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The 2nd Germany – Malaysia Security Dialogue
8-9 October 2013

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***T**he 2nd Germany-Malaysia Security Dialogue was a two-day round of meetings and talks with security experts from Germany, Turkey and Malaysia, regarding current security issues affecting the world. Topics included NATO, terrorism, maritime security, energy, cyber security and the situation in Syria. Organized by ISIS Malaysia and by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, the Dialogue was held on 8-9 October 2013 at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. This report on the Dialogue was compiled by ISIS Intern **Ms. Melody Goh**, with the assistance of Interns **Ms. Hon Jia Xin** and **Ms. Waayija Salmah**.*

Session One: Reassessing NATO's Role in a Changing World

Session One of the 2nd Germany–Malaysia Security Dialogue was chaired by **Admiral (R) Tan Sri Mohd Anwar Hj Mohd Nor**, Chairman, Armed Forces Fund Board, Malaysia. The two presenters were **Dr. Knut Kirste**, Political Officer of the Political Affairs of NATO, Brussels and **General (R) Dr. Edip Baser**, former Deputy Chief of Turkish General Staff and Second Army Commander, Turkey.

NATO's essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members through political and military means. It promotes democratic values as well as consultancy and cooperation in defence and security issues. Its long-term mandate is conflict-prevention and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

In opening the session, **Dr. Knut Kirste** noted that NATO has responded to three major developments: the globalization of security challenges, the decline of defence budgets, and the gradual shift of power on a global scale. Combined, they pose a formidable challenge to any military alliance. However, NATO as an alliance has adapted rather well to these changes in fundamentally transforming itself into a much broader security organization today.

To date, NATO is still the only military alliance in the world that can project its power and sustain large-scale military operations over strategic distances. However, today, the organization is much more than that. It has evolved into a much broader security organization that has three main pillars: (1) collective defence and security protection of its member states; (2) crisis management: the ability to contribute to international stability and security; and (3) co-operative security: working with partners across the globe in jointly addressing common security challenges.



From left: Knut Kirste, Mohd Anwar Hj Mohd Nor and Edip Baser

The globalization of security is most prominently demonstrated by the rise of non-traditional security challenges. These include spill-over effects of failing states, missile proliferation, energy security, piracy, and cyber-warfare. Geographical distance no longer shields us from the effects of these challenges, making borders largely irrelevant. No country is immune to the impact of these threats and no single country or organization can address them alone. What is required is the broadest possible cooperation between nations and organizations, and new approaches to how we look at security today.

NATO is confronted by challenges in areas ranging from faraway places such as Afghanistan and the waters around the Horn of Africa to areas on the very borders of NATO. Examples of the latter include the Balkans and the Mediterranean Sea. Ballistic missile proliferation poses a real threat to populations, while security at sea affects commercial interests at home.

Given NATO's expansion of efforts beyond its home borders, Kirste noted that legitimacy for its overseas operations was an issue initially. However, this has become less critical since the alliance *de facto* has developed into an internationally respected platform to deploy multinational peace support operations under the UN mandate, bringing NATO partners and nations together.

There is much talk today, Kirste said, about a post-operational era, in which the international community will grow tired of military engagement, possibly leading to NATO's obsolescence. However, he believes that 'NATO

does not have the luxury of retiring its armed forces anytime soon.' Though future operations may look different from their current state, he believes that NATO will continue to retain its 'indispensable value to the international community.'

In response to the threat of growing missile proliferation, NATO declared its intent to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, and for its territory and forces, against the growing threat of ballistic missile attacks, in an interim declaration at the Chicago NATO Summit 2012. However, Kirste also anticipated that more work would have to be done in order to bring this into full effect, especially on matters such as legal issues and the involvement of third states in NATO's missile defence plans.

In addition, NATO has adapted to the increasing security challenges by adopting a more comprehensive approach to conflict management. It has learnt that it has to incorporate civilian and military tools in its strategy. However, hard power still matters in NATO's strategy and addressing these new challenges would continue to require some form of military contribution, either to protect, enable, or support other more civilian components.

Furthermore, the alliance is gradually extending its role by tackling other new security challenges. Examples include the cyber domain wherein NATO has to protect not only its cyber systems but also to provide support for cyber-protection of other nations.

