

Deputy Secretary (Policy and Program Management), Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Australia

**Mr TATANG Budie Utama Razak**

Director, Protection of Indonesian Citizens and Legal Entities Abroad, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia

**Mr Alain AESCHLIMANN**

Head of Operations for East Asia, South-East Asia and the Pacific, The International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), Switzerland

12:45 - 14:00

**LUNCH**

*Venue: Serena Brasserie Cafe, Lobby Level*

14:00 - 15:15

**PLENARY SESSION 8  
GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: WHAT'S BEST  
AND WHAT WORKS**

*Moderator:*

**Tan Sri Dato' Seri Mohamed JAWHAR Hassan**

Chairman, Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia

*Speaker:*

**The Hon Tun Dr MAHATHIR Mohamad**

Honorary President, Perdana Leadership Foundation & Former Prime Minister of Malaysia

15:15 - 15:45

**REFRESHMENTS**

*Venue: Foyer, Ballroom 1 & 2, Level 2*

15:45 - 17:00

**PLENARY SESSION 9**

**THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN  
PROMOTING CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

*Chair:*

**Mr John BRANDON**

Director, International Relations Program, The Asia Foundation, USA

*Speakers:*

**Mr Charlito MANLUPIG**

Chairman, The Balay Mindanaw Foundation The Philippines

**Dr RIZAL Panggabean**

Center for Security and Peace Studies, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia

**Mr DON Pathan**

Director of Foreign Relations, The Patani Forum, Thailand

17:00-17:15

**BREAK**

17:15 - 18:30

**PLENARY SESSION 10**

**A NEW DAWN IN MYANMAR:  
POSSIBILITIES AND PROSPECTS**

*Chair:*

**Dr. Richard GRANT**

Consultant, Executive Director, Asia New Zealand Foundation, New Zealand

*Speakers:*

**Daw YIN Yin Myint**

Director-General, Training, Research and Foreign Languages Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Secretary, Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International Studies

**Dr TIN Maung Maung Than**

Visiting Senior Research Fellow & Coordinator, Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore

**Dr Patrick CRONIN**

Senior Advisor & Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program, Center for a New American Security (CNAS), USA

18:30

**CLOSING REMARKS**

**Dato' Dr MAHANI Zainal Abidin**

Chief Executive, Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia



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### **INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (ISIS) MALAYSIA**

The Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) was established on 8 April 1983 as an autonomous, not-for-profit research organization. ISIS Malaysia has a diverse research focus which includes, economics, foreign policy, security studies, nation-building, social policy, technology, innovation and environmental studies. It also undertakes research collaboration with national and international organizations in important areas such as national development and international affairs.

ISIS Malaysia engages actively in Track Two diplomacy, and promotes the exchange of views and opinions at both the national and international levels. The Institute has also played a role in fostering closer regional integration and international cooperation through forums such as the Asia-Pacific Roundtable, the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) and the Network of East Asian Think-Tanks (NEAT). ISIS is a founding member of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) and manages the Council's secretariat.

As Malaysia's premier think-tank, ISIS has been at the forefront of some of the most significant nation-building initiatives in the nation's history. It was a contributor to the Vision 2020 and was consultant to the Knowledge-Based Economy Master Plan initiative.



### **ASEAN INSTITUTES OF STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (ASEAN-ISIS)**


ASEAN-ISIS (ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies) is a network of non-governmental organizations registered with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Formed in 1988, its founding membership comprises the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) of Indonesia, the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) of Malaysia, the Institute of Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS) of the Philippines, the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), and the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS) of Thailand. Its purpose is to encourage cooperation and coordination of activities among ASEAN scholars and analysts, and to promote policy-oriented studies and exchanges of information and viewpoints on various strategic and international issues affecting Southeast Asia's and ASEAN's peace, security and well-being.

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