

# ISIS focus

INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (ISIS) MALAYSIA

PP 5054/11/2012 (031098)

Special Edition 2015



## The 29th Asia-Pacific Roundtable: Conference Report

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The Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia has hosted the Asia-Pacific Roundtable (APR) series since its launch in 1987 to promote trust and confidence in the Asia-Pacific region. As a Track 2 forum, the APR brings together think tanks, academics, media representatives and senior government officials acting in their personal capacity to engage in candid dialogue regarding major security challenges confronting the region. Over the past two decades, the APR has gained a reputation as the premier Track 2 forum in the region, being ranked by the University of Pennsylvania's Global Go To Think Tank Index as one of the world's top 20 think tank conferences.

The APR is a project of the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), with ISIS Malaysia as the anchor institution for convening the conference. In his welcoming remarks, His Excellency Ambassador Yong Chanthalangsy, Chairman of ASEAN-ISIS, highlighted the success of ASEAN-ISIS in international and regional cooperation such as institutionalising the meetings between the head of ASEAN-ISIS and ASEAN senior officials since 1993. ASEAN-ISIS has also contributed significantly to the emergence of the Track 2 diplomatic framework and process in the region, of which the APR is a highlight. Additionally, he reiterated the important contribution of the role players and participants of the APR and their commitment to the Roundtable over the years, which has in turn propelled the APR to become one of the region's preeminent events of its kind. This year's conference saw the attendance of over 300 scholars, government officials, policymakers and opinion leaders from across Asia-Pacific and Europe.

The 29th APR was officially opened by the Honourable Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dato' Sri Mohd Najib Tun Razak, who also delivered the keynote address. Among the key issues addressed were the need for the Asia-Pacific region to come to terms with the rapid shifts in its strategic environment and the challenge to consolidate regional stability and to promote positive, predictable and peaceful relations among and between nations, especially the major powers. Additionally, the Prime Minister urged the region to be vigilant against extremists who were exploiting the latest communication technologies for propaganda and recruitment purposes. The full text of the Prime Minister's speech is appended at the end of the report.

### **The search for security in Asia-Pacific: Implications for future stability**

Despite the growing salience of security threats that transcend the nation-state, challenges to order and stability in the Asia-Pacific region are intensifying. In the



search for security, the trends of exceptional optimism and growing number of uncertainties are pointing to an unfolding paradox in the region. Such characteristics are defining the new normal in the region as it undergoes a dynamic shift in the balance of power.



*Kishore Mahbubani*



*Vikram Singh*



*Ken Jimbo*

Countries are engaging in a form of ‘hedging behaviour’ to minimise security risks and optimise economic benefits. However, in an environment of rising competition and strategic uncertainty, reciprocal hedging — unless carefully and strategically managed — runs the risks of leading to regional instability. The inevitable change in the balance of power points to the centrality of the US-Sino relationship and its wider implication on Asia-Pacific. If not properly managed by both the United States and China, the dynamics of this relationship can precipitate a shift towards more acute rivalry. This can happen, in spite of the optimistic economic growth and the ‘geopolitical miracle’ of the rapid rise of China harnessed to a peaceful, rules based ecosystem over the years.

The increasing tension that is shifting the stability of the region is manifested in two ways. First, as the economic centre shifts towards the Asia-Pacific region, a new strategic locus is emerging in an increasingly multipolar order. This is seen in the American effort to persuade countries to not join China’s initiative in setting up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Secondly, China’s growing military power and capability in cyber intrusion has also fuelled security competition and concerns in the region. This is taking root particularly in the current internal rifts within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that are attributable not just to China’s assertive rise but also increasingly vigorous American engagement with the region. This new geopolitical struggle is exerting pressure on ASEAN due to its deep economic interdependence between the United States and China. An example of such unresolved differences can be seen in the South China Sea dispute. These developments are dramatically changing the dynamics of conflict prevention and conflict management in Asia-Pacific.

Over the last year, relations between Japan and China have seen a few signals of compromise. Both nations are striving to improve ties through the increasing engagement in security dialogues. The efforts in establishing a reliable maritime communication mechanism as well as cooperating in creating a crisis management mechanism are attempts to address the new communication channels of both countries. Japan’s recent approaches to refocus on territorial defence capacity and regional security are pointing to a closer alliance with the United States. The 2014 US-Japan Defence Cooperation Guideline reflects these developments. 15 August



2015 marks the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, and Japan plans to commemorate the occasion by reaffirming the previous statements of Prime Minister Murayama, made during the 50th anniversary in 1995. It should be emphasised that Prime Minister Abe's speech should not be seen as a political challenge to any party but a commitment to the existing statements and experiences. It will, however, be 'future oriented' by including his administration's 'active stance' on international contributions.



*Jusuf Wanandi*

A key issue for ensuring long term security in Asia-Pacific is the peaceful resolution of the South China Sea dispute. Presently, China's aggressive postures on the South China Sea tend to dominate discussions and its commitment to a Code of Conduct remains opaque. ASEAN is seeking to accommodate these disputes as best as possible to prevent the rising instability from affecting maritime security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region. Arguably, it is counter productive for China to undermine Asia-Pacific's security as it is the world's largest trading power and has significant interests in maintaining open seas and a peaceful maritime environment. China's leaders ought to acknowledge the importance of balancing its global interest against its sectorial interest. Essentially, China's behaviour in the South China Sea will set an important precedent for how the world sees what China does beyond that region. ASEAN too has a pivotal role in demonstrating greater unity in favour of non-coercive approaches in dealing with this long-standing dispute.

Another impact of the current dynamics in the strategic landscape of the South China Sea is that it is fostering opportunities for the need for external balancers from countries such as Japan, Australia and perhaps even India in building ASEAN's maritime security capacity. The role of such third parties in the complex power balance relationship comes in the form of joint military exercises and training, transfers of defence equipment, and networking capability especially to Vietnam and the Philippines as the critical front line states in this dispute.

The future stability of Asia also depends on a functional regional security architecture and economic cooperation. A greater stake in the maintenance, prudence and discipline to invest in political capital is imperative to build a robust regional security architecture. ASEAN will have to play a critical role in the coming decade to retain its cohesion. In doing so, the European Union (EU) serves as an exemplary lesson in forging constructive and productive architecture, including how not to react to a crisis. ASEAN, and indeed other Asia-Pacific centric cooperative mechanisms, should take note of the consequences of EU's diminishing role due to its geopolitical incompetence. Europe's long history of endless conflicts — whether large-scale or subregional — seems to deny the alleged benefits and peace dividends brought about by deeper economic integration.

### **China's new strategic initiatives**

China is promoting 'a community of Common Destiny' as a strategic initiative to ensure peaceful coexistence between different civilisations and development models in the region. This vision is built on two prominent features — openness and inclusiveness, and 'win-win' cooperation — which seek to create an 'Asia for Asia'. The idea is to establish a sustainable environment for long-term cooperation in development and security. Although the One Belt, One Road initiative is partially based on historical trade routes, it is not limited to countries along the Belt and Road. Similarly, the AIIB is an example of how China's initiatives transcend borders; 28 out of 57 members are not from the Asian region.



*Mohamed Jawhar Hassan*





*Zha Peixin*



*Madhu Bhalla*



*Aileen SP Baviera*

It is important to highlight, however, that the sustainability of these initiatives is dependent on the concepts of cooperation, equality and mutual benefits — not just from its prime mover China — but from all participants. The AIIB and One Belt, One Road initiatives must be seen as joint enablers for all participating countries. This is because the implementation of these initiatives is a long process that cannot be realised overnight, and efforts from China alone are simply not enough. Policy coordination and partnerships are vital as success depends on the readiness of other countries to embrace and work towards developing the initiatives.

The circumstances for a Chinese-led cooperation today are also appropriate for mutual gains because there is a foundation to work on — Beijing has formed closer trade and economic relations with its partners, as well as more dynamic people-to-people relations. The latter is essential. China understands that soft power and diplomacy matter because economic ties alone do not guarantee long-term cooperation, nor do they necessarily bring respect and cooperation. China's concept of Asian development and security is to not exclude those outside the Asia-Pacific region. These powers can play a role in ensuring peace and stability in the region, provided they respect the interests of countries in the region. In essence, Beijing understands that it has to find a way to work with the interdependent, globalised nature of the world we live in today.

However, Beijing's vision of a 'Common Destiny' could be problematic because it assumes that all countries in Asia want what China wants. A 'Common Destiny' according to China has enormous implications for global geopolitics and the existing Asian political order. Beijing overlooks two key obstacles. First, most Asian countries prefer a policy of dualism in which they lean onto China for economic gains but look to the United States as a security guarantor — almost a new status quo for some parts of the region. This is best reflected through the China-ASEAN relationship and the complexity of ties that its members have with both China and the United States. ASEAN member states enjoy major bilateral and trade relations yet they face territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea. For example, Vietnam and the Philippines face uncertainties with the rise of China due to its assertiveness in the South China Sea. In fact, some have argued that Beijing's land reclamation efforts are an example of how China views its rise as an entitlement to assert its will throughout the region.

Second, other Asian countries have their own ambitions. By promoting a Chinese-led concept of 'Asia for Asia', Beijing is creating competition between its proposals and what Asian countries want to do on their own. India, for one, has a different

vision in mind for Asia — one that is more expansionist and inclusive of global players like the United States. Prime Minister Modi's joint statement with President Obama on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is a prime example. Japan will always lean towards the United States, particularly if the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) is signed — a mega free trade agreement that includes ASEAN members, namely Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. Other regional countries such as the Philippines, Thailand and South Korea are possible signatories in the future. The different policies and aspirations of these Asian states indicate that regional players are not willing to fully subscribe to a 'Common Destiny', as envisioned by China.