With regard to the decline in defence spending, Kirste noted that the financial crisis has accentuated a problem which has existed for decades, namely, lower spending on defence by major NATO European allies. The financial crisis merely added the US component to the equation. All these at a time when emerging powers in Asia Pacific were increasing their defence budgets significantly. In short, there is concern that NATO nations will lose their place of influence on the world stage if defence investment issues continue to be neglected.

While there are plans among some NATO nations to increase spending, Kirste suggested that on the whole, NATO has to face the reality and should 'do more with less.' He added that the alliance has addressed this challenge by designing a number of programmes aimed at enhancing multinational defence cooperation, basically called 'smart defence.' With the participation of core partners, allies are increasingly encouraged to work together to develop jointly-identified capabilities, instead of defence planning and procurement based on national considerations only.

... NATO nations will lose their place of influence on the world stage if defence investment issues continue to be neglected

Those who are familiar with defence procurement and acquisition will note that this is a major step for NATO in revolutionizing its strategy, particularly for the bigger nations. The alliance has now identified a number of Tier-1 projects, intended for 'smart defence' initiatives. Most of them relate to the deployability of forces, intelligence surveillance, reconnaissance and ballistic missile defence.

Another way NATO is responding to the scarcity in resources is through the connected-forces initiative. This combines two basic ideas: (1) maintain high levels of interoperability among NATO nations as well as between NATO and its key operation partners, once the major operation in Afghanistan ends in 2014; and (2) transition from a deployed NATO to a prepared, resilient,

and credible NATO to ensure its continued effectiveness as a military force. As future deployment probabilities decrease, Kirste reiterated that NATO 'needs to stay fit for our purpose.'

Apart from the challenges above, NATO also recognizes the global shift of power in international affairs. In recent years, global power for the most part has been shifting away from the Transatlantic to the Asia Pacific. This has been true in economic terms for some time now, but is now also becoming true in military domains, especially in matters concerning defence spending. It is a cause for concern for some analysts while the transatlantic community fears that it may lose influence. Over in Asia Pacific, there is concern that as security in the region becomes more volatile, the region is not prepared institutionally for this volatility.

As a result of this power shift, the world in which NATO operates today is no longer Eurocentric, bipolar, or unipolar but increasingly multipolar, with a shifting centre of gravity. It is increasingly becoming one in which rising powers in different parts of the world, including in the Asia Pacific, have a profound influence on the international order.

NATO recognizes the need to work with others in order to achieve its aims. Its response is no less than a shift from its culture of deterrence during the Cold War to one of cooperative security. This policy has been successful in operational terms from Sweden to El Salvador and from Qatar to South Korea. Rather than seeking a military presence in the Asia Pacific, NATO is seeking partnerships in developing security cooperative relationships.

Recently, NATO adopted a more structured approach under the concept of 'Partners across the Globe,' seven of the partners being located across the Asia Pacific. It eventually turned some of these into full-fledged partners and also developed individual partnership cooperation programmes. None of these partners aspires to join the alliance but some of them look to NATO as an opportunity for interoperability, defence education, capability development, military technical standards, and experience-sharing.

Is NATO still relevant in today's world? Kirste concluded that it still is, drawing insights from the aforementioned examples. Though 'imperfect in many ways' and 'slow in adapting to changes,' NATO has shown a 'remarkable resilience' to the changing international environment by applying a more comprehensive approach to international security, offering more efficient ways of developing defence capabilities in times of austerity, and by working with partners towards cooperative security.

Dr. Edip Baser outlined NATO's strategic concept and its changes after the Cold War. During that time, NATO's strategic thinking was only concerned with the security of its territories and the protection of member states. The only threat under discussion was the huge military power of the Warsaw Pact, together with the nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union exporting communist ideology to areas of strategic importance to the alliance was also a serious concern for NATO. Therefore, the political and military structure of the NATO alliance was designed to first deter and then to plan and conduct operations through member nations' land, sea, and air. Deterrence was the core of NATO's strategic concept.

... NATO has shown a 'remarkable resilience' to the changing international environment ...

The Cold War was a time of political tension, and fear of a global war with total destruction weapons. NATO's 'ability to bring about the collapse of the Cold War structure' was credited by Baser to the 'decisiveness and firm solidarity of NATO' and the 'attractive power of democracy.'

Today, the question for NATO is: what are the new missions it should undertake in this new security environment? Certainly, Baser suggested, the alliance needs to define this environment in terms of conventional and non-conventional threats, as well as globalization. Thus, the new strategic concept of NATO should be one of deterrence against these new security challenges of the post-Cold War era. NATO's involvement in Afghanistan is an example.

NATO's relations with nations of the transatlantic community has enhanced rapidly since the end of the Cold War. For Baser, the key factors for this include general interest in Asia as well as a common peaceful world, safe energy sources and supply routes, and concern for possible future terrorist sanctuaries in rogue states.

Apart from NATO's collective approach to improving relations with other states, the United States on its part also has a particular interest in Asia Pacific. On the other hand, China looks forward to more cooperation with the US in the Middle East, considering its oil imports.

Session Two: The ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM+): Pathway to ASEAN-Europe Defense Cooperation?

Session Two of the Dialogue was chaired by **Lt Gen Dato' Pahlawan Dr. William Stevenson**, Chief Executive, Malaysian Institute of Defence and Security. The presenters were **Dr. Tang Siew Mun**, Director of Foreign Policy and Security Studies at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia and **Lt Gen (R) Klaus Olshausen**, President of the Clausewitz Association.

The US pivot to Asia is a phrase that is commonly used. However, **Dr. Tang Siew Mun** sees the potential for a greater European Union involvement in Asia. EU engagement with Asia has revolved largely around a political security framework such as advocating the processes of democracy, democratization, human rights, women's empowerment, and good governance. However, EU cooperation with Asia can be further enhanced in other areas, such as defence cooperation in areas where both the EU and ASEAN hold common interests. These can include, for example, building the ASEAN defence sector, and tackling maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

He outlined the following steps to strengthen the EU-ASEAN partnership through the Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action:

1. Foster mutual understanding on pressing issues and insecurities through forums and Track 2 diplomacy;
2. Strategize on military exercise frameworks and overcoming obstacles such as budget constraints in military coordination; and



From left: Tang Siew Mun, William Stevenson and Klaus Olshausen

3. Agree on specific areas for EU-ASEAN cooperation, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster risk reduction programmes

5. Other on-going dialogues with ADMM+ members; and
6. Defense cooperation and military training on peace support

Lt Gen (R) Klaus Olshausen noted that geography still matters and is an obstacle against greater EU-ASEAN cooperation.

The EU interest in ASEAN is seen in its trade with many countries in this region, free trade arrangements, and other activities to deepen mutual ties. Thus, the EU has a keen interest in the political security and economic development of the region. However, given the size of the EU (28 states in total), Olshausen suggested that an agreement on joining the East Asia Summit would take some time.

In addition, he also proposed that the EU becomes a security player by giving advice on building a more effective regional security structure. This, he said, could be done through experience-sharing.

A few broad areas for enhancing transnational cooperation between the EU and ASEAN in ADMM+ include:

1. Non-traditional security and traditional security;
2. Peace-building and conflict prevention;
3. Crisis management dialogue;
4. Prevention of weapons of mass destruction (WMD);

Session Three: Between Rhetoric and Reality: Countering Extremism in Europe and Southeast Asia

Session Three was chaired by **Mr. Michael Däumer**, Policy Analyst of Global Issues at the European External Action Service. The two presenters were **Tan Sri Dato' Seri Mohamed Jawhar Hassan**, Chief Executive of the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia and **Mr. Ercan Çitlioğlu**, President of Strategic Research Centre at Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi, Turkey.

The European Union has had a counter-terrorism strategy since 2005. It also entertains a strategy that focuses solely on countering radicalization and recruitment (countering violent extremism). This strategy is currently being reviewed because the European External Action Service now has a division called Global Counter-Terrorism that deals with counter-terrorism from a global perspective. The Director for Home Affairs in Brussels deals with the internal aspect of counter-terrorism. The new strategy will combine both the external and internal aspects of countering terrorism. It has also institutionalized mechanisms in the EU for countering extremism, such as the Radicalization Awareness Network, which engages in bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Thus it seeks to increase dialogues with its partners in Asia Pacific for such purposes.



From left: Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, Michael Däumer and Ercan Çitlioğlu

In placing the matter in its context, **Tan Sri Dato' Seri Mohamed Jawhar Hassan** defined terrorism as 'organized violence perpetrated against civilians by non-state groups and individuals for a political purpose.' He also defined extremism as 'not only violent extremism which is often used synonymously with terrorism but also excessively harsh political security or socio-economic measures perpetrated by states against their own citizens or against the citizens of other states and territories.'