Most observers agree that China's proposal of a new type of power relation in the region demonstrates that it is ready to become, or at the least move close towards becoming, a regional leader. Although the AIIB and One Belt, One Road initiatives are the building blocks or stepping stones to meeting Beijing's objective of national rejuvenation, they also cannot succeed without equality and mutual benefits to all its stakeholders. It is comforting to note that this is something Beijing seems to recognise. However, the concern is that China assumes its national rejuvenation and perceived benign regional initiatives will be welcomed by all in Asia, and that its neighbours are not willing to venture out of Asia for various partnerships or have initiatives and aspirations of their own. Doing so risks destabilising the support Beijing needs to ensure the sustainability of its strategic initiatives.

#### **The European Union's security architecture and its role to strengthen peace and security**



*Khin Maung-Lynn*

Much has been said about the apparent lack of common ground between the EU and ASEAN. However, the opposite is in fact true as the EU has remained and remains committed and engaged in this region in the areas of trade, diplomacy, humanitarian assistance and training and even on security matters. The EU has been a long-term dialogue partner of ASEAN, attended every ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and remains more active than ever before. The EU is committed to ASEAN, ASEAN security issues and that of the wider region.

In a more globalised world, the regional problems and security threats faced are often reflective of the interconnected nature of world affairs today. This is especially so when dealing with non-traditional threats like terrorism, refugee crises and trans-boundary crimes that threaten to spill into the realm of more traditional security threats. Different regions are facing variations of similar issues like dealing with war and economic migrants and refugees. Global cooperation and solutions are needed to effectively tackle these global problems. Here, the EU has a role to play. One must remember that the EU is not just an economic community. It is also a foreign policy community and security and defence provider, which is engaged in matters of security not just in Europe but around the world.

The following three key features of the EU security architecture best illustrate the outlook, function and role of the EU in matters of security and how it can strengthen peace and security. First, the general values and principles of the EU itself. The organisation was set up with the aim of ending bloody wars and conflicts in Europe where up to 18 million and 60 million perished in World War One and Two respectively. It works to promote coordination among member states, promote peace, avoid conflicts and manage crises and disasters. The EU is a long-term and resource intensive effort. Its defence and security architecture include many elements besides its military such as legislative, peacebuilding and humanitarian



*The Chairman of the European Union Military Committee, General Patrick de Rousiers, addressing a crowd of more than 300 during the luncheon*

components. The use of military tools is part of a wider, diverse toolbox. This diversity is one of the many strengths of the institution and has seen its support increase globally.

Second, the makeup of the EU security architecture itself is defined by the EU Council and the councils of defence and foreign ministers. These councils that oversee a coordinating working body manage the foreign and defence aspects of the EU, including crisis management. Democracy and consensus is a feature of this working body where each state has an equal vote. The military body consists of 28 defence chiefs of member states and is the highest defence body within the EU. As different members have different security and defence threat perceptions and concerns, flexibility and discussions are a constant feature of the overall EU security architecture. The working and military bodies constantly work in partnership with other institutions and organisations including the African Union (AU) and ASEAN. Regional forums on security matters are an important platform to develop a better understanding of the EU security architecture.

*The EU has launched up to 32 missions in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and North Africa and Asia since 2003.*

The third feature is the growing EU engagement in matters of security both inside and outside Europe. The EU has launched up to 32 missions in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and North Africa and Asia since 2003. A key operation that took place in Southeast Asia was the support given to Aceh after the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami. The EU also plays a major role in the western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden, protecting the sea lanes against pirates. This proved to be a major success story for the EU with major pirate attacks notably reduced since 2012. In Africa, the EU is involved with building up the Somali infrastructure and domestic coast guard forces. It still has a military and civilian presence in Mali and the Central African Republic, where it led a yearlong bridging operation to stabilise the locality on behalf of the United Nations. The EU also continues to financially contribute to and train the AU to manage its own security initiatives. In Europe, a new and growing concern is that of the migrant and refugee crisis in the Mediterranean. While the EU is committed to aiding and rescuing refugees, it will be soon embarking on operations to detect and disrupt smuggling networks in North Africa.



There are 18 partner countries that are actively contributing to or work closely with the EU security efforts globally. They include South Korea, China, Japan, Australia and even some South American countries. This number looks set to grow.

Besides closer cooperation, strategic dialogue is a key approach in identifying problems and solutions as countries continue to face similar threats in a more connected yet contested world. It is the '5c's' — capabilities, comprehensiveness, cohesiveness, cooperation and credibility — that are the greatest strengths of the EU security architecture and make it attractive to partners and friends from outside the EU. Indeed, the EU will not be withdrawing from its responsibilities but will continue to work together with other countries and institutions towards a more secure, cooperative and prosperous world, including in Southeast Asia and the wider region.

### **ASEAN beyond 2015: What does it mean to be a community?**

On 31 December 2015, the ASEAN Community declaration will come into effect, formalising the region's aspirations for a peaceful, integrated and economically vibrant collective of nation-states. With high expectations of the ASEAN Community post-2015, ASEAN member states need to have a clear vision of the way forward, in order to navigate the challenges and opportunities in the coming decade.

An appreciation of the region's historical context is important to understand ASEAN's development trajectory. The East Asian monetary crisis in 1997 sparked the transformation of ASEAN from a loose regional association to a more robust and integrated community. Key member states of ASEAN — Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia — were severely affected by the crisis, and the idea of regional economic cooperation was proposed by Singapore. In the 2003 Bali Summit, ASEAN leaders expanded the notion beyond economic cooperation and endorsed a balanced concept of community-building based on three pillars: the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC).

A new ASEAN Charter was thus prepared in 2007 and came into force in December 2008, establishing the legal and institutional framework of ASEAN. The principles and purposes of the three pillars were elaborated in the ASEAN Charter and the Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009–2015, which contains blueprints for each of the pillars.

Although the launch of the ASEAN Community was originally set in 2020, it was later brought forward to 2015 because of the importance of regional integration.



*N Hassan Wirajuda*



*Carolina G Hernandez*



*Thitinan Pongsudhirak*



*Mohd Munir Abdul Majid*

Based on the report of the Secretary General of ASEAN at the 25th ASEAN Summit in November 2014, preparations for the implementation of the APSC, AEC and ASCC were progressing well, with 85 per cent, 82 per cent and 97 per cent of the targets met respectively. However, the statistics alone do not tell the whole story because substantive contents of the blueprints are varied. In reality, achieving consensus on the remaining action lines will be a monumental task for the ASEAN member states in the year ahead. At the moment, the implementation of the Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009–2015 is still predominantly focused on the economic pillar. Progress on the political-security and socio-cultural pillars, which also happen to be the most contentious parts of the ASEAN Community, is still slow and needs to be hastened.

The three pillars also face various challenges in implementation. For political and security cooperation, a contentious area is that of political development — in particular, the promotion of democracy and human rights. This originates from the highly diverse nature of national and domestic politics in the region where different states practise different political and administrative systems. On economic integration, the most difficult to achieve is the free flow of services due to the need to develop wholly new standards. There are also issues of non-tariff barriers to be worked out among ASEAN's more advanced economies and fears of an uneven competitive field among members that are at the early stages of development. On socio-cultural cooperation, the focus is on investment in education and human resource development — areas that tie in with larger economic development conditions. These are sectors that were previously national concerns, a role that ASEAN has yet to penetrate or have much experience in. Other core issues outlined include those of social justice and community rights and environmental sustainability, all of which ASEAN needs to comprehensively work out.

A key criticism that has been levelled against ASEAN, and one that the organisation itself acknowledges, is the lack of a people-centric aspect to its community-building. This needs to be addressed and rectified to ensure that ASEAN does not become a predominantly elite-defined community. The blueprint of the ASCC is the only one that addresses ASEAN's people development directly. It includes over 300 action lines under the six characteristics — human development, social welfare and protection, social justice and rights, ensuring environmental sustainability, building the ASEAN identity, and narrowing the development gap. However, the ASCC is often seen as an afterthought beyond the first two pillars and it is important for ASEAN to dispel that notion. The ASCC will only succeed with a people-centric approach. The organisation must redouble its efforts to obtain sufficient buy-in from ASEAN's people. There has to be sufficient national and domestic political will behind the ASCC to sustain the ASEAN Community in the long term.

What then is the way forward for ASEAN and her people? Unity among member states is more important now than ever — especially in dealing with intra- and extra-regional issues and challenges. For example, developments in the South China Sea dispute and the recent Rohingya refugee crisis affect the whole of ASEAN, or at least significant parts of the region. Member states need to work together to resolve these problems and achieve consensus. ASEAN should 'keep its eye on the ball' in terms of transnational cooperation and continue acting as a united entity as originally envisaged, especially when dealing with large, external powers outside ASEAN that compete for influence within Southeast Asia.

As ASEAN moves closer to becoming a community, it continues to face challenges in balancing national sovereignty with transnational concerns in a diverse socio-

cultural landscape. Here, ASEAN needs to decide whether it wants to amend the ASEAN Charter to remove certain constraints or to work on other instruments such as the existing blueprints to strengthen such protections and identities. The ASEAN community-building process is a long and onerous one, considering that ASEAN member states are still working on nation-building within their own countries. The three pillars need to complement each other and work together in an integrated manner, an approach that is still lacking at the moment.

### **The maritime domain: Strengthening stability, promoting confidence**

The concept of the maritime domain in Asia, especially its future, appears to be in transition. Previously, the sea used to be considered as ‘public goods’ — unclaimed by any party. Countries worked together to ensure the administration of sea lanes, to address piracy and safety concerns, and to deal with environmental challenges. Besides national boundaries and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) claims, no one country ever claimed ‘ownership’ or overt influence over the seas. However, developments over the last decade have seen this notion slowly changing. The geopolitical situation today is such that the sea is now considered as a strategic asset that needs to be controlled.