He questions the assumption made these days which 'automatically connects' extremism in Southeast Asia with Muslims and Islam, especially after September 11. This was never or hardly ever the case in history, he said. Past struggles of national liberation against colonial occupation, 'which were as much Christian, Jewish, and Hindu,' he said, could also be defined as extremism using the above definition.

... the soft approach seeks to discredit and debase terrorist ideologies ...

Jawhar cited the unfortunate events of the uprisings in Xinjiang and southern Thailand amongst others, in which the main actors were Muslims, as a key factor in this perception. He

believes that had the September 11 event happened in another state, things may have turned out rather differently.

In trying to resolve these issues, it is important to look at the factors leading to such uprisings. In Southeast Asia, Jawhar notes that domestic factors include political marginalization, where people are denied their land and cultural rights, as well as socio-economic grievances and differences in political ideologies and systems. On the other hand, external factors range from anger in the Middle East towards the United States and the West about the occupation in Iraq and others, support for oppressive regimes, and the long history of the Palestinian issue.

A few initiatives that include both hard and soft approaches can be employed to tackle this problem. Here, he mentions the difference between the US (which usually uses hard approaches) and Southeast Asian countries, particularly those with a Muslim majority (which typically use soft approaches). The hard approach involves detecting, apprehending, and eliminating terrorist elements and their support structures through laws, institutions, intelligence, and cooperation with other countries and agencies. On the other hand, the soft approach seeks to discredit and debase terrorist ideologies through countering these ideologies, and rehabilitation programmes.



From left: Carlo Masala, Zulkifli Adnan and Sumathy Permal

Continuing the thought, the second speaker, **Mr. Ercan Çitlioğlu** offered a few root causes of terrorism namely, nationalism movements, religious and ethnic prejudices, the misinterpretation of religious ideologies, negative feelings towards Western powers, marginalization of minorities, individual personalities and behaviour, and general feelings of hopelessness generated by restrictive political systems.

It is also wrongly assumed that terrorism co-relates with the lack of democracy in a country. In fact, democratic countries have the potential for terrorism as well, he added.

Session Four: The Gulf of Aden: A Model for Maritime Security Cooperation?

Session Four was chaired by **Dato' Zulkifli Adnan**, Director-General of the Maritime Affairs Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia. The two presenters were **Professor Dr. Carlo Masala**, Professor of International Politics at the University of the German Armed Forces in Munich, Germany and **Ms. Sumathy Permal**, Senior Researcher at the Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA).

Statistics on piracy in the Gulf of Aden have shown a significant decline now as compared to four to five years ago. It appears that the 29 combined maritime forces (CMF) patrolling the

Gulf of Aden have been successful in deterring piracy. However, two questions remain: (1) How effective is this? (2) Is the current peace permanent or has the transition in the Somali government made any inroads into the severity of the political situation or advanced the law and order situation in Somalia?

Some additional aspects to consider regarding this situation include the high cost of stationing ships in the Gulf, as Malaysia's experience has shown, and the length of maritime stationing in the area. However, if the benefits outweigh the costs significantly, would the CMF be a good model for maritime security cooperation?

Further questions need to be raised as to the applicability of the Gulf of Aden's CMF to other future scenarios requiring maritime security cooperation. For the first speaker, **Professor Dr. Carlo Masala**, the Gulf of Guinea is one such scenario. Both the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Guinea share many similarities in terms of piracy attacks on commercial vessels plying these regions. The major differences between both are: (1) pirates in the Gulf of Aden are able to hijack a vessel and hide it in a place where nobody can find it, whereas this is not the case in the Gulf of Guinea; (2) failed states are one of the primary actors in piracy attacks in the Gulf of Guinea, making it a more difficult situation.

Recent developments in the Gulf of Aden have resulted in a significant decline in piracy activities, compared to the years 2009–2010 when piracy activities were at their peak. Prof. Masala credited this situation to four factors: (1) a dense web of governmental cooperation in navy patrols and information-sharing; (2) private companies implementing Best Management Practices (BMP), which include increasing the speed of the ships, hardening ships, and company transparency; (3) the presence of private armed security personnel onboard; and (4) regional capacity-building to fortify legal and prison systems.

... military-civilian capacity-building to transform navies, support the rule of law in the region, and re-socialize pirates in most of the cases

He further outlined other lessons which could be learned from the Gulf of Aden as follows: (1) The requirement for military-civilian capacity-building to transform navies, support the rule of law in the region, and re-socialize pirates in most of the cases; (2) establish permanent regional reaction forces for quicker response to piracy activities; (3) create regional crime courts to deal with the judicial and legal aspects of piracy; (4) build regional capacity to uphold the sustainability of the above measures; and (5) train and equip national coast guards and navies through the transfer of know-how and technology in maritime surveillance. Here, he commended the success of the Malaysian government in guarding the Straits of Malacca; similar efforts could be applied in the Gulf of Guinea, he said.

Ms. Sumathy Permal said the International Maritime Bureau's research showed the following factors for the declining attacks in the Gulf of Aden: (1) the presence of armed navies; (2) rapid actions taken by navies against suspicious ships; (3) preventive measures taken by commercial vessels in line with the BMP; and (4) the employment of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) on board.

She also spoke on the structures and functions of each subunit of the CMF, namely, CTF-151, CTF-152, and CTF-153, noting four

factors for the decline in maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden, which could be emulated by other counter-piracy efforts:

1. Coordinated cooperation by navies is possible for security even if their states are not allies in other geostrategic interests. An example of this is the navy patrol collaboration between the US and China naval forces in the Gulf of Aden;
2. Inter-probability issues can be addressed with a common system, for example, the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA);
3. Public-private partnership (such as Malaysia's smart partnership with the MISC), which could be adapted for maritime security operations; and
4. Conventional capabilities enhanced through multi-environment operations at sea and land.

She also noted challenges concerning the maritime cooperation task force. These include: (1) the broad area of operation, making it difficult to protect every ship along the coast; (2) the absence of an effective government since 1991 and the lack of initiative by the government to suppress piracy, until 2012 when the internationally-backed government was established; (3) the spread of poverty and unemployment in the Gulf of Aden, especially in Somalia; and (4) local support for pirates as they are perceived to be able to provide for the economic well-being of the Somalis.

To overcome the challenges, she proposed the following:

1. Increase multilateral efforts to aid capacity-building;
2. Provide support for governments in tackling domestic security problems;
3. Address issues on land-economic development changes and programmes; and
4. Develop multi-layered efforts in countering piracy

Session 5: Shale Gas and Energy Security: Redefining the Global Geo-Strategic Balance

Session Five was chaired by **Tan Sri Dr. Munir Majid**, Chairman of Bank Muamalat Malaysia and Visiting Fellow at IDEAS, London School of



From left: Mitat Celikpala, Munir Majid, Klaus Naumann and James Stannard

Economics. The three presenters were **Dr. Mitat Celikpala**, Associate Professor of International Relations at Kadir Has Üniversitesi, Istanbul, Turkey, **General (R) Klaus Naumann**, former Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr and former Chairman of NATO and **Mr. James Stannard**, Head of EP Unconventional Energy Business Exploration at PETRONAS.

... shale gas is widely dispersed around the world and potentially cheap to exploit ...

How do we begin to define energy security in today's globalised world? How do the rapid changes occurring in the world today affect how we understand energy security? These are some of the questions raised by **Dr. Mitat Celikpala**. Shale gas production boomed in the US over the last decade, and is arguably the most significant development in the energy sector since the days when oil replaced coal as the primary fuel for transport in the 1920s. Since shale gas is widely dispersed around the world and potentially cheap to exploit, the question today is: is it easy to reach all these resources and is it possible to utilize them effectively? The US International Energy Agency (IEA) forecasted that shale production would contribute 46 per cent of the US gas supply by 2035.

This, then creates new issues for discussion: (1) Will shale gas cause an energy revolution? (2) Is shale gas a real game changer or a disruptive innovation? (3) Can the US example be replicated elsewhere around the world i.e. increasing levels of production? (4) How do these factors affect energy security?

As energy security is increasingly a global concern, Celikpala posed a few questions for reflection:

1. Will enough energy be available to meet the growing needs of the world, and if so, with what technology?
2. How can the security of energy systems on which the world depends be protected?
3. How will energy development affect the environment?

In addition, there are environmental concerns for consideration: (1) The carbon footprint of shale gas, especially during production processes (2) Water consumption and contamination (3) Landscape related issues.

The following are the four factors to be considered for shale gas to meet the criteria of energy security: (1) Availability: there is an abundance of shale resources around the world; (2) Accessibility: viability of commercial extraction in other parts of the world; (3) Affordability : the

oversupply of LNG; and (4) Sustainability: it is difficult to produce supplies cheaply.