*The collective spending by Southeast Asian countries has increased from USD 14.4 billion in 2004 to USD 35.5 billion in 2013 .... By 2016, regional military expenditure is projected to exceed USD 40 billion.*

Three factors can be considered as the driving force for this gradual change. The first is the competition to secure access to energy sources at sea, due to the growing needs of regional countries for energy to fuel economic development. The second factor is the unresolved maritime-based territorial disputes, which if not managed well, would become a source of serious regional tension in the region. The third factor is the growing prospect of naval rivalry among major and regional powers.

In light of these developments, competing states in the Asia-Pacific region are hedging by purchasing more defensive and offensive naval assets to protect or enforce their maritime claims. Submarines, which serve as force deterrents, anti-access platforms and force multipliers, are gaining increasing popularity among the Southeast Asian navies. Under the pretext of responding effectively to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) missions, Southeast Asian navies are building or acquiring expeditionary and amphibious capabilities such as the Multi-Role Support Ship (MRSS), which in some cases go far beyond HADR purposes to include the projection of naval power and anti-access duties to preclude intervention from the sea.

Despite the financial crises in 1997 and 2007, naval acquisitions have continued unabated and naval modernisation remains a high priority in the national agenda, buttressed by the current economic growth. The collective spending by Southeast Asian countries has increased from USD 14.4 billion in 2004 to USD 35.5 billion in 2013 based on the report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), an increase of 147 per cent during the period. By 2016, regional military expenditure is projected to exceed USD 40 billion.

This slow shift from cooperation towards a zero-sum, winner-takes-all attitude by large powers has caused and will cause adverse repercussions overall. Tensions in the maritime domain are on the rise, leading to the higher possibility of incidents caused by miscalculations and misunderstandings. Stakeholders would be wise to remember that global economic prosperity depends on how we use the sea to promote trade flows, the sustainability of economic growth, and how contesting parties manage maritime border delimitations. In order to further enhance maritime cooperation between regional countries especially in the disputed



maritime domain of the South China Sea, concrete steps at the Track 1 and Track 2 levels have been initiated to cultivate trust and confidence.



*Rizal Sukma*



*Zhou Bo*



*Vijay Sakhuja*

At the Track 1 level, to achieve progress towards a code of conduct (COC) in the South China Sea, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry's 'Formula 3+1' concept, which has been recommended for adoption by the ARF consists of: (i) confidence-building measures and joint development mechanism to build trust among all parties; (ii) conflict prevention mechanisms to prevent the occurrence of incidents in the South China Sea; and (iii) crisis management mechanisms to handle and manage incidents which occur in the South China Sea. In addition, the 'Plus 1' focuses on maintaining conducive conditions to discuss the COC through 'early harvest' opportunities such as the initiative of hotlines between ASEAN and China in handling emergencies in the South China Sea and cooperation in the field of search and rescue (SAR) for distressed vessels at sea.

Meanwhile, it appears that China has officially adopted a dual track approach on the South China Sea issue. Firstly, relevant disputes should be addressed by countries directly concerned through consultations and negotiations. Secondly, China and ASEAN should make joint efforts in maintaining peace and stability through mutual understanding and accommodation, and through putting aside differences in favour of joint economic ventures. A platform to embark on this is the Maritime Silk Road initiative, proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. It is currently seeing some traction in the region. In order to advance the initiative, a China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund was also set up with three billion yuan in funding for the development of the maritime economy, environment, fishery, and salvage and communications at sea.



*Stephanie Lee*

At the Track 2 level, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Indonesia and the Hainan-based Centre for South China Sea Studies have collaborated to provide an informal mechanism for scholars, officials and other stakeholders to discuss maritime domain issues and challenges facing the region in their private capacities. This collaboration takes place through four working groups focusing on: (i) the implementation of the declaration on the COC; (ii) the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); (iii) maritime security; and (iv) the drafting of the COC.

Last but not least, further Track 2 efforts are carried out by the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). The CSCAP has consistently set up a number of study and expert groups to discuss maritime issues. Two most recent issues that

were discussed included principles for good order at sea and the Harmonisation of Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue. Such efforts should be further multiplied and intensified to promote confidence and ensure a stable maritime environment in Asia and the Pacific.

### **Cyber conflict: A question of when or if?**



*Elina Noor*

Unlike Northeast Asia — who have been discussing cyberwar and cyberwarfare issues for a while — stakeholders in Southeast Asia have only just begun to explore these phrases and concepts. The bulk of attention in Southeast Asia has been focused on more malicious technical issues such as malware or viruses. Strategic cyber security, however, moves beyond the technical protection of systems. The increasing civilian and military overlaps challenge the traditional understanding of security and warfare with implications for related policies. Though a cyber conflict is not likely to produce body bags, the damage it can cost a state is capable of crippling the connected nation. Most nations, especially developed, connected nations, are worried about cyber conflicts and are making preparations to not just contain and deter such attacks but to respond in kind.

Society's reliance on cyberspace is not governed by norms. Our defence of critical cyberspace infrastructure has yet to be perfected as governments may have excluded pertinent stakeholders from strategic dialogue. This vulnerability makes cyberspace an easy target for penetration. States that do not fully recognise the infrastructure related to cyberspace — such as submarine cables — are vulnerable to cyber attacks. It seems only natural for conflicts to occur in cyberspace, as they do on land, sea, air and outer space. As long as there is a penchant for war, a cyber conflict will be a matter of when. Moreover, deterrence against cyber attacks is deemed impossible and it is extremely problematic to identify the source or sources of attacks, priming cyberspace as a useful tool for states.

However, there are two pertinent issues of definitions in the cyber conflict vocabulary. The first concerns attribution while the second is in the multiplicity of attacks that can be made from cyberspace.



*Forrest Hare*

In April 2007, Estonia experienced three weeks of distributed denial-of-service attacks. The attacks began with a denial of access to government and political party websites. Then, news sites were targeted, where systems outside Estonia overwhelmed the digital based infrastructures. To function, these news sites had to block international traffic, preventing Estonia from informing the international community of their attack. By May 10, the attack had escalated and an Estonian bank, Hansabank, lost its Internet-based operations. The bank's connections to automated teller machines were also severed. The carefully orchestrated attacks had taken advantage of Estonia's heavily wired nation, destroying the functionality of its information infrastructure.

Though the attack on Estonia can clearly be seen as an attack, the incident does not declare the identity of the assailant. The virtual realm is shared by both civil and military users, making plausible deniability a tempting fog of war between nations — especially those desiring to leverage on the asymmetrical battlefield.

Cyber attacks too range from verbal or linguistic to criminal behaviour to privacy invasion and military attacks on the sovereignty of another nation's cyberspace. The attacks vary in devastation, which proves a challenge in determining which cyber attack leads to a cyber conflict. There is also a difference between cyber security

and information security. Policies made intent on content regulation and theoretical notions enjoy the ambiguity of such definitions.

Therefore, the definitions a nation chooses to base its cyber security policies on are anchored in its own national interest. Conflicts in cyberspace are increasingly reflected in physical, real-world geopolitical issues. As such, if escalated, cyber conflicts are expected to eventually manifest in kinetic warfare.



*Xu Longdi*



*Motohiro Tsuchiya*



*Caitriona H Heinl*

A key point to understand about cyber conflicts is that they are not natural occurrences outside other conflicts. Hence, steps can be taken to prevent cyber conflicts from occurring or escalating. The first is to ensure that incidents in cyberspace remain contained and do not escalate. Second, states should avoid inflicting devastating cyber attacks as they may draw a real-world response. Third, as cyber conflicts are dependent on real geopolitical conditions, the absence of kinetic military conflict will ensure cyber conflicts do not occur. Lastly, futility is a form of deterrence, where perpetrators have to be shown that ultimately, cyber conflicts will not bear any long-term positive results.

Mechanisms to reduce the possibility of cyber conflicts are anchored in diplomacy, transparency and trust-building — maintaining geopolitical stability, encouraging confidence-building measures, and developing a common understanding of international norms in cyberspace. International laws also need to be amended to make them applicable to cyberspace. Additionally, international alliances, where nation-states and international institutions address transborder attacks, will also work towards removing the ‘cyber-fog’ of war.

### **New security frontiers: The resource nexus challenge**

Global consumption of natural resources continues to increase every year. The Asia-Pacific region contributes significantly to this increase with the region set to continue undergoing sustained economic growth and urbanisation. However, the understanding of the impact of resources on strategic concerns remains complex due to interlinkages across the different resources — land, energy, food, water and minerals — where changes in one resource can have unintended consequences and repercussions on other resources. With the impacts of the exploitation of natural resources to environmental degradation becoming more pronounced, its linkages to human security are also becoming more evident. As resources become increasingly scarce, questions on whether resources have — or should have — strategic dimensions are at the core of the resource security debate.



*... markets can also contribute to exacerbating resource security challenges where action in one country in one resource could have repercussions in another country in another resource.*

In Asia-Pacific, access to and competition for natural resources have been the major drivers of strategic intervention. The resurgence of territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea is exacerbated by the lure of natural resources, such as hydrocarbon reserves and fishing grounds, around the islands. Water will arguably be the most contested resource with all the important Asian economies being in or near conditions of water stress. Additionally, most rivers in Asia are international rivers and most countries are dependent on cross flows. Deliberate actions by upstream countries as a strategic intervention can disrupt water flows downstream, and change the quality of the water. This in turn will affect the quality of the food and agricultural practices downstream. Water shortages have also prompted Asian countries to lease farmland, leading to a 21st century land grab. These scenarios demonstrate the strategic dimensions of the complex resource nexus challenge with many resources straddling international boundaries and powerful state actors as well as multiple resources with potentially damaging consequences for neighbouring states.

Market forces can play a major role in being both a driver to the resource challenges as well as a mechanism to provide a high degree of resource security. The latter is evident since the beginning of the century which saw, for example, minerals effectively being regulated by markets. With the Chinese economic boom resulting in an increase of demand and prices of minerals, markets responded by increasing the efficiency of the use of and economisation of natural resources. This eventually resulted in an oversupply of minerals with ample security for importing countries and demonstrated that market mechanisms for tradeable resources can provide a high degree of resource security.