Other pressing challenges of the impact of shale gas production on global geo-strategic security include its impact on the global energy market, domestic gas prices as well its capability of transforming international politics, and the global economy. To illustrate the latter, it is useful to survey the current players in the shale gas market. The United Kingdom currently produces its own shale gas, Poland has abundant resources and France will have its own energy if hydraulic fracturing, or 'fracking' is not banned. And the cost of fracking is cheaper in Europe. Therefore the outlook for Russian gas production is bleak. Also, China's high potential in shale resources will help its rise while affecting the revenues of other major oil producers in the world.

General (R) Klaus Naumann elaborated on the differences between fracking in the US and in China. Due to differences in geography, shale gas is more suited for fracking in the US as the shale resources there are not placed deep below the surface, whereas in China, shale resources are located in areas at high risk for earthquakes.

Shale gas production will enable the US to surpass Russia as the world's largest gas producer. It is beneficial to the US on other counts too: it will enable the nation to be non-dependant on foreign oil and gas supplies and increase job opportunities for American citizens. When shale gas export begins in 2025, it will also increase US economic growth, reduce its trade deficits (as there will be no more energy imports), making it spend less on imports from China and Saudi Arabia. On the whole, the energy industry will shift to the US, given the relatively lower gas prices. This then will increase the possibility of the US becoming an all-dimensional country with the ability to project power on a global scale.

There will be a domino effect from these projections. Firstly, China will secure sea and communications lines from Africa and the Persian Gulf. The US decision to export shale gas to developing countries will inevitably affect Russia. It will also cause Europe to depend less on Russia for oil and gas, causing a drop in Russian revenues and a possible failure of Russia's plans to modernize. Europe will join or replace the US in

the rebalancing to Asia and possibly help protect supply lines from the Gulf nations to secure oil provisions.

The likelihood of this scenario also increases given how the US wishes to reduce its burden of protecting the high seas of the Persian Gulf. This would then lead to Europe landing the job of guarding the Persian Gulf. The greater question then remains: will the U.S. withdraw from the Gulf?

All in all, the production of shale gas could play a serious role in aiding the US become a true global power once more, and change the face of international politics.

... the production of shale gas could play a serious role in aiding the US become a true global power once more ...

However, there are still many issues to consider in shale gas production. **Mr. James Stannard** listed three of these. Firstly, technical issues abound as the differences in geological ground will contribute to the risks of fracking. These include specifications such as rock characteristics, surface access conditions, and gas contaminants. Secondly, there are also economic factors for consideration such as market access, government policies with regard to royalties and taxes, and general market competition. On the other hand, socio-political factors such as strong regulation to manage NGO concerns and long-term stability to secure major investments are also crucial.

Stannard also attributed the growth in North American shale gas production to easy access to capital markets and the fuel switch from coal as well as declining domestic prices which encouraged the switch to LNGs.

He said there were a few challenges in managing the future scenarios of this developing gas sector, such as managing the new emerging shale basins in India, China, Argentina and Australia. While Argentina faces limitations on financing and entry barriers for foreign companies, Australia has to contend with limited



From left: Elina Noor, Rolf Nickel and Marco Gercke

availability commercially. In China, foreign companies have no first access to rights on resources. In addition, they face limitations such as locations with less facilities. Although the huge population will provide adequate labour, there will also be social problems.

The challenges of a globalized shale revolution can then be summed up in three areas: establishing commercial lines in a short time, managing high capital costs in technological development, and securing governmental support and collaboration to overcome these challenges.

Session Six: Cyber Warfare: Implications, Opportunities, and Challenges for Nations

Session Six was chaired by **Mr. Rolf Nickel**, Commissioner of Federal Government for Disarmament and Arms Control at the Foreign Office of the Republic of Germany. The two presenters were **Ms. Elina Noor**, Assistant Director of Foreign Policy and Security Studies at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia and **Prof. Dr. Marco Gercke**, Director at the Cybercrime Research Institute, Germany.

Cyber warfare has become one of the most vital, non-traditional security issues to emerge in the 21st century. According to The Cyber Index report commissioned by the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), there are currently 114 national cyber security programmes worldwide. The report also notes that 47 states have cyber security programmes that give some role to the armed forces. Some issues that were raised as part of the dialogue include:

1. How should cyber attacks be defined ?
2. Should cyber attacks be relegated to the same operational bases as air, land, sea, and space?
3. What are the laws applicable to cyber attacks?
4. What is the correct response to cyber attacks?
5. What can states do to counter cyber attacks, both domestically and internationally?