However, markets can also contribute to exacerbating resource security challenges where action in one country in one resource could have repercussions in another country in another resource. For example, a switch to biofuels in Europe can affect agriculture, land and biodiversity in Asia while the growth of electric vehicles in Asia may promote lithium mining in Peru. These challenges can create or accentuate security concerns such as social and political tensions if left solely to the market. Essentially, good markets require government intervention to correct market distortions but whether tradeable resources warrant strategic intervention is debated.



*Brahma Chellaney*



*Ross Garnaut*



*Philip Andrews-Speed*

The mismanagement of natural resources can also result in human security challenges. Corrupt practices in the Sahel region demonstrated how food and water shortages can lead to migration and other social tensions. These challenges are not



Norodom Sirivudh

limited to rural areas and developing countries but also affect developed and urban areas. The search for shale gas in Texas, for example, has led to confrontations between its producers and farmers competing for adequate water supplies. The worst impacts of these poor production practices are often being felt by people living in the margins of existence and the most vulnerable communities. As the fastest growing region in the world, Asia-Pacific's exploitation of natural resources is contributing to environmental degradation, and if unmitigated, will potentially result in serious consequences on the ground with direct and indirect impacts on human security.

Answering the resource nexus challenge requires a holistic and integrated governance of resources. It entails utilising the nexus approach across five different sets of resources — land, energy, food, water and minerals. One major challenge is breaking down existing silo mentalities and practices in policymaking and strategising across different resource profiles, involving multiple stakeholders both intra- and inter-state.

Asian economies cannot sustain their impressive economic growth without addressing and mitigating the resource challenge. With historical evidence demonstrating that strategic and military intervention on natural resources can lead to damaging consequences along with it not being the most cost effective strategy, collaboration in various forms is required to tame Asia's sharpening resource competition. A balance between rights and obligations should be at the heart of building a harmonious cooperative relationship in all resource issues where advantages of resource cooperation outweigh the duties and responsibilities. This requires all stakeholders to commit and redouble efforts in increasing understanding and information on the nature of the resource challenge, promote the resolution of disputes, and incentivise the desired behaviours.

### The geopolitics of economic partnership arrangements in Asia-Pacific

*In an ASEAN context, the RCEP could assist in narrowing the development gap among its members while the TPP could hinder such efforts.*

Stemming the slowdown in global trade is the main impetus behind the proliferation of Economic Partnership Arrangements (EPAs) in recent time given that trade has been one of the main engines of economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region. Of the plethora of EPAs, the most well-known is the TPP agreement, currently entering its final stage of negotiations. Its comprehensive and ambitious agenda has taken the centre stage in debates and forums around the region.

The TPP's binding agreement, which covers wide ranging sectors and a set timeline for trade liberalisation, sets it apart from the other EPAs whose agreements are largely based on voluntary action and flexible timelines. As the argument goes, the TPP would dismantle trade barriers more effectively and hence provide a more conducive environment for the trade in goods and services and investments to flourish.

While all EPAs benefit the economy albeit at varying degrees, there could also be unintended negative consequences. By the nature of its rules and regulations, the twelve economies that make up the TPP could end up imposing discriminatory practices and regulations against non-members, particularly smaller closed market economies. On the other hand EPAs such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) take into account the developmental stages of a member country, making it less likely to lead to conditions that widen the income gap among its members. In an ASEAN context, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) could assist in narrowing the development gap among its members while the TPP could hinder such efforts.



*From left to right: Sulaiman Mahbob and Steven Wong*

When speaking of the TPP, some argue that the United States is not actually the original architect of the arrangement. That honour belongs to Singapore, New Zealand, Chile and Brunei, four comparatively small Asia-Pacific countries. Nevertheless, once it embraced the TPP and adopted it as a key pillar of its rebalancing towards Asia, the United States — along with other major Asia-Pacific stakeholders — has been driving the progress and shape of the TPP.

As discussions on the TPP continue, so do the criticisms. While the TPP is technically open to all, many of Asia's big economies — China, India and Indonesia, among others — prefer to adopt a wait and see approach before making any firm commitment on the TPP. Additionally, its determined drive to create free trade the like of which the region has not seen before, could potentially damage domestic economic interests of some countries — even those currently in negotiation — making it harder for governments to garner domestic support for joining such an arrangement.



*Yoshiji Nogami*

Another criticism is that while the TPP fosters closer economic ties among its members, it is likely to alter existing trade and investment trends including the all-important global supply chain at the expense of non-members such as China. China is projected to lose as much as USD 34.8 billion due to trade and investment diversions should the TPP come into full effect. What then are the long-term implications of this negative impact on the Chinese economy? Surely it would create a significant impact on the regional and global economies that are so heavily dependent on China and China's domestic political stability.

It is not surprising, therefore, that some would view the TPP as another US effort to 'contain' China's rise. Perceived as a countermeasure against this, China has increased and deepened its bilateral relations with ASEAN while championing 'rival' regional EPAs such as the RCEP (the ASEAN-10 plus its six free trade partners, excluding the United States) and the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). In addition, China has also ramped up its AIIB and One Belt, One Road initiatives in order to increase its leadership role within the region.

If the development of EPAs in the region devolves into another avenue of US-China rivalry for power, ASEAN could face a challenging time as four of its members are currently in the midst of negotiating the TPP while two more have expressed interest. Coupled with potential economic discriminatory effects of the TPP, ASEAN



could find its unity and centrality under serious pressure. The differences between the TPP standards and those of other regional EPAs also beg the question whether these EPAs are complimentary or competitive agreements. The answer depends on whether there will be any eventual convergence among the EPAs in terms of the standards among the trade agreements.

Advocates of the TPP argue that the best scenario for the future is to have the TPP's 'golden standards' of comprehensive trade agreement adopted by the other EPAs and applied across the region and beyond. In essence, the TPP would serve as the basis for a global EPA, a replacement for the stalled Doha Round talks. Such a development could lead to continuing rapid expansion of international trade, ensuring — in theory — global economic growth.



*Il Houn Lee*

For small and medium countries heavily dependent on trade, risk aversion is a particularly compelling reason to participate in such EPAs. In this scenario, concerns about the costs of not joining, rather than considerations of its potential benefits, are likely to be a bigger deciding factor in the decision to join. For these economies, it is more prudent to seek inclusiveness in the form of a 'hedged economic interdependence' or 'multiple-interdependence existence' over dependency on a single entity. The ultimate consideration for most decision makers is providing for the economic future of a country, whether it be job creation, better income distribution, bigger market access or increased economic efficiency.

When all is said and done, however, the road towards a regional economic integration in Asia-Pacific, regardless of which EPA path taken, is full of challenges. These mainly originate from a combination of factors — a contentious regional history, perceived lack of political leadership in Asia and an overbearing leadership from the West, simmering conflicts in the East and South China Seas, the ups and downs of US-China relations and their impact on the region, difficult negotiations for existing EPAs and domestic opposition to EPAs. For the short and medium term, a pluralistic EPA scenario, where multiple rules and regulations coexist, seems likely to prevail.

### **Surveying the Southeast Asian political terrain**



*Aries Arugay*

In a region as diverse and dynamic as Southeast Asia, the sometimes cloudy linkages between domestic and regional political shifts are among the more interesting issues that regional scholars and observers keep tabs on. This relationship is argued to have a 'cause-and-effect' dimension, with the transformation of domestic political structure of individual countries — as exemplified most recently by Indonesia and Myanmar — considered as the new major force or trend in Southeast Asia's wider political trajectory.

There are three variables that can structurally establish the link between the two. These are the application of democratic systems and values, the level of nationalism, and external views on Southeast Asian politics.

The application of a more open democracy primarily contributes to the widening space for active political participation. This has led to the increase in citizens' demands for better, more accountable governance in various Southeast Asian countries. Closely tied to that is the rising nationalism in several countries as triggered by populist leaders or anti-establishment movements. Combined, they depict the fundamental transformation of society where the citizens' assertiveness and ability to influence governance in the political realm have increased

tremendously. This is exemplified in the real world by the fact that Southeast Asian citizens are becoming more politically active in recent years. The third variable differs slightly from these previous two as it mainly deals with the images and standards generated by foreign perspectives on Southeast Asia. These contribute to the norms to which governments are pressured to conform, thus influencing the state's behaviour in a normative way.



*Simon Tay*



*Philips J Vermonte*



*Nicholas Farrelly*

The three variables allow observers to ascertain the likely shape of political transformation, albeit in non-exhaustive ways, that Southeast Asian countries might go through in the near future. Together they present a challenge to the opinions of those who see the rise of Southeast Asia in a simplistic manner, devoid of any thematic depth that underlies the political complexion of individual countries.

No country captures this transformation image more accurately than Indonesia. Last year's national election was the most competitive ever due to the absence of an incumbent running, a first in Indonesia. The impact of this intense competition can still be felt today as the country is witnessing a divided legislature, which poses problematic challenges to policymaking. Furthermore, the return of an opposition party to the highest levels of governance sent the message that accession to power was only possible through legitimate election. It also demonstrated how citizens were able to 'punish' parties involved in scandals and misrule, such as the huge drop of votes for the previously governing *Partai Demokrat*. Additionally, it bore the fruit of Indonesia's decentralisation programme wherein a good local leader can now compete and walk away as the victor in a national election. Lastly, it revealed a growing active participation of the younger generation in the entire election process and not just as voters.

While commendable, these developments are not without their own problems. A divided government means that President Joko Widodo must struggle to secure opposition support for each initiative. Concurrently, he needed to manage his power relations with the chairman of his own party, Megawati Sukarnoputri, who ushered him into office in the first place. Moreover, despite the widely praised democratic values of the last election, Indonesian political parties remain as the most undemocratic institutions in the country. Nevertheless, when it comes to setting the standard for further dynamic democratisation, Indonesia comes on top as the potential game-changer in the region's political arena.