According to **Ms. Elina Noor**, cyber warfare occurs in a man-made environment. It is borderless, as cyber attacks are capable of reaching beyond the territorial borders of sovereign states. The anonymous nature of these attacks makes it difficult to identify the perpetrators through the internet while the involvement of various actors such as the private sector causes the issue to be multifaceted.

However, since it is capable of supplementing battles on the ground, cyber warfare is also an auxiliary of conventional warfare. It is cheaper, and more able to impose substantial kinetic effects on the target, thus making it an appealing instrument of warfare.

This then makes the application of suitable legal frameworks to prosecute cyber attacks a difficult one. The Talinn Manual on International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare was criticized because Asian countries were not involved in the development of the manual. Asian countries therefore should participate in discussing and constructing an effective framework to tackle cyber warfare.



Participants at the dialogue

Elina recommended four practical policies to counter cyber attacks. Firstly, there should be intensified cooperation and discussion as well as dialogues through Track 1 and 2 diplomacy. This should involve decision-makers, politicians, academicians and private sector entities. Secondly, there should be strengthened security and defence cooperation at a government-to-government level, to promote trust and confidence-building. Next, private sector actors should also be involved in the decision-making and information-gathering processes. Last but not least, international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) should be engaged to provide guidelines for tackling cyber warfare.

Continuing the session, **Dr. Marco Gercke** emphasized that despite the low likelihood of lives being lost through cyber warfare compared to killings or epidemics, cyber attacks have become more significant than ever due to the rapid evolution of information and communications technology (ICT). Moreover, given its ability to shift power structures in international relations and global politics, cyber warfare has become a major cause of concern. Cyber space enables even weak states to launch attacks on others through a 'virtual military.'

In conclusion, Dr. Marco made three policy recommendations. Firstly, states need to develop a proper defence system with an offensive capacity. Secondly, a comprehensive and substantive cyber security strategy needs to be established. Last but not least, international organizations such as the UN should play a greater role in developing international law on cyber warfare.

Session 7: Is There Light at the End of the Syrian Tunnel?

Session Seven was chaired by **Mr. Michael Flugger**, Deputy to the National Security Advisor of Angela Merkel in the Federal Chancellery of the Republic of Germany. The three presenters were **Professor Ilter Turan**, Professor of Political Science at the Istanbul Bilgi University in Turkey, **Colonel (R) Wolfgang Richter**, Senior Associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, and **Mr. Bunn Nagara**, Senior Fellow at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia.

Mr. Michael Flugger gave a brief chronology of the events leading to the Syrian crisis. The crisis started as the Arab Spring in Tunisia in December 2010 and spilled over into Egypt. The Syrians, Flugger added, were almost the last ones to take to the streets. The Arab Spring was met with excitement by the Germans as they hoped it would emulate what happened in Central Europe and in the Eastern European countries. Flugger noted that clearly this did not happen.

It took quite a while for the governments, notably the UK, France, and Germany to prepare a joint declaration. Announced on 18 August 2011, a day after Obama had made a similar declaration, the joint declaration stated that Assad has lost his legitimacy to govern the country and that if he continued to fail to reform the country and the system, then he 'should step aside.' The European Union had also earlier agreed on sanctions on travel and assets, initially limited to Assad and his family in the inner circle. Later on, these sanctions were multiplied through arms and oil embargoes in 2012, and finally became an all-out economic embargo which was actually 'much harsher than what we had against Iran,' Flugger continued.

Germany invested 420 million Euros in humanitarian aid to ease the plight of the displaced refugees. Thus far, Germany has received 5,000 asylum seekers en bloc and intends to continue measures of this kind; it hopes other European nations would follow suit. Germany also recognized, as far back as in 2011, the need to rebuild Syria, which saw Germany inviting



From left: Bunn Nagara, Michael Flugger, Ilter Turan and Wolfgang Richter

opposition representatives to Germany to prepare them for such tasks as writing a new constitution and other nation-building measures. In terms of military measures, Germany also aids its NATO partner, Turkey, in defending itself against possible missile attacks from Syria through the PATRIOT System.