*...when it comes to setting the standard for further dynamic democratisation, Indonesia comes on top as the potential game-changer in the region's political arena.*

Myanmar, however, is a different story altogether. The second quarter of 2015 saw the latest humanitarian crisis to befall the much persecuted Rohingya people, in which thousands of them were stranded drifting on the seas after they were denied entry to Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. Their Islamic faith, distinct Rohingya language and foreign physical appearance — they are often accused of being Bangladeshi illegal immigrants — have all been singled out as the main factors behind the failure of integration, leading to decades of discrimination. These tensions between the Rohingyas and the Buddhist Burmese majority are exacerbated by Buddhist nationalists' far-right discourse and actions that muster people's rejection and animosity towards this minority. As a result, ethnic boundaries are rigorously policed to maintain the alienation of the Rohingya people and persecution of or impingement on their religious rights. A small fraction of Rohingyas in Bangladesh face a roughly similar marginalisation from the government and local people, who deem the minority to be an alien component in Bangladesh's social structure.

The first step to resolving this issue is for Myanmar and Bangladesh to acknowledge that they bear joint responsibility for the fate of the Rohingyas, whether they like it or not. Expecting a 'magical solution' by other ASEAN countries or turning a blind eye to the 'boat people' crises of Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand only prolongs the suffering of the Rohingyas. Myanmar and Bangladesh must engage in regional and international diplomacy to mitigate the current problem. This effort must be endowed with effectiveness, practicality and optimism on the part of all the countries involved in the dynamics, including those who have been providing temporary settlement to illegal Rohingya immigrants. Failure-aversion and a goal-oriented attitude must be staunchly reinforced in executing a potential solution.

### **Calibrating the design of the Asia-Pacific security architecture**

For observers of the Asia-Pacific geopolitical landscape, a key factor when it comes to the regional security architecture is the growing rivalry between the United States and China, especially since the announcement of the US 'rebalance' in mid-2011. These developments have altered how regional actors look at the international relations dimension as a whole. With the status quos being challenged by both the United States and China, other stakeholders — from rising middle powers to smaller states to regional multilateral institutions like ASEAN — are inevitably feeling the heat.



*Shazainah Sharifuddin*

A key conundrum that observers face is in classifying the type of tensions that the region is going through — will it be similar to rivalries prior to the World Wars or another US-Soviet Cold War? Or is the current US-China rivalry in the Asia-Pacific region an entirely new type of competition, one in which its exact nature is still unknown? Is there a possibility of an all-out destructive rivalry, or can the great powers incorporate their strengths and work towards a mutually beneficial outcome?

In a post-Cold War world, states are seeking ways to institutionalise 'security' in order to ensure lasting peace and effective conflict management. However, it is also undeniable that despite years of tremendous efforts to nurture this desired security cooperation, most states — especially the larger powers — are still engaged in or heavily concerned about geopolitical rivalries. While it is understandable for states to prioritise their national interest and sovereignty, there needs to be a realisation that the cost of abandoning or intentionally neglecting any multilateral security cooperation will be extremely high.





*Paul Evans*

A key factor in calibrating the design of the Asia-Pacific security architecture is the need to foster more systematic dialogues and trust-building measures among states. The main intention is to inculcate the spirit and practice of dialoguing with one's neighbours, not against them. In response to the dynamics of international relations coupled with strategic transitions along the years, many security architectures have been established to adapt to the ever changing geopolitical environment.

The idea of a consociational security order (CSO) developed by the scholar Amitav Acharya best explains how interconnectedness can deter the conflicts by bringing together socio-politics, security and economic elements under the single roof of a cooperative security umbrella. At the same time, a CSO does not in any way hinder the essence of collective identities or shared-values in avoiding conflicts. Still, it is imperative for countries to recognise that conflict avoidance comes hand in hand with more material growth and development. Intertwining in nature, pacts established under the idea of a CSO often act as the mechanism that gives states no choice but to avoid conflict with each other to ensure lasting benefits.


Given the rising tensions in the region, today's security architectures are not considered ideal and need to be tweaked or changed altogether. The scopes of existing architectures, in particular, are being questioned by scholars and observers. With more global challenges emerging, there is a dire need for more serious and frequent discussion of the necessity for a broader narrative of values, norms and organising principles that currently regulate state-to-state interactions.

Taking the limited functionality of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) for example, how does the ADMM effectively deal with matters beyond their defence jurisdiction? How does it contend with ASEAN's cherished non-interference policy when there are disputes between its members? The Thailand-Cambodia border dispute and the South China Sea dispute are but two examples that have plenty of historical baggage and no permanent solution in sight.

Admittedly however, in such complex matters, there will be no security architecture that is completely error free or that expounds a seemingly perfect transformative character. Such faults are exacerbated by the absence of inter-institutional coordination, which is a stumbling block to a sturdy regional security architecture. Nevertheless, it is one of the unavoidable side-effects in the search for a better architecture for the region and, fortunately, a drawback that is anticipated and that can be fixed. Thus, stakeholders need to rethink their policies based upon the principle of consensus and which remain inclusive in nature. Stakeholders also need



*Tran Viet Thai*



*Anthony Miller*



*Zhang Zhixin*

to recognise that there will be no positive future for security cooperation in the absence of a major power accord and they should work towards that end.

Any talks of a new regional security architecture will have to take into account China's concerns — there is no way an effective architecture can be formed without its input. While China's rise was initially welcomed, little did anyone expect that China would rise as fast as it did and is now potentially poised to challenge the American hegemonic supremacy in the region and beyond. How the region and in particular the United States deals with China will have a major role in influencing how China perceives and deals with the region in turn, creating a lasting impact on the region.

Lastly, in the midst of these complexities, the utility of prevailing international laws should be re-examined and re-evaluated if necessary to ensure that they run parallel with the ever changing dynamics of the power equations. The contexts that led to the creation of some of these laws are no longer applicable and the utilisation of such legislation to solve contemporary issues could lead to unforeseen and unwanted outcomes. It is safe to say that some are no longer widely or substantively applicable and that the adaptation to contemporaneous situations and events might differ.



*Rod Smith*

### **Radicalisation redux: Bigger, badder, bolder?**

The term 'extremist' is a label used for individuals or groups who generally resort to violence in order to impose their beliefs, ideology or moral values on others. The term especially applies to individuals and factions who have become radicalised in some way. Studies have shown that many of those who join and support extremist groups are a product of the general absence of democratic, accountable governments in much of the Muslim world and — indirectly related to this — decades of state corruption, poor governance, repressive regimes, and poor development policies. Although they come from various socio-economic classes, they have witnessed or experienced rising inequality and the absence of opportunities to live dignified lives.

Since fighting began in 2012, the Syrian conflict has attracted a stream of frustrated, enraged young Muslims from around the world who have travelled to Syria, joining Islamist groups fighting the Assad regime. There are an estimated 20,000 foreign fighters from 80 countries affiliated to such groups. These groups include but are not restricted to Jabhat al-Nusra, an Al-Qaeda affiliate, and a collection of groups initially linked to Al-Qaeda in Iraq before morphing into the so called Islamic State (IS) in April 2013.

It is important to realise that the IS is not only a terrorist group. It is political and military organisation that holds a radical interpretation of Islam as a political philosophy and seeks to impose that worldview by force on Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Its goal is to consolidate and expand control of its territory in Iraq and Syria and, in the next stage, to advance into neighbouring Sunni countries. The IS rhetoric is not only reaching jihadi ideologues and sympathisers in the Middle East, but is also taking root in such groups in Southeast Asian, African and even Western countries. Its initial successes in battle appears to have galvanised jihadi activity among certain groups and, to a degree, its message also seems to unify them. In a Southeast Asian context, its achievements to date and slick messaging have and will continue to attract recruits from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand to the movement.











However, the real long-term threat to and concern for the region actually lies beyond the recruitment of militants who aid and abet IS operations across Iraq and Syria.



*Iftekahr Ahmed*



*Noor Huda Ismail*



*Saifuddin Abdullah*

IS militants pose a greater threat when they eventually return home than when they are fighting in the Middle East. Militants who spend time in the centre of IS activity among fellow violent extremists may return with their radical ideas endorsed. They would then bring their experience and capacity to train others to carry out acts of terrorism. Upon their return, they may also revive and inspire other militant groups to act on their radical beliefs.

Returning militants do not only consist of battle-hardened fighters, but may also include engineers, logisticians, propagandists with social media acumen and others, whose collective abilities have the potential to cause serious harm in the region in unforeseen ways. Beyond guns and bombs, militants with these campaign-hardened skills may prove more effective at undermining or destabilising governments, disrupting aid and development programmes, disrupting economic activity and financial institutions and, in some cases, spreading their general influence through subtle propaganda.

*Muslim societies must engage in a process of genuine self-examination and grapple with ... why they have failed to build stable religious and other institutions capable of helping their societies adapt to a rapidly changing world.*

In countering this radicalism and extremism, new strategies and methods ought to be adopted to prevent radicals from becoming a real, sustained threat. First, it could be time for a 'Group of Wise Persons' to be set up to examine the problem threadbare, take into account the multiple views and possible solutions, and make recommendations applicable to both regional and global issues. It is also high time for Muslim religious scholars, across different schools of Islam and from around the world to come together and explain the *maqasid al-shariah* — the higher objectives of the *shariah*, which have been distorted and abused by radical Islamic preachers. This would entail not just developing a counter narrative of Islam and its concepts of struggle but a re-telling of the narrative.

Second, the decline of the centuries-old tradition of *ijtihad* — the ever evolving interpretation of the Quran by religious clerics — has led to rigid and narrow interpretations of religious precepts. Muslim societies must engage in a process of genuine self-examination and grapple with the complicated question of why they have failed to build stable religious and other institutions capable of helping their societies adapt to a rapidly changing world.

Third, all stakeholders must work towards promoting regional and international cooperation through establishing a network of civil society groups and developing a guide for the public and private sectors to enhance their collaboration in combating extremist views. There should also be increased focus on aiding local communities in their efforts to take on extremist propaganda.