The first speaker, **Mr. Bunn Nagara**, reviewed the crisis in three broad areas, namely: (1) the fundamental reality of the crisis; (2) the evolving situation; and (3) the likely development of the crisis. According to Nagara, a 'basic reality of the issue' is necessary, to sift through the many opinions on the crisis, provide an objective understanding derived from facts, and to consider realistic approaches in resolving the issue.

The following are the ten points in Nagara's review of the basic reality of the issue:

1. Mutual violence continues indefinitely with no sign of any conclusion. Militarily, there seem to be no winners, and no outright victory by either the government or the rebels seems likely;
2. The Assad government is stronger than many had expected or been led to believe. This strength lies in both his military force and political support among the population;
3. The United Nations Security Council (hereafter UNSC) Draft Resolution, based on the chemical weapons inspection team's work, only determined that chemical weapons have been used and not who had used them;
4. While Assad's government and the rebels have blamed each other for using chemical weapons, both parties have committed atrocities especially against the civilian population. None of them has a monopoly on viciousness or virtue;
5. No country or organization is obliged, required or empowered to attack another country unilaterally under international law, without the UNSC's mandate;
6. Syrian rebels are deeply divided among themselves over values, ideologies, motivations, priorities, methods, and objectives;
7. Given their differences, many rebel groups are unable to cooperate in a single, stable, credible, and cohesive government or governing coalition that is assuredly better than the present government in serving the people's needs;
8. The incompatibility among Syria's many rebels would mean some remaining in government while others would have to leave. More extremist groups also tend to be better armed, more forceful, and less constrained. Thus, they are more likely to shape the direction of government;
9. A rebel coalition government would turn on itself in time, given the vast differences among component groups;
10. Regardless of ideology of participants, any group opposing the government or sovereign state through armed struggle is universally regarded as a subversive terrorist group and a national security threat. The state in question is thus entitled to pursue it, with extreme prejudice, and by all and any means, to exterminate it.

In conclusion, Nagara outlined several likely and unlikely developments for Syria:

1. The US threat of attacking to deter against, and degrade, the use of Syria's chemical weapons, was unrealistic and not workable from the start; it might have happened but it would not have achieved what it claimed it could or wanted to;
2. Limited strikes may have helped ease Congressional approval in the US but they are not realistic in the field;
3. Given also that Syria's chemical weapons production bases are elusive or unknown, and Western intelligence on them poor, targeting them while avoiding civilian centres is highly unlikely. The situation is exacerbated when chemical weapons are mounted on mobile platforms – targeting them safely becomes sheer fantasy.

To the question of whether there is light at the end of the Syrian tunnel, Nagara surmised that that would depend on how one defines that light. But for now, the light of progress is yet to be seen.

...the international community should put pressure on Assad to bring about a peaceful solution, and it should provide more humanitarian assistance to the suffering Syrians

Professor Ilter Turan stated that though Turkey did have very good relations with Syria for decades, the situation has changed due to the civil war in Syria. He spoke about the failure of the international community, including the EU, US and Turkey, in dealing with Syria. This encompasses several areas and include the failure:

1. To see people power in the mobilisation of the revolution;
2. To see that the current regime was so ruthless in crushing the rebellion;
3. To foresee the support of the Syrian government by Iran and Russia;
4. To understand the internal political situation in Syria;

5. To gauge the extent of fragmentation of the Syrian rebel groups.

On a different note, **Colonel (R) Wolfgang Richter** discussed briefly the US-Russian special agreement and commented on the implementation plan calling for President Assad to relinquish the use of chemical weapons in Syria. The plan had a number of shortfalls:

1. It was too ambitious as the inspection of chemical weapons was taking place in the midst of the ongoing civil war;
2. Assad's government was recognised as the legitimate government so that the inspectors could be assured of their safety and immunity;
3. It was difficult to locate the chemical weapons;
4. The destruction of chemical weapons needed sophisticated expertise. Such tasks needed technical, expert and financial support from the international community, all of which were not forthcoming.

Richter said that there would be a number of implications if Syria acceded to chemical weapons control. The international community would be able to achieve a 'chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction free zone.' Assad's forces would be prohibited from using chemical weapons against the rebels in the future and Assad's government would be recognised as the sole partner to an international agreement representing Syria in accordance with international law.

He concluded that the international community should put pressure on Assad to bring about a peaceful solution, and it should provide more humanitarian assistance to the suffering Syrians.

INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (ISIS) MALAYSIA

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