Fourth, there is a dire need to introduce a de-radicalisation related syllabus in the education curriculum for schools, colleges and universities in the Muslim world. Such a syllabus should ideally focus on the proper role of religion as espoused by the Quran, the value of inter-religious dialogue, and the need for respect and understanding of others.

Last, and most importantly, there is a need to fight radicalism, extremism and terrorism with human development, specifically social and economic development. Such an approach should emerge as a new public narrative and long-term objective for a smarter, more effective effort at strategic counter-terrorism. The struggle against extremism will not be won until the countries in which extremists thrive become truly democratic and work for the best interest of their citizens. Good governance is an important part of the 'recipe' for fighting against extremism.

*This report was compiled by **Mr Thomas Daniel**, with the assistance of **Dr Abdul Wahed Jalal, Mr Alizan Mahadi, Ms Farlina Said, Dr Jun-E Tan, Ms Michelle Kwa, Mr Muhammad Sinatra, Ms Nur Izzati Kamrulbahri, Ms Puteri Nor Ariane Yasmin, Mr Woo Hon Weng and Ms Zarina Zainuddin.***





## Keynote Address and Official Opening

by

**The Hon Dato' Sri Mohd Najib Tun Razak**  
**Prime Minister of Malaysia**

1 June 2015



I am delighted to be here this evening. To those of you who have just arrived from abroad, it gives me great pleasure to welcome you to Kuala Lumpur and to the 29th Asia-Pacific Roundtable (APR). I am aware that for many of you, this is not the first time you have participated in this Roundtable. To those of you: welcome back.

The history and reputation of the APR speak for itself. Over the years, this Roundtable has proven to be a significant feature of Track Two policy discussions in this region. I wish to commend ISIS Malaysia and the ASEAN-ISIS network for convening this annual gathering. It has never been more important for thought-leaders from Asia Pacific and beyond to deliberate on the issues and developments affecting the region.

*The migrant issue should be resolved at the ASEAN level with assistance from other countries and international bodies as needed ...*

The insights and analyses coming from conferences such as this will help governments make important decisions and formulate long-term policies, initiatives and programmes.

Over the next two days, I encourage you to engage in frank and robust discussions about the key challenges facing the Asia Pacific region.

Many of these challenges need to be addressed at a regional level. For example, I am deeply concerned by the plight of the Rohingya migrants trying to reach our shores. I was particularly shocked by the discovery of graves of alleged victims of people smugglers along the Malaysia-Thailand border. We must find and punish those responsible. The migrant issue should be resolved at the ASEAN level with assistance from other countries and international bodies as needed — only if countries work in unison can we defeat this trade in human misery.

Another pressing challenge, of course, is the need to consolidate regional stability and to promote positive, predictable and peaceful relations among and between nations, especially the major powers.

We need to make common cause, maximise the opportunities for collaboration and carefully manage any potential sources of tensions.

Stability is one of those words that can mean different things to different people. Standard definitions may convey a sense of permanence. We are so used to mentioning 'stability' in conjunction with words like 'preserve' and 'maintain'. A desire for stability could therefore be easily confused with a demand that everything remains the same, with familiarity prized and change treated with caution.

But the history of Asia-Pacific shows that it has always been a region characterised by profound change. In recent decades the region has witnessed the most dramatic improvements in living standards in modern human history. And along with these improvements have come shifts in mindsets and expectations.

*... the ongoing shifts in the distribution of power and influence in Asia-Pacific should not necessarily be seen as inherently threatening .... regional stability does not hinge on wishing away or seeking to prevent these changes.*

Thirty years ago, the average annual per capita income of developing nations in East Asia and the Pacific was USD 440. Today, that number is closer to USD 3,600. Malaysia's own per capita GDP has more than doubled from about USD 4,000 to USD 10,500 over the last decade.

The most dramatic growth has taken place in China, where real incomes have risen over twelve-fold in the past three decades. As a result, over half a billion people have been raised out of extreme poverty within a single generation.

This phenomenon certainly represents a giant leap for mankind. It has given rise to a genuine desire among the peoples of this region to see that their nations are accorded their rightful roles and status in the world — to be treated with respect and with dignity.

These ongoing changes in regional expectations and ambitions present some very interesting perspectives. Are they inconsistent with stability? Or could they be positive contributions to stability? Similarly, the ongoing shifts in the distribution of power and influence in Asia-Pacific should not necessarily be seen as inherently threatening.

In facing these challenging changes, we have to ask whether the structures of regional and global governance designed for a different era should remain static, or whether new structures and institutions should be more appropriate to ensure stability for the future.

Asia-Pacific needs to come to terms with the rapid shifts in its strategic environment. We need to realise that regional stability does not hinge on wishing away or seeking to prevent these changes. In fact, failure to properly accommodate and respond to them could create the conditions that could lead to instability.

The current trajectory towards global multipolarity is set to continue in the coming decades. The United States will remain a power of major consequence in Asia-Pacific, despite claims by some that we are witnessing the twilight of America's role and interest in the region.

At the same time, other major powers — China, India and Japan — will increasingly want to shape outcomes in ways that reflect their preferences and interests. Other key regional players, including ASEAN, will also have ample opportunities to shape the environment of Asia-Pacific. We should recognise that all can make significant contributions towards peace, security and stability.

I am confident that this transition towards an evolving strategic landscape, where power and influence are more evenly distributed, can be managed peacefully. Yes, we will have to account for a greater multiplicity of interests. Some of those interests will coincide, while others will not.

But, given the spirit of cooperation, dialogue and community-building that exists in Asia-Pacific, we should be able to strike a healthy balance in the spirit of mutual benefit and coexistence.

Deeper economic integration is key to this.

While governments play a major role in promoting integration, let us not underestimate the transformative effects of what businesses and people can achieve. Nothing can produce a stronger and more enduring foundation for good relations between nations than understanding, empathy and mutual-identification at the people-to-people level.

*... Malaysia, in principle, welcomes the plans for further cooperation from ASEAN's dialogue partners, including China's One Belt, One Road initiative and India's Act East Asia policy.*

These are among the reasons why my government is a strong proponent and supporter of initiatives such as ASEAN's Post-2015 Connectivity Agenda. This is also why Malaysia, in principle, welcomes the plans for further cooperation from ASEAN's dialogue partners, including China's One Belt, One Road initiative and India's Act East Asia policy.

In matters where our interests diverge, we need to adopt a firm reliance on the basic and fundamental rules and principles that govern inter-state relations. Whether we are managing disputes over access to resources, over territorial or jurisdictional rights, or any other issues that impinge on the interests of any nation, the rule of law must reign supreme.

This must be true in established domains such as land, sea, air and outer space, and in the emergent one of cyberspace, where many interesting debates are continuing to unfold.

Supplementing this respect for international law should be a strong commitment towards cooperation, mutual respect and the recognition that our destinies as nations are ultimately linked, regionally and globally.

This year is a meaningful year for ASEAN, and especially so for Malaysia as we are the Chair of ASEAN. By the end of 2015, it is our duty to establish the ASEAN Community. We have come a long way since 1967.

ASEAN today is a community of 10 member states united in diversity. We still have differing political systems and different levels of development, and our peoples are marked by a rich cultural, ethnic and linguistic mix. But this diversity is also potentially our greatest strength.

It is in recognition of ASEAN's combined growing citizenry and market of more than 630 million that Malaysia has chosen for our chairmanship the theme, 'Our People,



Our Community, Our Vision'. A people-centred ASEAN is one that will prosper with high standards of governance, sustainable development, respect for human rights, and women's empowerment.

*We reject ...  
messages of  
violence and  
extremism  
just as we reject  
terrorism,  
violence and  
extremism  
in all forms.*

There is much work to be done, of course — even and especially beyond 2015. But this is ASEAN's time.

ASEAN is the fourth largest exporting bloc in the world with a combined GDP of USD 2.5 trillion. By 2020, that figure is projected to increase to USD 4 trillion. We comprise the third largest workforce globally, and our youthful demographic is another positive indicator of our continued growth.

Prospects look promising, too, for the wider Asia-Pacific. The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific estimates that 60 per cent of the world's youth between the ages of 15 and 24 reside in this region. Youth unemployment in Asia Pacific is also among the lowest in the world, at 11 per cent.

The young are an incredibly spirited, vibrant and versatile part of our nations. They will form the future. The technological innovations of recent decades are second nature to them. These innovations have helped to transform our region and bring prosperity to our peoples.

But there is a flipside to this, one that we must be wary, too. Extremists are also adapting and exploiting technology in sophisticated ways for purposes of propaganda and recruiting terrorists. Let me be clear. We reject their messages of violence and extremism just as we reject terrorism, violence and extremism in all forms.

This region has for centuries been enriched by the assimilation and integration of different peoples, cultures and traditions. We must therefore proactively propagate a narrative of moderation, tolerance and peace. This is not just a counter-narrative to the one spread by the extremists. It is in fact our heritage.

This fight against extremism must be waged in the mind, articulated in speech and amplified in cyberspace so that the battle zones of today do not become breeding grounds for misguided ideologies to be exported abroad. In this regard, technology can be our ally, and we must use it skilfully to uphold our own peaceful, moderate traditions.

*... energy, land  
management and  
water resource  
planning should  
be coordinated —  
seamlessly rather  
than in isolation.*

Material achievements are but one measurement of success. In our eagerness to connect, progress and prosper, we must also be mindful of our responsibilities to the environment and what we leave for future generations.

We have witnessed for ourselves how natural disasters have increased in frequency and intensity across the world. This certainly calls for greater international cooperation in disaster management. Climate change has also amplified the problem of resource depletion.

Water, energy and land — three crucial resources for development and human well-being — are under increasing strain not only due to climate change, but also because of price volatility and population growth. At current rates, demand for energy and water will have grown by 40 per cent by 2030, and by 50 per cent for food. This risks a new and dangerous scramble for resources.

Our aim should be to prevent and preempt such an escalation. This means that energy, land management and water resource planning should be coordinated — seamlessly rather than in isolation. And we in the Asia-Pacific region can certainly lead the way in managing our resources with sustainability and stability foremost in our minds.

The challenges for Asia-Pacific are many. But so are the opportunities. In my interactions with other heads of government, it is clear to me that there is a great genuine desire to harness the great potential of our region and address any difficulties in a collaborative, accommodating and constructive way.

But this determination should not be confined to those at the leadership level. We all share a collective responsibility to ensure that our words, deeds and actions contribute towards the region's stability, security and prosperity.

Whether as officials who make important decisions, or as scholars and journalists who deliberate on and frame the discourse on key issues, you have the ability and obligation to make a profound and lasting contribution to a positive future for the Asia-Pacific region.

I would therefore like to encourage you all, the participants of this 29th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, to adopt a balanced and constructive approach towards the issues to be discussed over the next couple of days.

It is easy to highlight what and where the problems are. It is a lot more difficult to arrive at practical and realistic solutions. I urge you to take that difficult road, and, in the process, make a real difference to Asia-Pacific and to the world.

It is with great pleasure that I now declare the 29th Asia-Pacific Roundtable open. May you all have a very successful conference.

Thank you.



## Programme

### DAY 1: 1 JUNE 2015

1930 **ARRIVAL OF GUESTS**

2000–2200 **WELCOMING DINNER AND KEYNOTE ADDRESS**

#### **WELCOMING REMARKS**

**HE Amb Yong CHANTHALANGSY**

Chairperson, ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) &  
Director General, Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA), Lao PDR

#### **KEYNOTE ADDRESS AND OFFICIAL OPENING**

**The Hon Dato' Sri MOHD NAJIB Tun Razak**

Prime Minister of Malaysia

### DAY 2: 2 JUNE 2015

0800–0900 **REGISTRATION**

0900–1015 **PLENARY SESSION 1**

#### **THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY IN ASIA-PACIFIC: IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE STABILITY**

Despite the growing salience of security threats that transcend the nation-state — such as radicalisation and disease pandemics — challenges to order and stability in the Asia-Pacific region are intensifying. This session will examine the strategies of major and middle powers in Asia-Pacific. It will serve as a scene-setter for the subsequent sessions by taking a step back from current day-to-day events and adopting a long-term perspective on stability in the region. How are the major and middle powers seeking to promote their long-term interests amid uncertainties over the future shape of the Asia-Pacific strategic environment? What can be done to promote stability in relations between the major powers?

*Chair:*

**Mr Jusuf WANANDI**

Co-Founder & Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia

*Speakers:*

**Prof Kishore MAHBUBANI**

Dean, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy,  
National University of Singapore (NUS)

**Mr Vikram SINGH**

Vice President, National Security and International Policy,  
Center for American Progress, USA

**Dr Ken JIMBO**

Senior Fellow, The Tokyo Foundation, Japan



1015–1045

## REFRESHMENTS

1045–1200

## PLENARY SESSION 2

### CHINA'S NEW STRATEGIC INITIATIVES

In recent years, China has promoted a number of strategic initiatives. These include a New Type of Major Country Relations, the New Asian Security Concept, the Asia-Pacific Dream, as well as the One Belt, One Road initiative (the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road). This session is aimed at examining these initiatives from a broad strategic perspective. What do they say about China's view of its role in the world and in Asia-Pacific, in particular? What do the more conceptual initiatives such as the New Asian Security Concept and the Asia-Pacific Dream actually mean? What are the strategic imperatives that underpin these initiatives? What have been the reactions of other Asia-Pacific countries?

*Chair:* **Tan Sri Dato' Seri Mohamed JAWHAR Hassan**  
Chairman, The New Straits Times Press &  
former Chairman & Chief Executive, Institute of Strategic and  
International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia

*Speakers:* **HE Amb ZHA Peixin**  
Member, Foreign Policy Advisory Group,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China

**Dr Madhu BHALLA**  
Professor of Chinese Studies (Ret.), Department of East Asian Studies,  
University of Delhi, India

**Prof Dr Aileen SP BAVIERA**  
Professor, The Asian Center,  
University of the Philippines (Diliman)

1200–1330

## LUNCH

Hosted by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS)

### DISTINGUISHED LUNCHEON ADDRESS

#### THE EUROPEAN UNION'S SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND ITS ROLE TO STRENGTHEN PEACE AND SECURITY

*Chair:* **Mr KHIN Maung Lynn**  
Joint Secretary, Myanmar Institute of Strategic and  
International Studies (Myanmar ISIS)

*Speaker:* **General Patrick de ROUSIERS**  
Chairman, European Union Military Committee

1330–1500

## PLENARY SESSION 3

### ASEAN BEYOND 2015: WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE A COMMUNITY?

Following its declaration as a Community on 31 December 2015, higher expectations will be placed on ASEAN's capacity and resolve to enhance its economic vibrance, promote peace and security, and engender a stronger regional identity among its

people. This session will discuss concrete and specific steps that can be taken to meet those expectations, including the possible review of the ASEAN Charter and institutions. What should be the priorities for ASEAN's Post-2015 Vision? What are the main opportunities and challenges that ASEAN will face over the coming decade? If the ASEAN Community is 'a process, not an event', what should that process look like?

*Chair:* **Tan Sri Dato' Dr Mohd MUNIR Abdul Majid**  
Chairman, Bank Muamalat Malaysia & Board Member,  
Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia

*Speakers:* **Dr N HASSAN Wirajuda**  
Co-Founder, The Indonesia School of Government and Public Policy &  
former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia

**Prof Emeritus Dr Carolina G HERNANDEZ**  
Founding President & Vice Chair,  
Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS), The Philippines

**Dr THITINAN Pongsudhirak**  
Director, Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS) &  
Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand

1500-1515 **BREAK**

1515-1630 **PLENARY SESSION 4**

#### **THE MARITIME DOMAIN: STRENGTHENING STABILITY, PROMOTING CONFIDENCE**

This session will explore how stability and confidence can be promoted in the Asia-Pacific maritime domain even as countries place greater emphasis on asserting their territorial and jurisdictional claims, protecting critical sea-lines of communication, and exploiting maritime resources. What are the implications of maritime connectivity initiatives such as China's Maritime Silk Route and Indonesia's Global Maritime Axis? What are the kinds of capabilities being acquired for regional navies and coast guards to these and other ends? What concrete steps can be taken to cultivate trust and confidence as well as further enhance maritime cooperation between regional countries?

*Chair:* **HE Amb Stephanie LEE**  
New Zealand Ambassador to ASEAN

*Speakers:* **Dr RIZAL Sukma**  
Executive Director, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),  
Indonesia

**Senior Colonel ZHOU Bo**  
Director, Centre for International Security Cooperation,  
Ministry of National Defence, China

**Dr Vijay SAKHUJA**  
Director, National Maritime Foundation, India

1630-1645 **REFRESHMENTS**

**DEBATE: CYBER CONFLICT IS SIMPLY A QUESTION OF WHEN, NOT IF**

Despite growing awareness of the significance of cyber space to national security, ambiguity persists over whether an attack in cyber space can ever amount to an armed attack or war. Commentators are split between the extremes of the inescapability of a cyber ‘Pearl Harbour’ and the assured counterpoint that cyber war will not take place. This session will feature two panellists debating each side of the motion that cyber conflict is inevitable. In arguing their case, debaters will be encouraged to clarify concepts such as cyberwarfare, consider what espionage and subversion mean for national security, and examine the implications of cyber attacks on warfare and law. After the debate, the moderator will provide an opportunity for each panellist to offer a summation of his/her insights beyond the confines of the debate.

*Moderator:*     **Ms Elina NOOR**  
 Director, Foreign Policy and Security Studies,  
 Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia

*Debaters:*     **Colonel Dr Forrest HARE**  
 Air Attaché, Embassy of the United States in Kuala Lumpur

**Dr XU Longdi**  
 Director, Centre for Cyber Security & Research Fellow,  
 China Institute of International Studies (CIIS)

**Prof Dr Motohiro TSUCHIYA**  
 Professor, Graduate School of Media and Governance,  
 Keio University, Japan

**Ms Caitriona H HEINL**  
 Research Fellow, Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS),  
 S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS),  
 Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

**DINNER**

Hosted by the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Malaysia

**DAY 3: 3 JUNE 2015****PLENARY SESSION 6****NEW SECURITY FRONTIERS: THE RESOURCE NEXUS CHALLENGE**

The increase in resource use in Asia-Pacific has been above the world average. As these resources become increasingly scarce, governments and corporations have rushed to stake their claims, thus raising the potential for tensions in various parts of the region. The session will revolve around competition over finite natural resources and the challenges posed to Asia-Pacific stability. How will resource scarcity and volatility affect regional security? How do defence establishments look at future resource-related scenarios? What are the new growth and disruptive innovations around the corner? How can markets be shaped by regulators to encourage long-term mitigating and adaptive measures?



*Chair:* **HRH Prince Norodom SIRIVUDH**  
Founding Chairman, The Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP) & Privy Counselor to His Majesty the King, Cambodia

*Speakers:* **Prof Dr Brahma CHELLANEY**  
Professor of Strategic Studies, Centre for Policy Research, India

**Dr Philip ANDREWS-SPEED**  
Head & Principal Fellow, Energy Security Division,  
Energy Studies Institute, National University of Singapore (NUS)

**Prof Dr Ross GARNAUT**  
Professorial Research Fellow in Economics & Vice Chancellor's Fellow,  
University of Melbourne, Australia

1015–1045

**REFRESHMENTS**

1045–1200

**PLENARY SESSION 7**

**THE GEOPOLITICS OF EPAs IN ASIA-PACIFIC**

Asia-Pacific countries of varying configurations are engaged in negotiations for a number of region-wide economic partnership arrangements (EPAs). These include the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), with a 'collective strategic study' being initiated for the Free Trade Area for the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). This session will explore the implications of regional EPAs, with a focus towards how countries are using them to hedge and diversify their strategic relationships while promoting their economic competitiveness. What explains the existence of competing proposals for regional EPAs? How do these EPAs shape the Asia-Pacific strategic environment?

*Chair:* **Tan Sri Dato' Sri Dr SULAIMAN Mahbob**  
Chairman, Telekom Malaysia & Board Member,  
Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia

*Speakers:* **Amb Yoshiji NOGAMI**  
President, The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) &  
former Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Japan

**Dato' Steven WONG**  
Deputy Chief Executive, Institute of Strategic and International Studies  
(ISIS) Malaysia

**Dr Il Hounng LEE**  
President, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP),  
Republic of Korea

1200–1330

**LUNCH**

Hosted by HE Dr Makio Miyagawa, Ambassador of Japan to Malaysia

**SURVEYING THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN POLITICAL TERRAIN**

The diversity in Southeast Asian political systems means that the region will constantly witness shifts — whether minor or otherwise — in the domestic landscapes of any number of ASEAN countries. With elections anticipated in Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand over the next two years, the region may well see significant — perhaps even unprecedented — political transitions over that period. In Indonesia, the election of President Joko Widodo has been widely heralded as a new dawn for that country. Where is Southeast Asian politics generally headed? What are the challenges for the ASEAN Political-Security Community as it seeks to contribute towards the ‘building of a peaceful, democratic, tolerant, participatory and transparent community’?

*Chair:* **Dr Aries ARUGAY**  
Executive Director, Institute of Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS), The Philippines

*Speakers:* **Assoc Prof Simon TAY**  
Chairman, Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) & Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore (NUS)

**Dr Philips J VERMONTE**  
Head, Department of Politics and International Relations, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia

**Dr Nicholas FARRELLY**  
Fellow, The Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs & Director, ANU-IU Pan Asia Institute, Australian National University (ANU)

**CALIBRATING THE DESIGN OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY ARCHITECTURE**

This session will discuss what practical steps can be taken to strengthen the existing regional security arrangements and processes. What accounts for the persistent calls for calibrating the design of the regional security architecture? What should be the priority issues for the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus)? Should the EAS evolve from a leaders-led dialogue into a platform for providing strategic guidance to other regional forums, such as the ADMM Plus and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF)? Can ASEAN maintain its centrality and should it be at the ‘driver’s seat’? What precisely should the security architecture be able to do in order to be judged as sufficiently capable of managing challenges to order and stability in Asia-Pacific?

*Chair:* **Pengiran Datin SHAZAINAH Pengiran Dato Shariffuddin**  
Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade & Representative, Brunei Darussalam Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (BDIPSS)

*Speakers:* **Prof Dr Paul EVANS**  
Professor, Institute of Asian Research & Liu Institute for Global Issues, The University of British Columbia, Canada

**Dr TRAN Viet Thai**

Deputy Director-General & Director, Institute for Foreign and Strategic Studies, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV)

**Prof Dr Anthony MILNER**

Tun Hussein Onn Chair in International Studies,  
Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia

**Dr ZHANG Zhexin**

Research Fellow, The Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS),  
China

1615–1700

**REFRESHMENTS**

1700–1815

**PLENARY SESSION 10**

**RADICALISATION REDUX: BIGGER, BADDER, BOLDER?**

The last few years have seen an upsurge in violence by radical groups, with new players entering the scene — the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) being the most prominent. This session will focus on the rapid spread of extreme ideologies, from conflict zones in the Middle East and Africa to other parts of the world, including Western Europe and Asia Pacific. What explains the appeal of these radical groups across such a wide geographical footprint? How can governments and civil society organisations counter the spread of radicalisation and extremism?

Chair:

**HE Mr Rod SMITH PSM**

Australian High Commissioner to Malaysia

*Speakers:*

**Dr Iftekhar Ahmed CHOWDHURY**

Principal Research Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS),  
National University of Singapore (NUS) &  
former Foreign Minister, Bangladesh

**Mr Noor Huda ISMAIL**

Founder, Institute for International Peace Building, Indonesia

**Dato' SAIFUDDIN Abdullah**

Chief Executive Officer, Global Movement of Moderates (GMM) &  
Chairman of Youth Academy, Malaysia

1815–1830

**CLOSING REMARKS**

**Tan Sri RASTAM Mohd Isa**

Chairman & Chief Executive,  
Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia



## Organisers



### INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (ISIS) MALAYSIA

The Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia was established on 8 April 1983 as an autonomous, not-for-profit research organisation. ISIS Malaysia has a diverse research focus which includes economics, foreign policy, security studies, nation-building, social policy, technology, innovation and environmental studies. It also undertakes research collaboration with national and international organisations in important areas such as national development and international affairs.

ISIS Malaysia engages actively in Track Two diplomacy, and promotes the exchange of views and opinions at both the national and international levels. The Institute has also played a role in fostering closer regional integration and international cooperation through forums such as the Asia-Pacific Roundtable, the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) and the Network of East Asian Think-Tanks (NEAT). ISIS Malaysia is a founding member of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) and manages the Council's Secretariat.

As the country's premier think-tank, ISIS Malaysia has been at the forefront of some of the most significant nation-building initiatives in the nation's history. It was a contributor to the Vision 2020 concept and was consultant to the Knowledge-Based Economy Master Plan initiative.



### ASEAN INSTITUTES OF STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (ASEAN-ISIS)

The ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) is a network of non-governmental organisations registered with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Formed in 1988, its founding membership comprises the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) of Indonesia, the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) of Malaysia, the Institute of Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS) of the Philippines, the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), and the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS) of Thailand. Its purpose is to encourage cooperation and the coordination of activities among ASEAN scholars and analysts, and to promote policy-oriented studies and exchanges of information and viewpoints on various strategic and international issues affecting Southeast Asia's and ASEAN's peace, security and well-being.

ASEAN-ISIS is composed of the region's leading think-tanks: CSIS Indonesia, ISIS Malaysia, ISDS Philippines, SIIA, ISIS Thailand, Brunei Darussalam Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (BDIPSS), Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP), the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV), Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA) of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, and the Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International Studies (MISIS).



UEM Group Berhad (UEM Group) is an integrated engineering-based infrastructure and services group with an established track record and global operations. It has four core business divisions, namely: Expressways, Township & Property Development, Engineering & Construction, and Asset & Facility Management.

UEM Group has the ability, expertise and experience to deliver key national projects for the public and private sectors — spanning expressways, bridges, buildings, urban transit, water infrastructure, airports, hospitals, township and property development, and asset and facility management services. Since 1988, it has completed infrastructure, transportation and building projects in Malaysia totaling more than USD 8.2 billion.

UEM Group has assets totaling USD 6.0 billion (RM 19.7 billion) and shareholders' funds of approximately USD 2.2 billion (RM 7.1 billion) as at end December 2013. It operates via 20 major operating companies, three of which are listed on local and international bourses, and has human resources of more than 15,000 including 2,500 technical professionals. Its headquarters is in Kuala Lumpur, with presence in various countries around the globe including Australia, Brunei, Canada, India, Indonesia, Singapore, the Middle East, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.



The Embassy of the People's  
Republic of China in Malaysia

Asia Pacific's progress and development benefit from regional peace and stability. Despite uncertainties and challenges, China stands ready to expand dialogues, build confidence, deepen pragmatic cooperation and advance regional economic integration with other regional and international parties so as to enhance peace, stability and prosperity in the region.

China has been supporting and will continue to support the establishment of the ASEAN Community during Malaysia's Chairmanship, which will promote the regional integration process to a new phase. As a long-standing cooperative partner of the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia, the Chinese Embassy is honoured to sponsor the 29th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, which has been an effective platform for all parties to exchange views on security and other regional and international issues of common concern.



The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) is a political foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany. Through its international activities and projects, it promotes democracy and respect for human rights, the rule of law and social market economy, peaceful resolution of conflicts, and exchanges between cultures and religions. Its regional office in Singapore offers training programmes and grants, publishes research projects, encourages international dialogue and understanding, supports and organises international conferences and seminars around the ASEAN Plus Three region, and promotes the strengthening of the relations between Asia and Europe. Its main partners in Asia are think-tanks, political institutions and civil society organisations.

## *Sponsors*



The Japan Foundation was established in 1972 as a special legal entity to undertake international cultural exchange and was subsequently reorganised as an independent administrative institution in October 2003. The purpose of the Foundation is to contribute to a better international environment, and to the maintenance and development of harmonious foreign relationships with Japan, through deepening other nations' understanding of Japan, promoting better mutual understanding among nations, encouraging friendship and goodwill among the peoples of the world, and contributing to the world in culture and other fields through the efficient and comprehensive implementation of international cultural exchange activities. The Foundation consists of a head office in Tokyo, a branch office in Kyoto, two Japanese-language institutes and 23 overseas offices in 21 countries. It carries out its programmes and activities in three major categories: Arts and Cultural Exchange; Japanese-Language Education Overseas; and Japanese Studies and Intellectual Exchange.




New Zealand values its long-standing partnerships in Asia-Pacific, a fast-growing and dynamic region in which New Zealand will continue to play an active and substantial role. New Zealand connects with the region through political and security ties, economic relationships and people-to-people links. In addition to further leveraging its Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), FTA negotiations with India, Russia and Korea continue. New Zealand's relationship with the ASEAN grouping remains central to its diplomacy in Asia-Pacific and the 'NZ Inc' ASEAN strategy continues to underpin its engagement.

The global economic crisis highlights the need for active participation by all players in the regional architecture, which also includes the East Asia Summit (EAS). New Zealand supports efforts towards regional integration through both the ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) processes, as well as advancing the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations. New Zealand welcomes this opportunity to sponsor the 29th Asia-Pacific Roundtable.



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**Published by**

**Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia**

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